

EVACUATION OF TEXAS.

TRANSLATION OF THE

REPRESENTATION

ADDRESSED

TO THE SUPREME GOVERNMENT

BY

GEN. VICENTE FILISOLA,

IN DEFENCE OF HIS HONOR,

AND EXPLANATION OF HIS OPERATIONS AS COMMANDER-IN-
CHIEF OF THE

ARMY AGAINST TEXAS.

COLUMBIA:

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PREFACE.

THE translator, in publishing the following expose of general Filisola, in the English language, has had in view no other object than the satisfaction he thought it would give his fellow-citizens of Texas, and the friends of freedom throughout the world, to see an acknowledgment, by their own commander-in-chief, of the inefficiency of an army, composed at the commencement of the campaign, of nearly 8,000 men, and their total defeat, by so small a band as that which fought at San Jacinto.

It will forcibly strike every one, on reading the following account of the situation of the Mexicans after Santa Anna's defeat, that their entire army was in the power of the Texians, and, as they may be condemned for not following up that victory, a few words here, in justification of their conduct, it is hoped, will not be deemed impertinent or intrusive.

Nearly the same expressions made use of by Filisola, may be here repeated in their vindication: the

men, by incessant marches and countermarches, had worn their clothing to rags—the want of provisions, and every necessary to perform a journey, and the accident of their own commander, who was seriously wounded in the action, made them pause to reflect, which gave time for the capture of Santa Anna, who was overtaken and made prisoner the day after the battle, and having commenced negotiations with him, it was considered expedient, for the welfare of the country, that no more blood should be shed. It is due, however, to the individuals who composed the victorious army, to state, that they were, almost to a man, desirous of crossing the river Brazos, in order to attack the main force of the Mexicans, and that they were not restrained by the fear of consequences to themselves.—Peace was offered, and their first thoughts were naturally of their wives and children. It has been asserted in some of the newspapers of our mother country, that the soldiers of the army of San Jacinto, were principally volunteers from the United States—this is an error, not to call it by a harsher name, for it is believed to have been propagated by the enemies of Texas. More than three fourths of that army were native Texians, and should any doubt the truth of this, I refer them not only to the printed list of the names of the soldiers and officers in that battle, but also to the observation of Filisola, page 10, wherein he states, that after the mas-

sacre of Fannin, and his gallant associates, most of the real colonists still "remained untouched." When the army was on the Colorado, it consisted of at least 1,200 men, mostly colonists or native Texians: but when the commander-in-chief, general Houston, thought it advisable to retire towards the Trinity, they were obliged to place their wives and children in safety, and the assassination of the brave volunteers, did not in the least intimidate the Texians, who returned with all possible despatch to the ranks, to revenge their unfortunate friends, whose manes may be in some manner appeased, by the sacrifice of more than an equal number of their enemies, and by the sufferings of those who survived; so vividly depicted in the account given by Filisola to his government.

General Filisola viewed Texas with the eyes of a soldier, and a farmer must not be guided by his account of the country. He calls the largest portion of it *mud*. This mud, so fatal to him, and to his troops, is a rich mould of decomposed vegetable matter, which will compare, in fertility, with the best soil of the United States, and has an advantage which heretofore has not been generally known—that is, it serves as a clog to the impetuosity of the *valiant* Mexicans, whenever they may again attempt to invade a country, which they never in fact possessed, and which has been rendered valuable by the courage of those Texians who have been accused of

cowardice, because they accepted aid from ~~their~~ brothers and friends.

The publication of the present work has been delayed for various reasons—amongst others, the friends of Texas, who had perused it, were afraid that we might again fall into the error, that Mexico would not attempt to invade us, and in consequence, that no due preparations should be made for their reception.—This has now been in some measure provided for by the “bill organizing the militia;” in accordance with which, our worthy president has commissioned the proper officers, and no doubt is entertained that from five to six thousand men will be at the disposal of their country, exclusive of the regular army, and of the volunteers and emigrants daily arriving.

This work is therefore given to the public, and should it afford satisfaction to those who have adopted this for their country, the translator will be amply repaid for his labor.

G. L. H.

Brazoria, January, 1837.

REPRESENTATION, &c.

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EXCELLENT SIR;—

Vicente Filisola, general of division, with the respect due to the supreme government, has the honor to address himself to your excellency, in order to expose to you frankly and simply, his military and political conduct, as general-in-chief of the army of operations against Texas. The surprise and mortification which I have suffered, are caused, sir, by the purity and rectitude of my intentions, and proportionate to the slanders which have been uttered against me, some from error, others false and malicious, and others propagated with little examination and some levity, occasionally in various official communications, occasionally in the journal of the supreme government, especially in the official article of the 15th of last July. If my self esteem were only wounded by such slanders, if I were only accused of ignorance or of weakness, perhaps carried to excess for considerations due to the first general of the republic, prisoner amongst his enemies, and to more than six hundred Mexicans, I would consummate my sacrifice with silence, and the sacrifice I would estimate for a very small one; but no object, however great it may be, can exact the sacrifice of honor, and much less when this honor does not belong to me exclusively, because mine is identified with that of the army, which certainly has not judged me unworthy of commanding it, nor has thought proper to stain its well acquired reputation by retreating with me. Therefore, I in this manner appear before

your Excellency, and before the whole nation, not only to exculpate myself, but to ask justice against detraction and intrigue, cabal and insidious measures, and also to refute the injurious expressions with which my conduct has been disapproved, at the same time that I am threatened with a trial; because if this trial is to take place, as I desire, and is proper for me, the punishment ought not to come before it, and there is none greater than that already inflicted in the manner of presenting me to the republic in official accounts and circulars, which appeared as intended to discharge on me all the weight of unfortunate results, which have different causes, and to make the idea popular that I alone had the power, and did not wish to repair the great losses of an unlucky combat. My silence under such circumstances would be an injustice which I should do to myself, an offence equally unjust to the army, and an assent to the trifling consideration which the dignity of my employment has obtained.

It is not therefore the spirit of retaliation which guides my pen, nor will I say more than what is strictly necessary for my own justification; neither shall the bitterness of the expressions made use of against me be an arm of defence; but the truth which is due to the government, the truth which your Excellency ought to know, shall not be sacrificed to considerations of the moment, because circumstances pass, and truth belongs to all times, and is the property of private and public morality. This truth ought to be spoken under present circumstances, because to-day the men who can confirm it or give me the lie, are in existence, and some time hence it will neither have the same force nor the same merit; some time hence it would be a problem, which to day can be resolved. Permit me then, your Excellency, to beg in its justification, that this truth may not be charged to me as crime, less to passion, and much less to political imprudence, when the necessity exists for speaking it, taking for granted that although I endeavored to explain myself, my communications of 28th April, 14th and 31st May, (documents, Nos. 1, 2, and 3) were not understood as I wished them to be understood: without entering into the painful details of the present, and under circumstances in which my communications could be taken by the enemy, I ought not to have explained.

After them, I will solicit what is in justice due to me, and I will expose the articles of accusation accumulated against me, refuting them entirely.

In the official communication referred to, it is supposed, First, that the unexpected defeat of the division of the vanguard

commanded by the president general, and his unfortunate capture, introduced such a derangement, that the army made a retrograde movement, in which their conquests were successively lost, without the enemy daring to show his force before a force which was superior to him, and which, in a new encounter, would have been able to insure victory on its side. Second: that I blindly obeyed the orders of the president general, extorted by violence. Third: that it will always be strange and reprehensible, that I should then occupy myself in nothing else but a retreat, which the enemies would mistake for a flight. Fourth: but that which cannot be known without exciting the most profound indignation, is, that I should have consented to treaties extorted from the head of the nation by threats of death. Fifth: that it is a shame that I should have retired without venturing another action; and greater shame that I should have given the name of government to the principal usurpers and rebels of Texas.

From the letter of the minister of war to general Urrea dated 31st May, I am aware that this general pretended to the minister, in his letter or secret information of the 11th of the same month, to have performed the following services, First, that he covered the rear-guard of the army in its retrograde movement from the right bank of the river Brazos to the Colorado. Second: that afterwards placing himself in the vanguard, he facilitated with his well-timed operations the passing of the last mentioned river. Third: that he saved the artillery. Fourth: that he was opposed to the retreat of the army. Fifth: that there was a probability that in consequence of his measures in a short time his Excellency the president and general-in-chief would obtain his liberty, and embark in Galveston for the shores of Vera Cruz. Sixth: that when I at that time thought of retreating, he had opposed it. And in the letter of this same general directed to me and inserted in a letter to the same minister under date of 1st June last, these other suppositions are found. First: that in Guadalupe Victoria, before commencing his march to Matamoras, he held a long conversation with me, and thought he left me convinced how urgent it was, not to leave unprotected the line from Bexar, Goliad and Copano, before receiving orders from the supreme government. Second: that the enemy beaten on as many occasions as they dared to show their face, their principal fortresses lost, and obliged to abandon their homes, &c. only obtained their safety by a suspension of hostilities. Third: that the army of operations having concentrated more than four thousand men, and having their con-

quests protected, gave an example of pusillanimity, in not making another movement to attract fortune to its side, at least to inform itself of the fate of the principal chief, assemble the dispersed &c. &c., and in abandoning their positions and commencing a retreat, which Mr. Urrea, speaking with the frankness of a soldier, cannot call any thing else but a shameful flight, from which has resulted the want of order which, excepting the division that he had the honor to command, prevails in a great part of the army. Fourth: that I recognized the rebels of Texas as a legitimate government, and that the relations which I had commenced with them tended to grant them what the nation has always been opposed to. Fifth: that he disapproved of the retreat which the army commenced from the right bank of the river Brazos, and that he was obliged to do so only because my orders were sent to the force situated in Columbia to unite with me without waiting for his, which left his rear-guard exposed, and with only four-hundred men in Brazoria. Sixth; that his Excellency the president is to-day a prisoner to our shame, who perhaps calculated that in our discretion we would do the contrary to what he ordered, and he continues with a multitude of reflections which have no other object than to constitute me the ridicule of the nation, exciting against me at the same time their indignation and contempt, and making himself known as the only support of the national honor and rights. In the letter of general Vital Fernandez dated 2nd June, it is said that I had approved the treaty which his Excellency the president general had concluded with the rebels of Texas, in which the territory of the republic is dismembered. In the letter from the secretary of state, that in all this business I had lost sight of my duty and honor; and in fine, the official article concludes, that the supreme government will make me responsible to the laws in the manner as is prescribed in them, leaving only to them my vindication or chastisement.

Never, your Excellency, in my life had I commenced a military operation with more good will and enthusiasm, than I was animated with, in the campaign of Texas. I place as witnesses of this assertion as many individuals as have seen my exertions for the public service, from San Luis to Laredo, thence to Monclova, from that city to the river Brazos, and from its banks to the encampment at Chilitipin, where I met the order to deliver the command to Mr. Urrea, exceeding not only the fulfilment of the duties of my situation, but even the duties and fatigues of the lowest soldier in the army, and have been an example of

suffering, sobriety, resignation, sincerity and constancy; circumstances, your Excellency, which gave me good reason to hope for better treatment than I have received. I was nevertheless disposed in regard for the public service, to constitute myself a victim and to appear as the only one to be blamed for every thing that in this serious affair, could appear unfavorable to the foresight and efforts of the supreme government and to the national decorum. I made this indication in my letter dated 31st last May; but always without making it more sensible by the addition of the injurious and inconsiderate suppositions which have since been made, and of the low and immoral intrigues practiced to my dishonor and prejudice by some of my aspiring subordinates, and of the communications of the secretaries of state and war, wanting both reflection and civility. I am obliged, then, to disregard every other consideration in order to preserve my honor: it is due to the nation, to my own family and friends, who would be ashamed to acknowledge me, should I remain silent any longer after what has passed. I suppose the government is by this time well convinced by my letters dated 14th and 31st May last, and 10th June, (document No. 4,) of the necessity the army were in of retreating, and of the true causes which induced my movement; but simply the supreme government's knowledge of it, is not now sufficient to prove my innocence to the whole nation who have seen the recriminations made against me, without seeing my letters, or hearing me first, as I think it ought to do, because no one can be condemned without previously hearing his defence. I am a Mexican by adoption; I have arrived at the height of my career: no personal interest could conduct me to the campaign of Texas, nothing but the love of country and of my honor, which has since been attacked with so much levity: I will defend it at every cost, as without it I neither love life or any thing in existence. I know very well that I have no support, because I have had no other than my honesty and services, and unfortunately both go for very little in our deplorable circumstances: but in regard to it I ought to try every thing, and although I obtain nothing, I shall at least have the consolation of having omitted nothing that it could in any way exact. Let me then be permitted, your Excellency, in preference to every other consideration, to refute one by one, and in the same order, these false charges alleged against me, and the pretended services which some attribute to themselves.

First: the unfortunate action of the 21st. of last April and the capture of the president, could not introduce any disconcert

in the army, because that which does not exist cannot be destroyed. I will now however mention what was done, and not that which could or ought to have been done.

After the taking of the enclosure of the Alamo, which happened on the 6th March, and the insignificant advantage of the death of Dr. Grant, with twenty adventurers and three Mexicans who accompanied him, which took place on the 2nd day of the same month, and of which we were advised in Bexar on the 7th, the president general-in-chief then supposed that the enemy would not again present themselves, and that in consequence the war was concluded.

From this false impression, and from the contempt which from that time he conceived for the enemy, have emanated the misfortunes which we have since suffered, and which we shall still experience should we proceed with the same indiscretion as until now, in an affair which requires at the same time firmness, much circumspection and consideration.

With that idea, the president supposed that nothing remained to be done but to go on giving directions to the different generals and corps in the manner he intended to take possession of Texas: in consequence, on the 11th he made generals Sesma and Woll march in order to occupy San Felipe de Austin, and afterwards to continue on to Harrisburg and Anahuac with the battalions of Aldama, Matamoras and Toluca; fifty dragoons from the regiment Dolores, two six-pounders and rations for eight days; this section forming an entire force of 725 men. Recollect, that always when rations are mentioned, that the ration of biscuit or corn-bread, his Excellency wished, that after leaving Monclova should only consist of half a pound, that is to say, of one half of the weight which the by-law on the subject prescribes, that only one rial (12½ cents,) should be allowed for the maintenance of each soldier per diem, and that the officers should provide themselves with provisions, as they could without any thing more than their pay, leaving them entitled to recover the rations of campaign when it could be given to them.

This same day he ordered Colonel John Morales to set out for Goliad with the battalions San Luis and Ximenez, one twelve-pounder, one eight-pounder, one mortar and rations for a month: and on account of advice received from Mr. Sesma, that the enemy appeared disposed to defend the pass of the river Colorado with 1,200 men, and having been informed by general Urrea from San Patricio, that he was going from that point to Goliad, where, it was said the enemy were fortified, and had learned

that they would resist with five hundred infantry and fourteen pieces of artillery, of various calibre, on the 16th he ordered general Tolsa to march to reinforce Mr. Sesma with the battalions of Guerrero, 1st battalion regular militia of Mexico, and 40 dragoons from Tampico: and he sent colonel Cayetano Montoya to reinforce Mr. Urrea with the regular militia from Tres Villas and Queretaro, and a twelve-pounder; all these troops carrying rations for a month.

Even at that time his Excellency had thought it advisable to order general Gaona to Nacogdoches with the battalion of Morelos, and militia of Guanajuato; and he was more confirmed in this movement by the information sent him by Mr. Urrea, that the enemy, having abandoned the post of Goliad, were overtaken on the road to Guadalupe Victoria, at a place called Encinal del Perdido, where they had capitulated, and were prisoners in his possession, with all the artillery that they had, and in consequence, the said Mr. Gaona marched for Nacogdoches with the two battalions already mentioned, two four-pounders, 20 frontier dragoons, 50 convicts, and rations for forty days, on the 24th; the whole number of men of this section including the said convicts being 725.

If the taking of the Alamo and the trifling advantage obtained by Mr. Urrea, in the death of Dr. Grant, caused the general-in-chief to believe that the war was already terminated, this last victory convinced him that now his presence in Texas was no longer necessary and that he ought to return to the capital of Mexico, going by sea from Copano or Matagorda to Tampico, and thence by land to San Luis, &c., leaving to me the command under his instructions, of all that should remain to be done. With this intention he ordered general Urrea on the 25th to scour all the points on the coast, from Guadalupe Victoria to Galveston, with the understanding that his left wing was protected by the section of Mr. Sesma, and that under his most strict responsibility, he should fulfil the orders of the government, shooting all the prisoners; and as regards those lately made, that he should order the commandant of Goliad to execute them; these being the same instructions given to Gaona and Sesma with respect to all found with arms in their hands, and to force those who had not taken up arms to leave the country. It was also made known by the general order of the day, that the whole brigade of cavalry under the orders of John Joseph Andrade, and all the utensils and property that had remained, which belonged to the regular battalions of Guerrero, Matamoras and Ximenez, that of

the regular militia from Queretaro, and 1st battalion of Mexico, all the pieces of artillery which existed in the general quarters and that had been brought from Mexico, and the thirty-two wagons, belonging to Joseph Lombardero & Co., should be got ready to leave on the 1st April for San Luis Potosi, on account of the expenses increasing, according to the contract made respecting them.

It is very proper here, your Excellency, to observe to you, that the enemies slain in the taking of the Alamo, as well as those who perished in the various encounters of Mr. Urrea, were adventurers, all of whom had arrived from New Orleans after the taking of Bexar by the colonists, with the exception of thirty inhabitants from the town of Gonzales, who arrived as a reinforcement to Travis the day before the assault, and of some officers; and that in consequence the forces of the real colonists or inhabitants of Texas remained still untouched.

None of the measures adopted up to this time had accorded with my views, and on various occasions I had endeavored to insinuate my opinion to his Excellency on the subject, but without effect, for he would not listen to anything that was not consonant to his own ideas; and these appeared to me of the most dangerous tendency. As his Excellency had, or appeared to have a great regard for what Col. Almonte represented to him, I went in search of this person, requested him to take me to his quarters, and there to have the goodness to show me the map of Texas, as he did; upon this, I made him as many observations as occurred to me in disapproval of his Excellency's conduct up to that time, and I most earnestly entreated him to make it thus known to him, and to receive that manifestation as a formal protest in discharge of my responsibility to the country for every reverse, emanating from these measures, that should befall us in our military operations; because my opinion was, that after leaving garrisons in Bexar, Goliad and Copano, we should march in a body until we had beaten the main body of the enemy, forcing them to leave the country, or to confine themselves to the island of Galveston; without leaving on this account unprotected the passes of the rivers which should remain in our rear. This step, supported by a very judicious and proper manifestation made by general Sesma from the right bank of the river Colorado, dated the 15th, resulted in his ordering the cavalry, pickets, deposits, &c. to suspend their march, got in readiness as I observed for San Luis; in his also ordering by an express, general Gaona on the 25th, that after passing the Colorado at the town

of Bastrop, he should march across to San Felipe de Austin; and general Urrea to do the same to Brazoria, passing the Colorado at Matagorda, determining to conclude in person the few remaining military operations, as he thought; perhaps, his Excellency, carrying to extreme the maxim of not subjecting his military operations to discussion, and relying on his own inspirations, which on other occasions had given him fortunate results, could not with patience hear an opinion contrary to his own. On the 29th, in consequence, the battalion of Zapadores and that of Guadalupe marched with two eight-pounders, two four-pounders, a howitzer, and rations for a month, under the orders of colonel Amat, in the direction of Gonzales; for which place his Excellency, with his staff, and myself with him, set out on the 31st. On the second day's journey, he received communications from Mr. Sesma, in which he advised that part of his division had already crossed the Colorado, but that as this river had greatly increased on account of the rain, and that the means of crossing it were very scarce, the transporting the troops, cannon, ammunition, &c. to the other side gave him immense trouble; that nevertheless, he omitted nothing to hasten an operation attended with so much risk.

The 2d of April we arrived at Gonzales; the river was swollen, and it was necessary to construct a raft to pass it, &c. The impatience of his Excellency did not admit of delay, and on the 3d he determined to continue on to the Colorado with his staff and a picket of cavalry, to join Mr. Sesma; leaving to me the charge of the operation of passing the river. On the 5th he arrived at a place on the Colorado called Paso del Atascosito, and on the 6th he continued with the division of Messrs. Sesma and Tolsa to San Felipe, where he arrived on the 7th, having left Mr. Woll at said Atascosito with a battalion and a picket of cavalry, with the object of constructing a raft to be enabled to pass over the river the artillery, the twelve wagons, and the ammunition, &c. that was coming on with me.

As his Excellency could not execute the passage of the river Brazos at San Felipe, because the enemy, although in small numbers, were on the other side, on the 9th he selected the best companies and marched down the river to look for a spot to cross it; on the 11th he arrived at Old Fort, 16 leagues distant from San Felipe, and from thence he ordered on the same date Mr. Sesma and myself to direct ourselves to that point to join him; on the 13th Mr. Sesma did so; and on the 14th his Excellency, without waiting for me, with only a few more than 700

men and one six-pounder, marched to Harrisburg, where he arrived in the afternoon of the 16th. On the 10th I arrived at Atascosito; on the 13th I concluded the manœuvre of passing the river, on the 14th I marched to San Felipe, and on the 15th was on the road from there to Old Fort. Mr. Urrea on the 15th was in Matagorda, so that the position of the army on that day was this:—The president general on the road to Harrisburg, about 20 leagues distant from Mr. Sesma; myself 16 from the latter; Mr. Gaona lost in the desert between Bastrop and San Felipe, without our knowing anything about him; Mr. Urrea in Matagorda, 30 leagues distant from Mr. Sesma, more than 40 from me, and 50 from the president. The same Urrea was distant from Goliad 30 leagues or more, and the detachments of Victoria, Copano and Goliad at 45 from Bexar, where Mr. Andrade had remained. Four days after the misfortune of the president, Messrs. Tolsa, Woll, Gaona, Sesma, Urrea and myself were in company at the dwelling house of Mrs. Powell, with all that part of the army which existed between the rivers Brazos and Colorado, and afterwards effected its retrograde movement in the best order. In which epoch, then, was the army in the most confusion, before or after the misfortune of the president? I believe I have explained the motives that existed for this movement with sufficient clearness in my letter of 14th last May, which your Excellency will have had the condescension to see.

That the enemy did not dare to show their face. They, after the first reverses, had adopted the plan of burning every thing and retreating as soon as we approached them, in order to prevent our finding supplies, and to take advantage of any imprudence that we should commit. In fact, this they did with whatever remained behind them. Houston, on abandoning the left bank of the Colorado, took a position 10 leagues above San Felipe at a crossing of the river Brazos called Groce's, where he had a steamboat to facilitate the passage, with the object of observing the forces which marched under the immediate command of the president and those under general Gaona. On the 15th, he had it in his power to attack Mr. Gaona, the president or myself, in San Felipe, or on the road from that town to Old Fort. He thought better to attack the president, because he was on the other side of the Brazos, unconnected with the other forces; he therefore sent the steamboat down the river to attract our attention, and marched against his Excellency. Since the 21st of April, they have always taken very good care to have between

themselves and us either the river Brazos, the Colorado, or the Guadalupe; so that even if we should have gone in search of them, it would have been in vain, for they would have commenced by shooting their prisoners, and afterwards carried off all that would be of service to them, being always three or four days journey in advance of us. Who is so foolish, that knowing the manner of gaining with safety, would like to expose himself to the danger of losing?

Second. *That I blindly obeyed the orders of the president general.* It appears to me, that I have expressed with sufficient clearness what was the true motive of the retrograde movement of the army in all my communications, notwithstanding that which I was obliged to pretend in my letters to his Excellency the president, because both his and my own were carried and brought by the enemy, who could see and read them at pleasure, and it was necessary to use the language in which they were written in order to produce the effect that I desired. If, then, your Excellency, I had in every event to effect said movement, why should I not take advantage of the occasion that was presented, of seeing it was a favor in order to save the life of the president general, that of so many other brave Mexicans, and making my retreat with greater safety? I do not comprehend, your Excellency, the crime that on this occasion I can have committed; but should it be adjudged as a crime, and my life be the forfeit, I will esteem myself paid with usury for only having had the intention of saving more than 600 unfortunate prisoners, and perhaps preserving the lives of 2,500 companions in arms besides, who probably would have fallen victims, even though they escaped lead and steel, to the season, climate, exposure and famine.

Third. *That it will always be strange and reprehensible that I should then occupy myself in nothing else but a retreat, which the enemy would mistake for a flight.* I believe, your Excellency, that I have sufficiently done away with this error in my letter dated 10th June last, and I see that the government are convinced that the enemy could not mistake my retreat for a flight, because the official journal has taken my letter referred to as a text in reply to other public papers, who, in contempt of the army, and consequently of the national cause, have made the same assertion. I see, then, that if an unfavorable trial could have been formed against me on this point, more reflection and more consideration have changed this opinion by seeing the said letter. On the contrary, I cannot conceive how, accusing me with almost the

same words in an official journal, the same periodical, taking my part, refutes a paper of the opposition, precisely on an article of accusation, in which the ministry and their opponents would then agree. If my letter of 10th June had not been credited by the ministry, they would not have rested on it the defence of an army which, crossing a desert exposed to the rains, knee deep in the mud, famishing and without clothes, has always preserved the consciousness of their valor, and only have retired from the inclemency of the season in a country at all times unpopulated and producing but little, at this time annihilated, and which by the rigor of the climate and nature of its soil, buried the men in an element which is not that of their existence.

Fourth. *But that which cannot be known without indignation is, that general Filisola should give the name of government &c.* Inasmuch as your Excellency will have already seen the treaties to which this charge has reference, and concluded by his Excellency the president general, your Excellency will be satisfied that nothing is granted in them with respect to the army that I was commanding, that was not authorized by circumstances, or by me as commander-in-chief in operations conducted at so great a distance from the supreme government; and for which this same supreme government had thought proper to empower me, in the orders communicated by his Excellency, the secretary of war, in the two despatches of 15th May last, Nos. 5 and 6. It would be inconceivable that a general-in-chief could not retreat without a previous consultation and order from the government for each particular case, and that his duty should only consist in marching forward; and only in a war where no quarter was to be given, by an especial and positive order from the government, could I be prohibited the exchange of prisoners. And to what else did I compromise myself in recognizing that treaty, than to retreat and exchange prisoners? And was not this positively ordered by the secretary of war in the said despatch of the 15th. The remainder of the treaty refers to the person of the president general, viz: that his Excellency would not wage war against the colonists, nor use his influence in having it waged: they will allege that I recognized it by promising to return the property of the colonists, and to pay on my march for the provisions needed by the army, and this may appear an accusation to any one that can imagine that the treaty in this part contained anything more than mere words; but to any one that has an exact idea of the situation in which Texas was, from the destruction by the colonists themselves, and by our march

over that burnt, abandoned and devastated territory, it must be evident that nothing was promised that could be fulfilled, because the treaty obligates to return property existing, and not that which is annihilated, and the president general did not stipulate or bind himself to indemnify the losses occasioned by the war. I say the same in respect to payment for provisions and baggage: if there had been any provision or baggage, the army would have paid for them without the necessity of stipulation; but where there is nothing to eat, in a country, as I said previously, annihilated, one can neither take by force or purchase that which does not exist.

From the river San Antonio to the river Bravo is a desert in which neither cattle nor grain is to be met with, because of the few that existed of the former before the retreat: either Mr. Urrea had driven it all before him, or the owners themselves, who were Mexicans, and to whom in all cases it would have been necessary to pay, as they were neither enemies nor had connection with them. I shall always regret that the exchange of prisoners did not take place. What nation, what army ever thought themselves lowered in the estimation of the world, or dishonored by making a regular warfare? Does civilization and the law of nations perchance allow wars where no quarter is to be given? Are not exchanges of reciprocal utility? In our case, sir, I must be permitted to observe that the advantage of the exchange was on ~~our~~ side, as on account of former events the life of the Mexican prisoners is in continual danger, and the reprisal that we could make against a hundred insignificant prisoners is by no means an equivalent to the loss of a single Mexican; and when general Fernandez disobeyed my order to exchange, whom did he disobey, me or the supreme government, who ordered me? And for this act have the government lavished praises on him instead of sustaining their own orders? This, your Excellency, were it not seen, would not be believed; and such an example will forever be of great prejudice to the nation. It appears to me that in this respect I better calculated the value of the men who belonged to us, in obeying as I ought: and I think that even should the nation consider this part of the treaty disadvantageous, every thing could be reconciled, because these exchanges, and this kind of treaties, entirely of war, are formed and concluded between the belligerent generals, and only a definitive treaty of peace is not in their power, unless by special authority.

Having touched this point, self-respect requires me to give some explanation concerning the erroneous intelligence which was attached to my simple expression, that I did not deem necessary to explain with definitions relating to the powers and faculties of our constituted authorities.—I have said in fact how much force I gave, under the painful circumstances in which I found myself, to a treaty concluded by the president of the republic and general-in-chief of the army: but I never thought that the injustice would be done me, of supposing me to be ignorant, that when the president of the republic in person commands the army, he neither exercises nor can exercise the executive power, and that his command as chief ceases when he becomes a prisoner. The first is a truth of right, and the second both of fact and right, and I, being under the necessity of retreating on account of the reasons more extensively explained in my despatches of 14th and 31st May, will not deny that the stipulations of the president general also powerfully contributed, not to decide me, because I was already decided by necessity, but because I saw in his treaty exactly the contrary to what has been interpreted; that is to say, that he treated with the expectation that I would not comply, because that which his Excellency the president was well aware of, is generally unknown, viz: the situation in which he had left the army, and the necessity of a retreat, which at the same time should save the army and the prisoners. On this account I also said, in honor of the chief of the nation, that in his treaty he had not regarded his own person but their interest, and I meant to say that the interest of the nation was at that time in preserving their army and in saving the lives of the prisoners. If they did not choose to understand this as the cause of my retreat, it is not the fault of my comprehension, nor ignorance concerning the attributes of supreme powers, and concerning the cessation of all exercise of authority in a prisoner, no matter how illustrious he may be: but if respect be due to the opinion of that man who, with his own opinion has so frequently directed the destinies of the republic, at one time on the chair of government, at another on the field of battle, and above all, an opinion confined to the movements of an army, from which he had just separated himself by a misfortune, whose situation he knew so perfectly, and whose plan of operations he had not communicated to his second in command, for if the government in place of giving instructions, receives them from him, I being reduced to know his plan by its results,

ought to have a further support in them to my measures; and in face of what the supreme government recommends to me on the 15th May, respecting the preservation of the life of the president, without other restriction than the acknowledgement of the independence of Texas, and even this prudently, as may be seen in their communication, how can my conduct be condemned, except upon the false impression that I could give battle and conquer the enemy after the unfortunate day of the 21st April? On this point, sir, allow me to observe, that the charges necessary for forming a trial with respect to my military and political conduct were not collected, when both one and the other were condemned with so much bitterness in the official communications published in the journal of the government.

Fifth. *That it is a shame &c.* In answer to the first charge I have already made known what I might say here, and in respect to the greater shame, it will perhaps appear littleness on my part to occupy your Excellency's time in refuting the idea to which the expression gave birth, perhaps not mediated; or put on paper in a moment of prejudice.—Refer to my ratification or consent to the treaty which the president general concluded, and let it be examined, if there exists in this document any expression of mine which styles *government*, or which recognizes in the rebellious colonists of Texas a regular or constituted nation: and even should I have called *government* that which the colonists have, I do not think I would have said any thing injurious to our republic, because I might not say, *the self-styled government*, or might not use the adjectives which have become so common since the year 1810, such as *revolutionary government*, *rebellious government*, *hordes led on by ring-leaders*, *band of robbers*. All of this may do well enough in a public paper, in a proclamation or ~~manifesto~~, and besides having lost much of its force, by its frequent repetition, it hardly causes shame or offence to those who excite insurrection; all this, I say, does not destroy a truth in fact, to wit: that a band of robbers have their chief who governs them: that a people in a state of rebellion and insurrection without a cause legitimately just, and without this cause or its effects being recognized by other nations, and for that wish to separate even in a state of anarchy and confusion, such a people have a form of government: because, let men be what they will, their existence in the social state, in small or large numbers, always supposes some sort of government. The strong desire of making an independent nation of Texas cannot appear more ridiculous to any one than to me, as I have just come from see-

ing that immense desert, the largest part of it sand, another large portion mud, ungrateful and unproductive in almost all the places where there is not, nor has been, a settlement of any consideration, and where those that did exist before the devastation, rendered the scanty inhabitants hardly distinguishable from the wandering tribes. When I see that it has been proposed to recognize such a nation as independent, in the senate of the United States, I am inclined to believe that they were not speaking seriously, or that they had ulterior views, because Texas neither has nor will have for a long time, the elements necessary to constitute it a state under the federal system, or a department or regular province under the present political system of our republic. To have the illusion, that this country is a new *El Dorado*, as romantic or interested people at a distance have wished to judge it, will be again falling into great faults attended with sad consequences. A neighboring nation may covet this territory, which will be a garden in comparison to another soil more unproductive; but it can never be said in good faith that Texas possesses all the elements which are required to constitute a nation, separated from all other governments of the universe.—This is my opinion; but I do not think that in every official communication I am obliged to lay down principles, to give definitions or make a patriotic grammar or dictionary, and there is much less time for it on the field of battle or on the march, and general F. V. Fernandez will perhaps be convinced by the present explanation, that I have not endangered, and much less injured our republic, by using in my official note to said general, the word *government*, with respect to the colonists of Texas, as it was not injured by the government in the despatch of 15th May from the minister of war, when he used the term *general* to the ring-leader Houston. Without doubt, sir, it is greater shame to occupy ourselves about words when we ought in preference to view things as they are in reality.

Let us see now, your Excellency, if the services which Mr. Urrea attributes to himself to my prejudice and to that of my other companions of the army, also the charges which flow against me from his secret information dated May 11th, have more foundation than the former.

First: That he covered the rear of the army, that he saved the artillery &c. That part of the army of operations which, after the unfortunate 21st of last April, was between the rivers Brazos and Colorado, was situated on the 24th on the right bank of the Brazos in the points of Old Fort, Columbia and Brazoria,

myself and generals Sesma, Gaona, Tolsa and Woll, occupying the first of these; colonel Solas the second, and Mr. Urrea the third. The second point is about 12 leagues distant from the first; and the third, four from the second, down stream. The dwelling-house of Mrs. Powel where I ordered them to concentrate, is situated in the plain, at the distance of five leagues from the river, and about equi-distant from Old Fort and Columbia, the section of Mr. Solas, who was occupying Columbia, was the first to arrive there on the afternoon of the 25th; afterwards the force which was under my immediate orders; and a little later, Mr. Urrea, with the force from Brazoria. The three sections described three convergent lines in their march to said house; consequently neither of them could cover the rear-guard of the other, because they arrived at the same point from three different roads: but the rear-guard of my section was covered by the experienced and active general Gaona, who remained with only the battalion of Guadalupe at the pass of Old Fort until about mid-day. The 26th was a day of rest and re-organization, on which day the section of reserve fell to the lot of Mr. Urrea, the first brigade of infantry to Mr. Gaona, and the second to Mr. Tolsa; general Sesma remaining as my second, and Mr. Woll major-general. On the 27th we commenced the march, the right section naturally being in advance, because no enemy had appeared on the left border of the river Brazos, according to information received from Peter Rodriguez, lieutenant of frontier dragoons and commander of a detachment composed of pickets of Dolores, Tampico and frontier dragoons, which I had ordered on the morning of the day previous to the pass of Old Fort, and had remained in it until the break of day of the 27th. We encamped that night in a small clearing, and Messrs. Gaona and Tolsa protected the avenues most exposed with their brigades, that of Mr. Urrea occupying the place of the greatest safety. On the 28th we encamped in a single line on the left bank of the principal rivulet of the three that form the river San Bernard, in which Mr. Urrea with his brigade formed the left, being also in the spot less exposed in case of any fighting taking place: the march had also this day been made in order, because, in addition to our not having suspicion of enemies, the other rivulet which we had passed on the day previous was not now fordable on account of the rains. On the 29th not having been able to ford the stream, on the banks of which we were encamped, we counter-marched, the right wing in advance, by the same road that we had come the day previous, and encamped

on the right bank of the centre rivulet of San Bernard already mentioned, which we had passed as I observed, on the 27th, as it was not yet fordable. This night I arranged that general Urrea should march at day-break of the following day to the pass of the Atascosito on the Colorado, in order to refit a raft that I had left there, or to construct another in case the weather, current or other accident should have destroyed it. In fact, on the following day Mr. Urrea went before, leaving his cannon and baggage, that they might not embarrass him, and commenced a raft there, which I finished on my arrival. He passed the Colorado with his section and encamped a league distant from the right bank of the river, when all the rest of us remained on the left bank, passing his artillery, baggage, &c. &c. Where are, then, up to this time, your Excellency, the well-timed operations of Mr. Urrea, which at the same time covered the retreat of the army, facilitated the passing of the Colorado, and do so much honor to his military talents? What general, what officer of the army did not toil more than he did in those days of suffering?

That he saved the artillery. This, your Excellency, ran no other risk in the whole campaign than that of being bogged, about two leagues on the bank of the middle rivulet of the San Bernard, of which I have already spoken, on which we encamped the 29th, and absolutely required nine days of the most harassing labor, in addition to the incomparable constancy and indefatigability of Mr. Peter Ampudia, commander of the said artillery, to be enabled to drag it out. During all this time, Mr. Urrea was at rest on this side of the river Colorado, more than a league distant from its right bank, and nine leagues from where the artillery, ammunition and baggage were buried in the mud. His worship was occupied, as may be said, with his private interests, and with other entertainments as foreign to the circumstances as to the public service, and it is impossible to understand how such failings should not embarrass him at least in supposing that he saved the artillery, as it is unquestionable that this merit belongs to generals Gaona, Tolsa and Sesma, Mr. Ampudia, to the other officers and chiefs, and to all the individuals of the army, not belonging to the section of Mr. Urrea, who worked incessantly night and day, some dragging out the artillery and ammunition from the mud in which they were buried, and others passing them to the other side of the river at the same time with that which belonged to Mr. Urrea, or to his section. The only piece lost in the whole campaign, was a twelve-pounder, abandoned

by one of the corps that garrisoned Matagorda, and was precisely part of the section of Mr. Urrea; and I having commanded that a summary investigation should be made on account of it, he did not execute it, at least whilst I had the command, without considering that this fault endangered the honor of the nation, and left the right wing and rear of the army exposed.

Fourthly. In the council of war of generals which I assembled on the 25th April, in the house of Mrs. Powel, I opened the discussion by manifesting that my birth and want of confidence in my own abilities, impelled me to request them that a native general should take the command, which misfortune had caused to fall on me for the moment, to whom I would blindly subject myself, let him be who he would; all replied unanimously in the negative, expressing an entire confidence in my honesty and patriotism, and each one gave it as his opinion (speaking before myself) that it was absolutely necessary to re-pass the Colorado, re-organize the army, establish a plan of operations, hospitals, deposits for provisions, line of communications, workshops for repairing the arms, &c. &c., and to obtain positive information respecting the life or death of the president and his other companions in misfortune. It is true that Mr. Urrea, who was the second to speak, declared that he was sorry that the army should have to retrace their steps; but that his want of knowledge made him place a blind confidence in the experience and capacity of the second in command; and to what individual of the army did not the retreat, as well as the event that originated it, cause sorrow?

The fifth supposition, your Excellency, does not need refuting, because it is refuted by itself and by subsequent facts.

The sixth untruth which reduces itself to, that I, even at that date had thought of retreating, I can disprove by the testimony of the whole army, by the measures taken at that time, by my despatch of the 14th of that month, and by having afterwards detained the few inhabitants that were still remaining in the town of Goliad, where I established my general quarters, commenced refitting the fortifications, re-organizing and drilling the army, establishing a general hospital and laying a plan for my future operations, erecting a work-shop for repairing the armament, &c. &c., when Mr. Urrea on the contrary, passing through there, had terrified them by telling them that the army were retreating to Matamoros, and that they had better leave the place, as the people from the mission of Refugio and San Patrio had done; at the same time, in order to carry off his own pro-

perty, he had deprived them, as they represented to me, of their oxen, carts, &c., so that the poor unfortunates could not put in practice that which he on the other hand advised them.

What I have said, your Excellency, is all that there is relating to the private information which Mr. Urrea sent to his Excellency the secretary of war, under date of 11th May; it now remains to make your Excellency take notice of the bold suppositions contained in the despatch directed to myself, and inserted to the secretary under date of 1st June last, and of which, mention has been made at the commencement of this representation.

First. That in Guadalupe Victoria, before commencing the march to Matamoros, &c.

I am astonished, your Excellency, how this general can have addressed me, supposing things that never took place between us. I do not recollect of having conversed in that place with Mr. Urrea about any thing else, than of his march to Matamoros, the insecurity of the place, and of the necessity of sending some troops there; it was he who made me distrust, as may be seen in the copy which, with due respect, I have the honor to annex, marked No. 7, representing to me the discontent of some of the inhabitants of the department of Tamaulipas and of that city, with regard to the existing order of affairs, and whose machinations he, as he said to me, had stifled in last February by his activity, prudence and energy: in a word, soliciting from me, although indirectly, to appoint him commander of that garrison and of the post of Brazos de Santiago: how could Mr. Urrea flatter himself that he could convince me on the importance of any military measure, notwithstanding my want of information? On the contrary, he gave me to understand that he wished to go to Durango, because the existing order of affairs, as he thought, was in danger, and a frightful crisis was going to take place, so that all his efforts were bent on making me act according to the intrigue that he was forming against me and according to the secret information which he had given to the government, and on obliging me to hasten the march by all the means in his power, as I have been able to comprehend from his subsequent acts. For this reason he endeavored to prevent my finding provisions in Guadalupe Victoria, and distributed those in Goliad and Refugio, as well as the cattle, without method or order, and which, by my commands, general Ramirez and Sesma had collected for the army; he carried off the officers left in charge of them against my express order, in order that I might find no one to bring charges against: without my previous knowledge he carried off the

twelve-pounder intended for the defence of Copano, under pretence that it would be of more service at Brazo de Santiago, and gave me advice, not officially, of this imprudence, only when it could not at that time be remedied, because, even though he should have received my disapproval at the river Nueces or farther on, it is probable he would have disobeyed me; he drove before him all the cattle he could find, and induced the inhabitants of Goliad, Refugio and San Patricio to abandon their homes; and if indeed he pretended to advise me from the mission of Refugio, that he thought I ought to await the orders of the supreme government at the posts of Bexar, Goliad and Copano, it was only after he had committed all that I have stated, being sure of his own march to Matamoros. He sent before him every thing belonging to himself, taken from Brazoria, Matagorda, La Baca, and other places, and had constantly made it his first object to march in the van-guard after leaving the house of Mrs. Powel, from whence he despatched most all of his regiment to Guadalupe, as also various confidants of his own private affairs, all of whom I never again beheld; for in his division he had a sort of inquisition in which he had even forbidden the guides to give me any information, or come into my presence, and carried things to such a pitch as to reprimand a guide because he was replying to my questions respecting the roads near the rivulet of the San Bernard and when, in fine, he was well aware of the impossibility when he left me, of my being able to preserve the line as he pretended I ought to do until knowing the determination of the government. Besides, why did he not make mention of this supposed conviction from Refugio? And why did he carry off with him from San Patricio to Matamoros the lieutenant colonel of engineers, Mr. Lewis Tola, being the individual sent to the army for the purpose of constructing the necessary fortifications at Bexar, Goliad, Copano and other places, where circumstances should require it? In relation to this, I beg your Excellency to be pleased to inform himself from document No. 8, which I accompany; and I must add, that similar deeds are not in accordance with the apparent conviction of Mr. Urrea, on the importance of not leaving that line unprotected, which assertion is more confirmed on considering that said Tola was not required in Matamoros, as in that place there was an engineer appointed expressly by the government.

Secondly. *That the enemy, beaten on as many occasions, &c. &c.*

This mass of bragging, boasting expressions, void of all reason, and which denote the want of meditation, or the boldness

of one who directs them to a superior with the sole object of malignantly censuring him, of making a clangor, and showing a want of respect to the supreme government and people, by means of the press, cause at the same time pity, indignation and sorrow. Pity, because by such conduct, is made known the absence of all military knowledge in him who makes use of it, as well as despicable, his intentions; indignation, because by addressing himself to a superior, these three consequences are inferred, each more unfortunate than the other: either that he supposes his chief as wanting in reflection as himself, or that he believes himself supported, in order that he may insult him in such an indecent manner, or that he is not aware that such tales, devoid of all solidity, being related to a government at a great distance from where the events take place, may induce it to take erroneous measures of little service, and even prejudicial to the cause which he pretends to sustain; and sorrow, because by such conduct is seen the want of moral capacity in an officer who, at the same time, on account of his want of judgment, can expose the life and safety of multitudes, the fate of a large portion of his country, and cause the government to be ridiculed. To what will Mr. Urrea call attention? *beaten in as many actions as they presented themselves, and their principal fortresses lost.* To the skirmishes of San Patricio, mission of the Refugio and plain of Perdido, into the details of which I do not wish to enter, in consideration to this same Mr. Urrea, and to others of more consequence: *fortresses*, the insignificant and decayed walls of the mission of Refugio, the barracks of Goliad and of the Alamo? For each one of these skirmishes Mr. Urrea deserved a court-martial, and due chastisement for having assassinated in them a number of brave soldiers, as he might have obtained the same results without this sacrifice; and in respect to the Alamo, as he was not present at its capture, I do not wish to speak of it, as this is not the place nor is it my object. Where will Mr. Urrea have seen one single thing that resembles a fortress? A redout even! I do not think proper to mention at this time, whose security was most caused by the cessation of hostilities &c. &c.; but I cannot do less than greatly regret the absolute want of military judgment in general Urrea, at present, charged with a laborious and delicate operation in which he is in fact going to expose the reputation of the nation and government.— *Obliged to abandon their homes and property, concealing their families in the woods, and reduced to an insignificant number, without*

discipline, instruction or officers who know how to lead them, an event until now inexplicable, &c. &c.

This mound of false ideas or erroneous conceptions, is nothing more than heaping words one on another, without saying anything that he wished to be understood, or without knowing what he did say; the enemy, who is it? the colonists or the volunteers from New Orleans and other places? If the former, they were not obliged to abandon their homes, because the proclamation of the president, published in Bexar after the taking of the Alamo, offered them guarantees of all kinds, so that if they abandoned their property and homes and concealed their families, they did so voluntarily and by a combined plan; and if the latter, they had in Texas neither one nor the other: if their number were insignificant, unfortunately, experience proved the contrary in San Jacinto, without counting more than a thousand men distributed at the same time at Anahuac, Galveston, Velasco, Calebra Island, and on board their Steamboats. As regards their discipline and instruction, I must say, that comparisons are at all times odious; I will therefore content myself, with simply adverting, that it is too well known that the kind of people which compose the rebel forces of the Texians, procure their subsistence the greater part of them, by their rifles, that is to say, by hunting, and that common danger obliged them to observe discipline and subordination. And what had been the instruction given to our men pressed on the eve of the expedition? Had our recruits, of which the army mainly consisted, ever fired a gun in their life? consequently they had less instruction than the enemy in the use of fire-arms, although the valor and endurance of a Mexican soldier compensate for every thing: and as regards the capacity of their officers, there is no doubt but that of ours is the greatest; but nevertheless they were well led on: were it not impolite, I would most clearly demonstrate it with the events at the mission of Refugio, Goliad and plain of the Perdido; and I can do no less than advise Mr. Urrea in another campaign, to study better his own operations and those of the enemy, in order to have a quicker perception of events and results, and then they will not appear so inexplicable as that of San Jacinto, of which he is now complaining.

Thirdly. That the army of operations showed an example of pusillanimity, having concentrated more than four thousand men, &c. &c.

Concerning this, I refer to what general Andrade has said in his despatch of 30th July, which has been printed, and if there

were some examples of pusillanimity in the army, I am forced to say that the following may be interpreted as such. First: Mr. Urrea having been appointed with a respectable force of cavalry and infantry to form the right wing of the army, and to take the road along the coast to the town of Goliad (bahia del Espiritu Santo) the most interesting post for the operations of war, inasmuch as it protects the port or sound of Copano by which we were to receive the provisions from Matamoros, &c., he did not arrive until the 21st March, on which day the van-guard of the army under the orders of generals Sesma and Tolsa were on the river Colorado, fifty leagues in advance, and as many of the enemy as were between said river and the San Antonio cut off without any mode of retreating except by sea. Secondly; when the president arrived at Harrisburg, his worship did not pass beyond Matagorda, leaving Mr. Sesma without support and their right wing of the army unprotected. Thirdly: it having been agreed upon in the council of generals held in the house of Mrs. Powel, on the 25th April, that a party of cavalry should be sent to the pass of Old Fort in order to collect our fugitives of the action of the 21st who had remained there, and to inform themselves at the same time of the fate of the president, and having named Mr. Adrian Woll, major general of his regiment, he refused, and it was necessary to compose it of some pickets of Dolores, Tampico and frontier dragoons, who, on account of their worn out horses, had not been able to accompany the president. Fourthly: whilst all the rest of the army remained on the left bank of the Colorado to drag out of the mud the artillery, ammunition and baggage, nine days, he not only advanced so far as to pass to the right bank, but even went to encamp a league distant from this side. Fifthly: that he, commanding the reserve, and having under his orders nothing but cavalry, the force most proper for covering a retreat through plains, begged to advance with his force to Guadalupe, three days before the army could do so, and instead of bringing two six-pounders according to orders, he brought two four-pounders in order to come more quickly, and to set an example of obedience and to furnish another proof of his opposition to the retreat. Sixthly: a corps of the section under his command, abandoned a twelve-pounder, a lieutenant colonel and the artillerists who manœuvred it, without seeing the enemy; and seventhly; he begged to come to protect Matamoros, and he did so with such haste, that he even left in the town of Goliad his wounded, whom I collected and afterwards forwarded to him. *More than four-thousand men concentrated &c.* The army, from

Bexar onwards, was never composed of even three-thousand men, and hardly numbered 2,563 at the residence of Mrs. Powel, where took place the concentration of the entire force that existed between the rivers Brazos and Colorado: the remainder of it was divided among the posts at Matagorda, Victoria, Goliad, Copano and Bexar, and the nearest of these detachments was fifty leagues distant from that residence on account of the obstructions of the rivers which separated them. *Their conquests protected.* There is no doubt that if all of them were like Matagorda as is seen above, we could live with great safety. *He did not attempt any movement to attract fortune to his side.* What an indiscreet observation, your Excellency! From the residence of Mrs. Powel to the San Jacinto, is about fifty leagues, and the river Brazos to be crossed; one thousand soldiers with every necessary cannot perform this in four days—the fifty leagues require at least six days marching, which make ten; five days had passed since the action of the 21st. Fifteen days then the enemy would have had to prepare themselves: if battle suited them they could give it to us, and if not, they would shoot our prisoners, embark in their steamboats and other crafts, give a turn by Galveston Bay to ascend the river Brazos, take us in the rear, attack the force which we of course had to leave at Old Fort with the wounded, sick, baggage, artillery &c., and leave us in a trap to die of hunger. Besides, could we after the storm of the 27th, move on the offensive even in fifteen days? And what were we to eat? There was not to be found in all the country around Old Fort a single biscuit at any price, to make a little gruel for the poor fellows who were perishing with dysentery, and every thing between that place and the enemy, was burnt or destroyed; a great portion of the armament out of order, full of rust and without even an armorer, the powder of our cannon and musket cartridges, converted almost to a mass; without an apothecary, without lint or a bandage, without a surgeon; in fine, to such an extent that one of the officers taking compassion, performed the duties of one. But even should the enemy not have made the operation indicated, what impeded them getting over to Galveston, and make us perform marches and counter-marches, without any other result than wearing out the soldiers, even though we should have had provisions? *Inform themselves of the fate of their principal leader, collect the dispersed, &c. &c.* What a want of memory, or of desire to speak the truth! Why did he not do it when he was ordered, and not by his disobedience, cause other troops than his own to be sent on the operation which now so

much surprises him? Besides, it is forgotten by Mr. Urrea, that before there was time for any of the military operations that he now indicates, on the 28th April in the afternoon, on the bank of the stream San Bernard, information was received of the existence of the worthy commander-in-chief, and of the armistice made with Houston, in celebration of which his worship and other chiefs and officers requested me to have a flourish of drums and trumpets, to which I in not acceding thereto, replied to them, that even although his Excellency was *alive*, *what had happened* did not on his account cease to be a national misfortune, for which reason I could not allow rejoicing. He has also forgotten, that he earnestly besought me to permit him to go to see his Excellency, and to inform himself of the situation in which he was placed; and that I answered, I thought it dangerous for him, and that general Woll had better go; because he, in addition, understood English: was this ignorance of the fate of the commander-in-chief? was this a desire to go to the attack? Why such a difference afterwards? Because we are out of the affliction of the moment, and because some sentiments give way to others. This is the world.

He abandoned his positions and commenced a retreat, which, really speaking with the frankness of a soldier, he cannot call any thing but a shameful flight. To this, in fact, may be compared the marches made with his division by this soldier, from the Colorado to Victoria, thence to Goliad, and from Goliad to Matamoros; but not so the retreat of the army, which, besides having effected it with all possible convenience, remained ten days on the Colorado, twelve in Goliad and twelve on the river Nueces, as was also the retreat effected by the force stationed in Bexar under general Andrade, made with the order, circumspection and firmness which have always distinguished this general.

From which has resulted the want of discipline. This is an imputation made with much inconsiderateness and impolicy; and although I could answer it to my own advantage, I do not wish to do so in order not to be guilty of the same faults. I have it in my power to explain with facts to Mr. Urrea, by what means an armed force is rendered wanting in discipline; but it will be too severe, and perhaps useless; I will content myself then, only with saying, that the whole army was composed of Mexicans who were determined, that throughout the whole campaign they never knew fear, and that their retreat was alone caused by want of resources of all kinds, the sudden overflow of the rivers, bad weather, and circumstances of the moment; suffering previ-

ously the greatest hardships with a resignation that bordered on stoicism and insensibility.

Fourthly. *That I recognized the revolted Texians as a legitimate government, &c. &c.* This is much to venture without referring to previous events, and I challenge Mr. Urrea to quote me a single act to justify that which he affirms so unthinkingly, and concerning this, I refer to what I have previously made known.

Fifthly. *That he disapproved of the retreat that the army commenced from the bank of the river Brazos.* Let it be so said by generals Gaona, Sesma, Tolsa, Woll, and the commander of the artillery, Mr. Peter Ampudia, who composed the council held at the residence of Mrs. Powell on the 25th April. And if the enthusiasm of Mr. Urrea was as great, as one would suppose by his despatch directed to me, dated 1st June, what was the reason, that, although brought by one of the officers most in his confidence, it was not delivered to me until the 11th, at Santa Gertrudis, a place about forty leagues distant from Matamoros, which is one easy day's travel for any courier; for in eleven days the expresses can easily go from Mexico to Goliad; and as a proof of it, I received the superior order to deliver the command to Mr. Urrea, dated on the 31st May, on the 12th June, at Jaboncillos, a day's journey this side of Santa Gertrudis, notwithstanding its having been detained two days in Matamoros, in order that Mr. Urrea might dictate his orders relative thereto to Messrs. Gaona and Andrade. *That he was only obliged to do it because my order to the troops of his section, situated in Columbia, to unite with me without waiting for his, left him with his rear guard exposed, with only four hundred men.* This, your Excellency, is inexplicable; when I directed Mr. Urrea to come to me, the retreat to this side of the Colorado had not been spoken of, for this was afterwards discussed in the council of generals; therefore he could not oppose that which was not yet known, in Brazoria, where he was well entertained; and up to that time I was also ignorant what would be his determination, after the concentration of the army; in consequence, it is false that he was obliged to follow the movement of the army, because I had left him only four hundred men in that place. There is also more villainy in this, as Mr. Urrea in this expedition has feigned ignorance of every thing; he has also pretended to be ignorant of the number of men that were at Brazoria, unless his other occupations of personal interest did not allow him to take the trouble of knowing the force of the corps that were serving with him.

Be pleased then, your Excellency, to learn from the following demonstration, taken from the sums of the statements of that time, with the understanding that the one belonging to the command of Mr. Urrea, is revised by himself.

OLD FORT, 24TH APRIL.

ARMS.	CORPS.	FORCE.
ARTILLERY.		50
INFANTRY.	Pioneers	144
	Morelos	382
	1st battalion, regular militia of Mexico	206
	Gaudalaxara	254
	Guanaxuato	285
CAVALRY.	Dolores	46
	Tampico	21
	Frontier Dragoons	20
Total		1408

UNDER THE ORDERS OF MR. URREA IN COLUMBIA AND BRAZORIA.

ARMS.	CORPS.	FORCE.
ARTILLERY		20
INFANTRY.	Ximenez	273
	San Luis	394
	Queretaro	258
	Cuautla	102
CAVALRY.	Tampico	97
	Militia of Guanaxuato	21
Total		1165

RECAPITULATION.

First section	1408	2573
Second section	1165	

DETACHMENTS.

In Bexar, of various corps and arms		1001
Yucatan.	In Copano	60
	In the mission of Refugio	5
	In Goliad.	174
Tres-Villas.—	In Matagorda	189
Cuautla.—	In Victoria	40
Regular militia of Durango		21
Frontier dragoons		15

Total force of the army . . . 4078

Mr. Salas alone, as the aid who carried the order, informed me, and as I afterwards saw, had in Columbia two hundred men. Matagorda was protected by Tres-Villas, Goliad and Copano, with the battalion of regular militia of Yucatan, and Victoria only had a detachment of sixty-one dragoons, conformably to the demonstration made. How, then, did Mr. Urrea remain in Brazoria with only four hundred men as he asserts? Where were the other five hundred and sixty-five, which are wanting to complete the 1165?

That his excellency the president is to-day a prisoner, &c. His excellency was better aware than Mr. Urrea, of the precarious situation in which the army had remained, of the want of supplies that would immediately take place, and of the difficulty of continuing the campaign, and remaining in the country without them. These considerations, rather than that of his own life and that of his unhappy companions in misfortune, caused him with his usual quickness, to enter into an agreement in which nothing is stipulated that the army ought not to have done even without it, and for which the supreme government itself had thought proper to authorize me, almost under the same date, in the despatches of his excellency the secretary of war, dated 15th May. As regards the pity and compassion which I ought to have had for the inhabitants of the river San Antonio, Goliad, San Patricio, &c. I would like that your Excellency himself could hear the praises which are prodigally bestowed on Mr. Urrea, for the good treatment which they received from him, and not only them but all the inhabitants from Matamoros to Leona Vicario, and a great portion of those of Tamaulipas; one may see that the immediate cause of this was, either because they were not aware of his benevolent intentions, or because they are naturally ungrateful.

This is, then, all that I have to say, your Excellency, as regards the secret information of Mr. Urrea; *to have caused the arms of his division to be respected in every place; his operations to cover the rear-guard of the army, and placing himself in the vanguard, to have facilitated the passage of the river Colorado; his military talents which so strongly recommend him; his distinguished services in having saved the artillery of the army; his subordination; his desire to avoid the retreat and of placing the president at liberty; his high-minded loyalty; his opposition to the shame of his country and of the army, and his disinterestedness; and the great merit that he acquired in being the sole cause on account of his secret despatch, that I should be deprived of the command without*

being heard, without receiving my despatches; that it should be given to my calumniator himself; and that the evening of my life should be filled with pain and bitterness, after forty odd years of honorable service, during which I have never received a single reproach, and for which I am only consoled by the opinion at this very day formed by the public, who render justice, and are not hasty in their judgments. This was his zeal for the public service, for the honor of the army and decorum of the government and nation, for which promotion and extraordinary praises have been prodigally bestowed to the prejudice of others who better deserve them. I then must, excellent sir, conclude for my part as respects general Urrea, with accusing him to your Excellency, as having committed the crime specified in the 10th art., tit. 12, 2d treaties of the general ordinance of the army, and to request as a matter of justice that he may be tried according to it. What I have exposed is a sufficient proof of it, and a greater proof is that of all the generals of the army, whose science and patriotism Mr. Urrea will never equal; he alone should have had any thing to say as to my conduct, and the others should have thought well of my movements, as I always consulted them, including colonels Morales and Montoya, of the section of Mr. Urrea, and who suggested very solid reasons for the necessity of the march that the army commenced for Matamoros.

Let me also be permitted, your Excellency, in sustainment of the charge that I was executing, and in regard to the public service, to say that there is in relation to the equivocal conduct of general Vital Fernandez, who, in a most efficacious manner, has contributed to the slights and insults which I have suffered, and with whom the government find themselves obliged to adopt measures, perhaps not very favorable to the good name of the nation, of the public service and of justice.

This general wrote officially to his excellency the President, general-in-chief of the army of operations, being ignorant of his misfortune, under date of 29th April last, that with the escort of lieutenant colonel Luis Tola, sixty infantry and thirty cavalry, he remitted him one hundred and forty thousand dollars of the one hundred and seventy-three thousand eight hundred and ten and one fourth dollars, which were deposited in that commissary for the army, and that they ought to arrive at Goliad on the 12th May; but as soon as he was informed of the event of the 21st April, he ordered an express to overtake the said officer, that he might return to Matamoros from Santa Gertrudis, (a place much nearer to the town of Goliad than to the former,) with one hun-

dred and ten thousand dollars, and that only thirty thousand dollars should be continued on to the army, under the frivolous pretext that the Indians had risen, it being the fact that it is always so, and the money had already passed the places that they frequent; and it has never happened that they attack a party of fifteen, as if besides the one hundred and ten thousand did not run more risk with the sixty infantry who returned back, and the thirty thousand with the thirty dragoons who continued on to Goliad, than if they had followed their primitive destination all in a body. This occurrence astonished all the officers of the army as well as myself, and made us enter into a calculation concerning the views that such conduct contained, under circumstances such as we were in; and recollecting the former conduct of this general, and the reports of his connivance with the colonists, which were current in February last, when we were in Monclova, and which Mr. Urrea had told me he had rendered of no effect by his presence at that time, &c. &c.; made me conceive very strong suspicions concerning the safety of our rear-guard and communications with the supreme government; or at least that the army would not again receive part of that money. With respect to this last suspicion, but little was wanting that it should not so happen, notwithstanding that I made general Joaquin Ramirez and Sesma, and my aid-de-camp lieutenant colonel John Cuevas, march to that place with all diligence; since, in fine, the army did not receive more than one hundred and forty thousand dollars from the hundred and seventy odd thousand; and of this Mr. Urrea took for only eight hundred and a few men, of which the section was composed with which he marched to that city, fifty-five thousand eight hundred and seventy-five dollars seven rials and five granos, as your Excellency may please see in the copies which, with due respect I annex, marked with Nos. 9 and 10.

The want of communications from the supreme government was another anxiety which we all experienced: in fact, I ought to receive the answer to my despatches, dated 25th and 28th April at the latest on the 22d May in the town of Goliad; and when I set out from there on the 23d, I had not yet received it, which gave rise to fresh suspicions, much more as I had purchased through Mr. Urrea a horse for a hundred dollars for the courier; and in truth they had too much foundation, if attention be paid to the copies of the certificates, numbers 11 and 12, which I take the liberty also of sending to your Excellency; corroborated besides, by my never receiving an answer to my

despatch dated 14th May last, nor have I seen it published, as was done with all the others. One may see that he was not permitted to continue until Mr. Fernandez received in Matamoros on the 30th, my official letter with the 9th article of the treaty, because they wished to force me by all means to retreat, or to any other compromise that would suit their purposes, and to let Mr. Urrea have an occasion to make a noise about his zeal and military knowledge in his official letter of the 1st June for the purposes that they designed, when the said despatch could very well have reached the secretary on the 28th, or at latest on the 29th, and I could have received the answer at the Nueces on the 7th or 8th June. But what, your Excellency, is more to be wondered at, is, that an order of so much interest as that communicated to me by the secretary of war and marine dated 19th May, No. 13, should not reach me until the 10th June, at Motas de Dona Clara, 22 days after being written, time more than sufficient to have arrived and returned from Goliad: in a word, that I should have received it almost on the same day of my relinquishment of the command of the army by the respected order of your Excellency, dated 31st May, twelve days after, to deliver the command to Mr. Urrea, notwithstanding this had been detained two days in Matamoros. But this was because they wished to be previously assured that the command of the army would be given to Mr. Urrea; so that if this measure had been delayed longer, they, without doubt, would have still detained that order; and because they also wished that the army should continue retreating, that they might afterwards find plausible pretexts for another purpose. Could I not, your Excellency, have received this order of the 19th May very easily on the 30th of the same month, before passing the river Nueces, counter-march in virtue of it, and on the 2d June join Mr. Andrade at the rivulet Mugerero, and on the 3d be again in Goliad? But this, it seems, did not suit the views of Messrs. Urrea and Fernandez. Is it not equally strange that my despatch of 31st May should not be received until the 25th June, when in the same time one could go as far as Nacogdoches?

Does not all that I have exposed, your Excellency, sufficiently make known the cabal and intrigue, (as I say at the commencement of this respectful manifest,) which has been practiced against my honor and the public service? Why so strong a desire to detain my communications to the supreme government, and the orders that they thought proper to direct me? This indeed, your Excellency, is *shame, and greater shame*

yet, that for such manoeuvres they receive promotions, confidence and praises which the supreme government has lavished on them.

Sufficient proofs have I exposed already, to destroy the calumnies, and to prove the rectitude of my intentions; but I will yet produce another to show that neither pusillanimity nor fear were the motives of my retreat; it was only necessity.— Since my arrival at Goliad, the officers constantly represented to me, that the soldiers, without clothing and food, could not pass the rainy season in those places; and nevertheless, as it was my intention to await the orders of the supreme government, I commenced repairing the barracks, and making other preparations, when an agent of Mr. Urrea was presented to me, telling me that the enemy 1,800 strong, was preparing to attack me, (document No. 14,) and immediately I sent orders to General Andrade to demolish the fortification of the Alamo, of no use at any time, to spike the various pieces of artillery taken from the enemy, to send across to San Patricio all that he had in Bexar, escorted by the pickets and cavalry which were under his orders, and that he, with four hundred chosen dragoons and two pieces of artillery, should march on the left bank of the river San Antonio to Goliad, making the journey in four days. I commenced my march to the river Aransaso, two days' journey distant, and intended by making a countermarch, that on the same day and hour Mr. Andrade and my forces should meet the enemy, by which means, they confident that I was retreating, would have been taken by the surprise that I expected to give them, and would have found themselves surrounded on all sides: but as I was already commencing this movement, the commissioners were presented to me with the articles of the armistice, and consequently the declarations of Escalera and Sanchez were disregarded; as I observed besides, that the enemy kept the river Guadalupe between their forces and mine, I made it appear that my march was in consequence of what the president had determined, and I continued on to the Nueces to wait for General Andrade. If this event had not occurred, the enemy would have been beaten, and I would have continued to retreat after the victory, the same as before, because battles do not nourish soldiers who stand in need of every kind of provisions. On the Nueces I also wished to stop and await the orders of the supreme government (which I would not have received, because I have shewn that my calumniators held back from me every thing necessary to carry out their views) and I wrote officially to

general Fernandez to send me provisions: his answer (No. 15) shows that I ought not to expect them, for even those which he says were coming in the schooner Watchman, were not enough for more than five days: what resource had I then, except to continue retreating? I ought not to suppose that any effort would be made in Matamoros to provide for me, because, in addition to what he says in his communication referred to, that there were none there, Mr. Fernandez took by force from the commissary, some which were sold in the market, even of those belonging to the army, which Mr. Cayetano Rubio had prepared; in consequence, I ordered the troops to continue on to that place, and in doing so I think I have rendered a service, because on the contrary, some would have perished from necessity, and others deserted, so that to this measure is their preservation due, and I will never repent it, whatever be the comment made.

In fine, your Excellency, generals Urrea and Fernandez obtained the most complete success; my discredit, the command, promotions, every thing that all this could produce, and may it please God that it may all result for the honor and service of the republic. I mean, while time solves the problem, showing who has acted with the most rectitude in their intentions, resting on my conscience and on the justice of the judges who may have to try me, to remain tranquil, and believe myself entitled to ask of your Excellency, that if what I have exposed deserves consideration, the conduct of those generals be equally subjected to judicial examination, according to the articles of ordinance which I already quoted with reference to Mr. Urrea, and as regards Mr. Fernandez, according to that which may be proper in conformity with what I have made manifest. In consequence of all, I entreat your Excellency to condescend to decree as I have petitioned, inasmuch as it is justice.

Your Excellency,

VICENTE FILISOLA.

Mexico, August 19th, 1836.

DOCUMENTS.

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NO. 1.

Excellent Sir:—I have to-day received the official and private communications of his Excellency the president, Don Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, which I send to your Excellency.

As I had commenced my movements, as was my duty for the service of the public, according to what I represented to your Excellency in my despatch of the 25th inst., for that reason, for those which in good time I will more extensively explain to your Excellency; and for the indications of his Excellency general Santa Anna, I have answered him as follows:—Army of operations.—Excellent Sir—As soon as I was informed by some dispersed officers and soldiers of the unfortunate encounter which your Excellency communicates to me in his letter of the 22d, I made the movements proper for concentrating the army, and having effected this, marched on this flank, in order that being disembarassed of some useless and troublesome things, I could again make an opening on the enemy; but in attention to the said communication of your Excellency, to the circumstances expressed in it, and wishing to give a proof of my esteem for your person, as also for the prisoners of which your Excellency makes mention, I am going to re-pass the Colorado, and will cease hostilities, should the enemy not give occasion to continue them.

Generals Gaona, Urrea and Ramirez Sesma, have joined their divisions to mine, as I have previously remarked. Your Excellency is well aware of the disposable force with which I can operate with these divisions; and in consequence will perceive that I cease hostilities in spite of my responsibility to the supreme government, only, I repeat, for the consideration due to your person, and to the peace of the republic; but in return, I wish to know also that your Excellency, and those who have been made prisoners shall be perfectly respected, as are several of the enemy that I have in my power. Hostilities ceasing, as I say to your Excellency, property shall also be respected, only that which is very necessary for the army will be taken; and should

their owners appear, they shall be punctually paid, as they would have been, had they not have abandoned, and many of them burnt their dwellings. Some small houses of wood have been set on fire, which has excited my indignation, and that of the generals under my orders;—this act, perpetrated by the pillagers, who are never wanting in armies, has called our attention to such a degree, that in consequence, I imposed penalty of life to whomsoever should repeat it, even before receiving the communication of your Excellency.

As your Excellency says to me that he has agreed upon an armistice with general Houston, and does not explain to me the basis of it, general Adrian Woll passes to inform himself of them, in order that they may be fulfilled on our side, and also to be able to exact their fulfilment from our opponents. With what I have stated, all that your Excellency says to me in his letter referred to, is attended to; and I take great satisfaction in reiterating my esteem and consideration.—And I advise your Excellency of it in order that he may be pleased to give an account of every thing to his Excellency the president pro tem for his superior determination.

God and liberty. Rivulet of San Bernard, 28th April, 1836.—*Vicente Filisola*. To his Excellency the secretary of war and marine.

NO. 2.

Army of operations.—Excellent Sir:—In the afternoon of yesterday I arrived at this place with that part of the army of operations which, on account of the sad event of the 21st of last April, remained under my command, whose force is made known by statement No. 1, which I have the honor to annex for the particular information of his Excellency the president pro tem.

In my last despatch to the government, dated 28th April, from the bank of the river San Bernard, I stated to your Excellency, that I would in good time more extensively inform the government of the motives which, even without the intercession of his Excellency the president's measures, compelled me to make a retrograde movement in this direction; now that I am enabled, I proceed to do so.

As I said to your Excellency in my first despatch, dated 25th

last month, his Excellency the president passed over to the left bank of the river Brazos, by the place called Old Fort, on the 15th of the same month, and afterwards marched on to Harrisburg with the battalion of Matamoros, the preferrent companies of Guerrero, first regular militia of Mexico and Toluca, a six-pounder, and seventy chosen dragoons, having advised me to despatch general Cos with 500 men and two pieces of artillery against the fort at Velasco. On the 17th I received an order from his Excellency, that the force which was to go with Mr. Cos should only consist of 200 men: and on the 18th another order, in which he advises me that Mr. Cos should be sent to join him with 500 infantry and fifty boxes musket cartridges; which was done on that day, with the remainder of Guerrero, Toluca, the battalion of Aldama, and two companies of the regiment Guadalajara. His Excellency promised himself to give the finishing touch to his work, because the complete occupation of Texas appeared to be already carried to pure and due effect. The army had taken the fort of the Alamo, beaten and destroyed the greater part of the forces which the enemy called of the line, taken a considerable number of artillery, guns and munitions, passed three large rivers, and was animated in the midst of hunger and nakedness with a burning zeal in favor of sustaining the integrity of their country's soil; a little more calm, would undoubtedly have crowned their heroical efforts and sufferings with success.

On the afternoon of the 23d, I was concluding the operation of sending across the river the section with which general Gaona was to march to Nacogdoches, when a soldier of the frontier dragoons presented to me a small piece of paper, written with pencil, by colonel Mariano Garcia, first aid of Guerrero, in which he informed me of the unfortunate occurrence of the afternoon of the 21st; a short time after some fugitives arrived, and amongst them D. Miguel Aguirre, captain of the regiment of Tampico, wounded in the action in the thigh by a rifle ball, who said that the defeat had been complete, and that the existence of the president was at least doubtful; such news made me immediately suspend the continuation of the passage of the river by the force that was to have gone with Mr. Gaona, and to command a picket of cavalry in the direction of the battle ground, as much to acquire information of the true fate of the president, as to protect the fugitives who might have escaped; but the enemy had burnt a bridge which was the only road for retreating, and in consequence they obtained nothing, or very little in either view,

for all had been killed or made prisoners. Alarm and discouragement was general amongst all classes, for it was believed that all the prisoners, the president included, would have been shot as a reprisal for the conduct observed in Bexar and Goliad with theirs. The situation which the army was in at Old Fort was extremely exposed; the camp was situated on an angle jutting out towards the left bank of the river; the landing on that side is surrounded by a thick wood of live oaks, from whence the enemy could fire without being seen, and the bank of the river is higher on the left side than the right, from where it was necessary to sustain those who would be attacked from the other side: on the other hand, the river can be passed in various places at a little distance farther up or down, and in this case, the forces that were there would have found themselves caught in a trap, as is commonly said: it was very urgent to leave this false position, make general Gaona re-cross the river, to re-unite the forces which general Urrea commanded that were in Brazoria, and to take measures conducive to the safety of all; which was effected on the 25th at the dwelling of Mrs. Powel, five leagues from Old Fort.

The march of the army had been as far as the right bank of the river Brazos, similar to a torrent; it was only necessary to advance in order to conquer; the soldiers, with inimitable heroism had borne every kind of privations and fatigue, their clothing destroyed in the passing of the rivers, mending the roads, and during the long and painful marches which had been performed without any rest, and without even being able to wash themselves for one day; the greater part of the troops were barefooted, wanting clothing, shelter and everything necessary to endure a campaign at such an immense distance; for many days they had not eaten biscuit, and after leaving Monclova they had only received half a pound of that or baked corn bread. The officers were in want of everything; a carga of corn, (about four bushels,) came to be sold at the exorbitant price of ninety dollars; a loaf of bread has cost three; a tortilla two rials; for a small lump of sugar, two dollars and a half has been paid; and for a pint of brandy, eight dollars. I had behind me two large rivers, unguarded by any detachment, a number of sick without physicians, without medicines, and without the hope of any provision in the wide desert in which I was placed, whose scanty habitations and subsistence had been reduced to ashes by the owners themselves, and I was ignorant of the plan of campaign which the president had thought of, because his Excellency had not

confided it to any one. The situation of the army was then, under every aspect the most lamentable and discouraging even for the most intrepid and unthinking of men. I can assure your Excellency that even triumphing and without the misfortune of the 21st, the army would very little have bettered their sad situation.

The enemy possess three steam boats and several small schooners, with which, by taking their position on Galveston and the island of Culebra, they could with impunity have made incursions up the river against our right flank and rear-guard, and also place in jeopardy our detachments at Copano, Goliad and Matagorda, because the wet weather, by leaving us isolated between the Trinity and Brazos, and between this and the Colorado, would have put it out of our power to give them speedy assistance, and cut off our communications for receiving provisions. The conquest of Texas will always be an easy matter for the Mexican republic; but the preservation of it in my opinion requires very different measures from those adopted in this campaign; it must be a work of judgment, prudence, constancy and immense sacrifices by the public treasury; the contrary will produce nothing but momentary advantages, enormous expenses, and shameful consequences.

Aware, then, of the situation in which I was placed, and wishing to hear the opinion of the generals, my companions in arms, I assembled them; and they unanimously agreed, that it was necessary to re-pass the river Colorado, establish our communications with the interior of the republic, and await assistance from the government and instructions, when they should be advised of the misfortune that had happened and of the condition of the army in every respect. In consequence, I disposed a retrograde movement to the pass called Cayce's, in the direction of this village, ordering colonel Francisco Garay to march one day's journey in advance, and to construct some rafts or other means proper for passing the river. On the 27th, I left the dwelling of Mrs. Powel for the rivulets of San Bernard, and at two o'clock of that afternoon was passing the first of them, when a heavy rain commenced falling, which continued until the following day. The army passed the night in a pond without having a place to stand on that was not covered with water; on the following day I continued the march to the second rivulet, the troops being up to their knees in water the whole distance; when I came up to it I found that it was not fordable, as the rain had swollen it so much, and the guides assured me that it would take

at least eight days to go down, and that afterwards it was necessary to pass through a forest for five leagues, full of reeds and high grass, which, on account of the storm, would be very difficult to get out of. For this reason, as I ought not to lose a moment to insure a passage to the Colorado, I determined to make for the place called Atascosito. On the same afternoon I received the gratifying news of the existence of the president, which I had the honor to send to your Excellency a copy of; but as the movement commenced was the result of the condition of the army, I continued it on the 29th, when I encamped near the same rivulet that I had passed on the 27th; although about three leagues above is the road for the passage called Atascosito. All the land comprised between the rivers Brazos and Colorado, is of such nature, that with little rain the roads and fields are impassable, so much so that the animals sunk up to their breasts; for this reason we again passed the night buried in the mud. On the 30th I once more commenced the march, and from morning till night we advanced scarcely one league. The baggage mules were so immersed in the mud, that they could not move; the wheels of the wagons were buried above their axles, and the horses and men could not step because they had no foot hold. The night was horrible; artillery, cavalry, sick, baggage mules, every thing that accompanied the army was a confused mass, without any distinction and without being able to move from the place where they were caught.

With immense trouble it was hardly possible to assemble the brigades of infantry and form them in a place that appeared less miry; but the weight of the men very soon made us know that the surface of the ground was all the same, and the soldiers sunk up to their knees: to heighten our misery there was not a single splinter of wood to make fire for cooking, and consequently less for watch-fires. This want made me fear yet greater evils, and that the soldiers would, without distinction, lay hold of trunks or ammunition boxes to warm themselves; thanks to the zeal of the generals, chiefs and officers, and to the unparalleled endurance of a Mexican soldier, no disorder occurred during the whole night. The morning of the 1st of May presented to my sight a spectacle truly horrible, and which can only be believed by those who were witnesses, because it is not possible for any one to imagine it who does not possess a knowledge of the topography of Texas, of the qualities of its surface, and of the inconsistency of its climate in continual changes of cold, heat, snow, rain and frightful hurricanes. The position of the army on this

morning was on the right bank of the principal rivulet of several which form the river San Bernard, and between the two roads which come from San Felipe de Austin to Bexar and to this town, which are marked on the map of Texas of 1833; all the rivulets were swollen so as not to afford a passage before eight or ten days, and no other outlet remained but the road which leads to the pass of the river Colorado, called Atascosito; the land between the said rivulets is swampy and of the same kind as that on which we were encamped: the said pass was not five leagues off: cannons, wagons, mules, ammunition and men, were all buried in the mud. All the provisions which the purveyor of the army had, consisted of some few bushels of beans and salt, and to heighten our misfortune, there was no other firewood, as I previously observed, than the artillery carriages, wagons, trunks, ammunition boxes and those of the muskets. In the army the dysentery was already commencing, and we were without the means of cure and without physicians; there remained at last no other alternative, than to perish with hunger or to abandon every thing, saving only the men. The day before I found myself under the necessity of lightening the baggage wagons, by making the muskets and bags for earth which came in them to be carried by the soldiers, who were already without strength for want of nourishment; and nevertheless said empty wagons could not arrive at the place where we passed the night, until after four o'clock the next morning. If the enemy under those critical circumstances should have met us on the only road that was left, nothing would remain but to die or surrender at discretion, because there was not a single musket capable of striking fire, and almost all the ammunition was wet; what a different situation from that of ten days previous! In order not to expose ourselves to an accident so shameful, in the morning I had made general Urrea advance with his brigade to Atascosito; on that day he took possession of it and procured some means for passing the river; but it was not possible for the army and the immense load of ammunition and baggage, to arrive in five days afterwards at that place, on account of the bad condition of the country, and on the other hand it was impossible to subsist so long without eating. I determined then to advance with every thing that could follow, which consisted only of men, and to leave all the rest to the zeal and incomparable indefatigability of lieutenant colonel Don Pedro Ampudia, commandant-general of the artillery, with pickets of soldiers from each corps, so that they might assist him in the work. At dark,

I encamped one league distant from Atascosito; the soldiers were enabled to eat meat roasted, and on the following day I sent fire wood and meat to lieutenant colonel Ampudia. The storm threatened still to continue, and made me despair of saving the baggage and artillery. On the 2nd day, about three hundred of the enemy presented themselves to the rear-guard of our scattered pieces and baggage, and opened communications with Ampudia, who was scarcely able in a small space to manœuvre two four-pounders, the only cannon that he could get out of the mud, and about one hundred infantry; but they appeared to have orders not to commit hostilities, and only to expedite our crossing the river Colorado. Ampudia informed me of this occurrence, and as I did not wish to compromise myself in any treaty that the president should have made with the rebels, I only made evasive answers that he should save all that he could and pass the river. No one who has made war for even a very short time, can be ignorant of the difficulty and danger of this operation in the face of the enemy, even under the most ordinary circumstances; but under those in which I was placed, it was indeed horrible. At last, thanks to the constancy and indefatigability of Mr. Ampudia, that of the generals, chiefs and officers; heroism and endurance of the Mexican soldier, who, one and all, worked incessantly like so many plough-men; this operation was concluded on the 9th, without other loss than the twelve baggage wagons, the forge and a gun-carriage, which it was not possible to drag from the mud, because at that time neither the men nor the beasts had sufficient strength to do it, inasmuch as said wagons were in very bad order on account of the long marches made with them, and because, in fine, in all the space from that place to the river Colorado, there exist no means of subsistence on account of the country being deserted, and it was absolutely necessary to arrive quickly at this town and procure them, although unfortunately I have found nothing but meat, a little rice and a very small quantity of beans. This day, your Excellency, a quart of corn has been sold for a dollar, at the same price a small loaf of sugar, and a loaf of bread weighing a pound and a half for three dollars; there is a very great want of every thing except meat.

The army, as I have already said, is without clothing, the arms ruined, ammunition of every kind in very bad condition, horses and mules badly used in the extreme; we have neither physician nor apothecary: we are threatened with the epidemic of the season and the innumerable sufferings which the army

has undergone; and should this misfortune take place, the men will perish without the least assistance, in the midst of discouragement, and abandoned without even the consolation of spiritual assistance, for we have not a single chaplain to say mass for us. The immense bulk of baggage is incredible, ~~the army~~ take three times the number of mules more than is due ~~to them~~: this disorder, owing to the bad organization and management commenced at Saltillo, is an immense caravan which contains double the number of consumers to that of those who bear arms; because, I repeat, they only thought of advancing, and of nothing more: it is necessary then to re-organize, rest and instruct them, as the greater part are recruits who scarcely know how to carry a musket on their shoulder. Nevertheless they are animated with the best national sentiments, and desirous of carrying to the end the orders of the supreme government, should the means be provided for them; because, on the contrary, they will see themselves obliged to continue their retreat. The post of Matagorda was garrisoned by the battalion of Tres-Villas, and a twelve pounder, under the orders of colonel Augustine Alcerica, who, having heard the fate of the president, precipitately abandoned it, leaving exposed part of his battalion, and Don Juan Olsinger, captain of engineers, who embarked in a small sloop with the piece, three artillerymen and several prisoners, and I have not yet heard from him, there having elapsed sufficient time for him to have landed at Copano, or some other place on the coast. The treasury does not contain a dollar; the government remitted money to Matamoros for the army, but the commandant general there has detained it, and has not forwarded a single rial, after making many offers to do so. As these late occurrences may have occasioned some disturbances in the port of Matamoros, or places near to it, I have ordered general Urrea to march with 800 men, which I will be pleased to hear has merited the approbation of the supreme government.

I have the honor to accompany by copy, No. 2, the latest communication that I have received from his Excellency the president, in order that your Excellency, being pleased to render an account of it to his Excellency the president *pro tem.* may make of it the use that may be deemed proper, with the understanding that I will not obey any order that is not received from the secretaryship under your charge, the only legal office that I at this time recognize; and with the understanding, that should the army retreat from these posts, it is also necessary to abandon Bexar, and not to leave any force there exposed to suffer a

second mortification, for wishing to maintain a post entirely insignificant.

Annexed is a general statement of the army as it exists in this place, Bexar, and different detachments which include the force with which general Urrea has marched to Matamoros.

I have the honor, your Excellency, to repeat the protestations of my great consideration.

God and Liberty. Guadalupe Victoria, May 14th. 1836.
Vicente Filisola. To his Excellency, the secretary of war and marine.

NO 3.

Army of operations.—Excellent Sir:—Since my despatch to your Excellency, dated 14th instant, seeing that the town of Guadalupe Victoria is nothing more than ten or twelve wooden houses, scattered along the left bank of the river Guadalupe, which was, besides, a very bad military position, I determined to march to the town of Goliad, which being situated on the right bank of the San Antonio, unites, besides the advantages of being ten leagues nearer Bexar and the port of Copano, whence the army ought to receive provisions.

The town of Goliad is what was formerly called Bahía del Espíritu Santo; it was reduced to an old quadrangular enclosure, extending one hundred and fifty paces on each side, containing in it a small church and the barracks of the frontier dragoons, who protected it: around it were from twenty-five to thirty huts, some of stone and mud, and others of wood, and five small brick houses of one or two rooms each. The colonists whom general Urrea fought when they abandoned it, burnt all these dwellings, which were converted to cinders, and the army in consequence had to live bivouacked. The troops have destroyed their clothing in seven month's continual marching, during which they have passed the night sleeping on the ground with their clothes on, daily employed in making fagots of all kinds, and wanting even soap to wash themselves, because those places do not furnish materials for constructing huts, nor fire-wood to cook with, having finished the remains of the huts that escaped the burning, which was made use of for them. The weather began to be extremely warm, and the dew that fell at night was equal to a shower of rain; these circumstances have completed

the rotting of the garments of the soldiers, and have daily added to the number of sick in the army: there was no possibility of sheltering them under a roof, as the church was very small; we were in want of physicians, medicines, proper aliments, linen for the beds, as these were only made of the rags of the clothes which remained to them; in consequence the poor miserable fellows had to make their beds on the ground, on which, **their** sufferings causing them to keep in continual agitation, formed sores on their shoulders and hips. It is, your Excellency, a spectacle truly pitiful and disanimating, to see our unfortunate soldiers lose their health in serving their country.

Inasmuch as the country is a desert, no other means of subsistence could be found than that of the cattle which the army took with them, that we met with between the river Colorado and the Guadalupe, belonging to the colonists: having finished these it was impossible to procure others, without going for them as far as that place, or to the right bank of the river Bravo, because Bexar is wanting in every kind of supplies. In Goliad we found some provisions brought in the national schooners Second Correo and Second Bravo; but of these, unfortunately, a great part of the biscuit proved to be rotten, and the little barrels which came as containing four arrobas, did not produce even two and a half. The purveyor finds himself under the necessity in these deserts, not only to provide nourishment for the soldiers, but also for the generals, chiefs, officers, wagons, muleteers, and even for the immense number of women who follow the army, because if he does not, the soldiers take the victuals from their own mouths to give to them, debilitate themselves, and then get sick. So it is, that according to the nearest calculation I made, I had provisions for twelve days, giving out a half pound biscuit, and economizing the remainder as far as possible. It is true that the American schooner Watchman has been about to sail from Matamoros with provisions to Copano, destined for the army, although up to the 23d, she had not sailed from that port: but these, according to the note which I annex, **only** would have lasted, even giving half a ration daily to each man, scarcely for ten days, and this supposing that there was no error nor cheat in the weight as in the former remittance; the beans a little more or less, and may be rice for a day more; in addition, not a single ounce of salt was sent, which the army were actually in want of, and it is the most indispensable article, because without it, it is not possible to eat meat, the principal

nourishment from which they have subsisted, and could have subsisted a few days more.

At Guadalupe Victoria I was assured in a positive manner, and by a person worthy of credit, that a north American brig which was coming from New Orleans to Matamoros, laden with provisions for the army, had been captured by a Texian vessel; and that in New Orleans they had lost the suit against the captain, who had been apprehended, for which reason, the house that sent provisions, refused to send more in future. This made me fear that I would not receive any by sea for a long time; and as to receiving them by land, besides there not being a great quantity in the departments of the republic from whence they could come to me, the distance being enormous, and the means of transportation so difficult, that the army would have perished before receiving them. As the army is composed rather of squads of battalions, than of these properly so called, the number of chiefs, officers, &c., is three times what they ought to be, in proportion to their force; so it is that the mules for carrying and pulling, which are with the army, are in prodigious quantities; this circumstance renders it almost immoveable, and very little fit for the operations of war; heavy for the offensive, and very dangerous or exposed for the defensive, as it has to take care of more than two thousand beasts for carrying and hauling, without reckoning the horses of the mounted soldiers, generals, chiefs and officers, which, as there is nothing for them to eat but grass, have every day to go to a greater distance, and increases the care; because the wild Indians and the people of Bexar are constantly scheming to rob what they can, and do it with so much sagacity and dexterity, that it is difficult to avoid it; my horses and baggage mules have already shared this fate, as well as others of several chiefs and officers.

Bexar is forty leagues distant from Goliad, and in case of being attacked, at least six days march would be necessary to send aid to it, as it is not easy to obtain news in good time through immense deserts, where a road may be intercepted by any small party; and besides, during the rainy season, the roads from the left border of the Bravo, as far as the Sabine, are impracticable, not only for the operations of war, but also for mercantile speculations; and the rivers become immense lakes, impossible to be crossed. So then, your Excellency, mine was a most embarrassing situation: I found that it would be impossible either to return to the offensive, or to remain on the defensive: first, for want of provisions, and other assistance for preservation, and

the season of the year; and because, in addition, throughout the whole country comprised between the rivers Guadalupe, Colorado and Brazos, fevers are so common from June to November, that it is a miracle in any year that a single one of the inhabitants escapes being attacked by them, and it would have been wishing to make a voluntary loss; and secondly, because without the same resources, and without barracks, it would have been attended with the same result, although with less honor. On another side, the reflections of the other generals and chiefs, concerning the influence which the unfortunate occurrence to the president could have in the interior of the republic, were incessant. I can assure your Excellency, that my patience and suffering arrived on this occasion to an extreme that I never believed myself capable of enduring.

With all this, your Excellency, notwithstanding the many considerations I have manifested, there was another which most tormented my mind: the president of the republic, the illustrious Mexican general, Santa Anna, found himself a prisoner, and had only saved his life by offering that the army should retreat, and the colonies remain free from it. He had despatched an order for the purpose, and particularly intimated to me that on this movement depended his life, and that of seven hundred valiant Mexicans: should I act offensively, and even gain the action—in the act I killed him and the rest; and should I lose, besides the loss which the army would experience, the republic would suffer that of the president, and so many other brave persons, whose lives, without doubt, the rage of these adventurers would not spare; and should I remain on the defensive, besides producing the same results, I would expose myself to other losses as lamentable as they would be inevitable. The plan, then, that I had to adopt, was clear, to continue the retrograde movement which I had commenced, in conformity to what the president had offered, and not leave in Bexar any detachment to suffer a new mortification; but I rather wished to await the orders from the supreme government, and circumstances did not permit me to do so; I arranged, then, my march with the intention of covering the line from the river Bravo, and of holding the posts of Matamoros, Camargo, Mier, and Revilla. There it would be possible to re-organize the army as might be most convenient, give instruction to those who were in need of it, be ready to open a new campaign against Texas, or give succour, should it be wanted, to that part of the republic which the government should order.

Being already on the march on the 25th, and suffering a violent tempest and rain, which began as we commenced marching, two individuals of the rebels of Texas were presented to me with despatches for me, from his Excellency, the president, which contain the treaties, which, with sorrow, I have the honor to annex, by copy, to your Excellency, for the due information of the supreme government. As that which is exacted in them, with but little difference, is the same that his Excellency, the general-in-chief had previously provided, and on the other hand, I found it indispensable, agreed to it in the camp on the rivulet of Mugerero on the 26th, the answers that I have being likewise annexed.

The 28th, on the march for this place, I met the respectable communications of your Excellency, dated 15th of last month, and, according to the wishes of the supreme government, which they make manifest to me, I find that they are satisfied with what has been essentially done, up to this time; the life of him, who has so often exposed it for the good of the country, is preserved; that also of a very precious portion of the generals, chiefs, officers, and troops of the army of operations, who were made prisoners, the change of those which we have of the enemy agreed upon for an equal number of our own; and had all those made in the campaign been preserved, all would surely have been the same, and the question would simply be reduced to the liberty of his excellency, the president; but unfortunately it was not so, and the number of those who can benefit by this opportunity is very small, for whom I have already extended the orders. As regards the liberty of his Excellency, the president, it is natural that they should wish to address themselves directly to the supreme government, to negotiate for it on the best terms that they can, because the 10th article of the agreement in question, so makes it understood; and as respects the independence of Texas, in nothing is the national honor compromised. I am also ordered to preserve the city of Bexar; but this was not attainable without destroying all the rest: on the other hand, Bexar is of no importance as a settlement, less as a military position, and is absolutely useless for a combined place, on account of its situation entirely isolated.

I have thought, then, your Excellency, that I proceeded conformably to the interests of the republic, to the desires of the supreme government, to my duty and conscience; should the government not thus deem it, I am ready to answer in the way they think proper, because in all cases, I more value their deco-

rum, and that of the nation, than my own existence; but I entreat you to weigh well my reasons, to consider that perhaps there never was a general placed in so complicated and embarrassed a position as that in which I found myself; I do not mention other reasons, perhaps more convincing; and, in fine, I think I have saved the whole army from a disaster, and the national decorum from a positive disgrace. On this occasion, your Excellency, I have the honor to reiterate my most sincere protestations of my great consideration and respect.

God and Liberty.—Camp on the right bank of the river Nueces, May 31st, 1836. *Vicente Filisola.* To his Excellency, the secretary of war and marine.

NO. 4.

Army of Operations.—Excellent sir:—I have received with due respect, the despatch of your Excellency, dated 19th last month, and fully informed myself of all, that by order of his Excellency, the president *pro tem.*, is advised me in it, as also of the energetic measures which are taken to reinforce the army of operations against Texas, the command of which has fallen to my insufficiency. I must say, that it is extremely grievous to me, your Excellency, to see that I do not find myself in a situation to fulfil any of such respectable commands, for the strong motives which I at length exposed to your Excellency, in my despatches of 14th and 31st last May; and it is much the more grievous, inasmuch as perhaps the arrangements of his Excellency, the president *pro tem.*, may have been dictated in consequence of inexact information concerning the importance of localities, subsistence, and preservation of the troops; but I am animated, nevertheless, excellent sir, by the hope that his Excellency, the president *pro tem.*, may have changed his opinion, after having seen my communications referred to, if perchance they have had the good fortune to be believed: but even were it not so, it is absolutely out of my power to vary my direction from the places to which I advised your Excellency I was advancing, in my last communication referred to, as was also the ability to preserve for a longer time, the line which I am now commanded to sustain; the motives which compelled me to the retrograde movement, instead of having disappeared, have gone on increasing, on account of more days having transpired, and of the sea-

son having advanced; I now find myself in full movement, general Juan Jose Andra^{de} having joined me with the garrison which was in Bexar, after having completely destroyed the insignificant enclosure of the Alamo, and every thing that possessed any thing like defence in that settlement; nothing, in consequence, remains for me then to answer the charges that the supreme government may think proper to make against me.

I will add, nevertheless, your Excellency, in fulfilment of my duty, and for the satisfaction of the supreme government, that by no means could the enemy, and much less any man who thinks, confound the movement made by the army which I had the honor to command, with a flight. They commenced and continued it, surrounded by obstacles almost insuperable, and embarrassed by an immense quantity of artillery and baggage, having remained between rivers not fordable, on their flanks, rear-guard and front, and buried in the mud during eleven days, in an extension of country of more than two leagues. They afterwards passed three very large rivers, without any previous preparations, and in sight of the enemy; made their marches with all the convenience that could be exacted; remained fifteen days in Goliad, and ten on the river Nueces; did not lose the most trifling article of their disproportioned artillery and baggage; did not abandon a single one of their sick or wounded; and only commenced their retreat when no other aliment was left but meat, without the enemy being able to oblige them to do it.

The posts, which the absolute want of every kind of means of subsistence and preservation, obliged them to abandon, are by nature so insignificant for stratagem or tactics, that should the enemy remain in them, they would afford us a certain and easy victory in another campaign, because they really are not sustainable as military posts.

Allow me, your Excellency, to do away with the error, in believing that the presence of any force whatsoever, can in any manner contribute to the safety of the life of his Excellency, the man deserving of his country, and general-in-chief. For men who have committed to the flames every thing that was most dear to them, in order to retire, and determined to abandon the country, and all their property forever, the presence of hostile forces would be attended with no other result than the more speedy abbreviation of the precious days of his Excellency, and of the generals, chiefs and soldiers, in their hands, and whose lives have only been spared by a cold calculation. His Excel-

lency, in my humble opinion, in the treaties that he agreed upon, and that I had the honor to send your Excellency, acted with entire liberty, and had nothing more in view than the interest of his country. He was well aware of the situation of the army, and all that it was able to perform under the circumstances in which he had left it: so that he was willing to become the only victim of his ever to be lamented misfortune, without ever sustaining the ugly imputation of selfishness or weakness of mind in his proceedings.

As regards myself, I do not pretend to fly from the responsibilities which may result to me from my operations; I am firmly convinced of having acted with the sincerest desires for the welfare of the nation, and of being guided by no other rules than those prescribed in the ordinances for similar cases; notwithstanding that in them, in vain may one seek for a precept applicable to the situation in which I was.

There has been neither forces, your Excellency, nor valor wanting, in the present campaign, for we have had sufficient of both; there has indeed been wanting a good organization of these forces, a better and more fit employment of the valor, plan, system, order, union, and sustainable points well understood for the operations; means of subsistence and preservation for these same forces: circumspection in the present movements, and foresight in past events, mobility, instruction, and better discipline in all classes of the army, and measures more adequate to facilitate quickness in the movements and operations of the campaign. For this reason, should the number of troops be augmented, and the same errors still exist, the inconveniencies of another campaign which may be undertaken, will be multiplied for these same causes; the public treasury will be still farther pledged, and perhaps without a better result.

No transactions could, nor can now, take place between me and the commander of the enemy's forces, inasmuch as it was done by the president, even when I was doubtful of his existence; because I supposed, and with probability, that he and all the other prisoners, would have been shot in reprisal for the conduct observed towards those of the enemy. Afterwards, any step on my part, would not have obtained any thing else than to impair the situation of the president, and that of his unhappy companions in misfortune.

I know too well, your Excellency, my disadvantageous position, in the sight, not only of the nation, but of the whole world: but it is not, nor has it been possible for me, to act dif-

ferently from what I have done, nor have I been able to present the army in a better manner than I have. The command of it devolved upon me when I least expected it, under circumstances full of embarrassment, which events, and even the elements, made worse; without knowing what was wished to be done, nor what had been done, for his Excellency never had the goodness to confide to me his plan of campaign; I neither new nor saw any thing that did not come under my immediate observation. I know well that my reputation will suffer as long as I do not remove the veil, which at this time covers the campaign. I will do so in good time, and with the assurance of obtaining justice, and of leaving that of my companions in arms in the state which each one deserves.

I will never cease to reiterate to your Excellency, that which I have repeatedly said, as to the nullity of Bexar in every sense, and that the posts of Texas are not sustainable, whilst a maritime force does not co-operate with the operations of the land service; I think it my duty to so inform you of it, as it is also to answer to all the charges which they may wish to make against me for the errors which I may have committed in this campaign, and to repeat my high considerations for your Excellency.

God and liberty. Encampment at Motas de Dona Clara, June 10th, 1836.—*Vicente Filisola*. To his Excellency the secretary of war and marine.

NO. 5.

Secretary's office of war and marine.—Central section.—First bureau.—Excellent Sir:—With the most profound sorrow, his Excellency, the president *pro tem.*, has learned by the official letter of your Excellency, of 25th last month, the defeat suffered on the 21st of the same month, by the division commanded in person by the president, general-in-chief of the army, and the very lamentable misfortune that his Excellency should be made prisoner with other chiefs and officers.

His Excellency, the president *pro tem.*, is in some measure consoled that a general, so experienced as your Excellency, should be the one who obtains the command, the which he expressly confirms.

The first desire that his Excellency has, is, that you address the enemy's general, exacting from him, by decorous means, the

liberty of the president general-in-chief, or at least during the time this point can be regulated, the considerations due to his high dignity, and to a person so distinguished in the annals of American history, and for whose preservation the entire nation is interested by gratitude, and because he is chief of it.

His Excellency, the president *pro tem.*, counts upon your Excellency's directing all his efforts to save the remainder of the army, by concentrating it, so as to render it more respectable, placing it in a convenient place for receiving provisions, for which the most efficacious measures are adopted. The preservation of Bexar is of absolute necessity, in order that the government, according to circumstances, may act as they see fit.

The fate of all the prisoners is very interesting to the nation, and it is recommended to your Excellency to endeavor to alleviate it, *giving authority from this moment to propose exchanges, and to preserve for this purpose, and because humanity exacts it, the life of the prisoners made, and that may be made from the enemy.* Your Excellency knows the circumstances which may result from an imprudence committed in this affair; but the government fears nothing as regards this, because it knows how great is the skill and zeal of your Excellency, for the best service of the country.

I take this occasion to assure your Excellency of my most distinguished consideration and esteem.

God and Liberty.—Mexico, 15th May, 1836.—*Tornel.*—**To his Excellency, general Vicente Filisola, second general-in-chief of the army of operations against Texas.**

NO. 6.

Secretary's office of war and marine,—Central section.—**First bureau,—Excellent Sir:**—By the communication of your Excellency, of 28th ult., his Excellency, the president *pro tem.* has learned the orders communicated to your Excellency, by his Excellency, the president general-in-chief, after having been made prisoner, as also the letter written to your Excellency.—His Excellency approves the conduct observed by your Excellency, to whom it is not necessary to advert, that the president general being a prisoner, does not enjoy liberty, and that the resolutions he may dictate, naturally proceed from the violence which his enemies may do him. *For this the supreme government.*

wishes that your Excellency should act with extreme prudence, and that in endeavoring not to compromise in any manner, the life of the illustrious general Santa Anna, should also shun pledging the honor of the nation, which is very far from being dejected by a reverse so common in war, and to which, if importance be attached, it is only due to the very grievous circumstance of the president having been made prisoner.

In no case shall your excellency compromise himself for the acknowledgment of the independence of Texas, because this act is null of itself, and the nation will never agree to it. But all is left to the prudence of your Excellency, and I again recommend, and as strongly as possible, how much the nation and the supreme government are interested in the salvation of the president general.

I repeat to your Excellency, the protestations of my most distinguished consideration.

God and liberty. Mexico, May 15th, 1836. Tornel. To his Excellency general Vicente Filisola.

ARTICLES of an agreement made between his Excellency, the general-in-chief of the army of operations, president of the Mexican Republic, Don Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, for one party, and his Excellency, the president of the republic of Texas, Mr. David G. Burnet, for the other party.

ART. 1st. General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, agrees not to take up arms nor to influence their being taken up against the people of Texas, during the actual strife of independence.

ART. 2d. Hostilities shall immediately cease, by sea and land, between the Mexican and Texian troops.

ART. 3d. The Mexican troops shall evacuate the territory of Texas, passing to the other side of the Rio Grande del Norte.

ART. 4th. The Mexican army in its retreat, shall not make use of the property of any person without their consent and just indemnification, taking articles only necessary for their subsistence, when the owners should not be present; and sending to the general of the Texian army or to the commissioners for the arrangement of such matters, advice of the value of the property consumed, the place where taken, and the name of the owner should it be known.

ART. 5th. That all private property, including cattle, horses, negro slaves, or persons contracted, of whatsoever denomination, which may have been taken by a part of the Mexican army,

or which should have taken refuge in said army from the commencement of the last invasion, shall be returned to the commander of the Texian forces, or to the persons that should be named by the government of Texas in order to receive it.

ART. 6th. The troops of both belligerent armies, shall not be placed in contact, and for this end the Texian general shall take care that between the two encampments, a distance shall intervene of five leagues at least.

ART. 7th. The Mexican army shall not delay any more in their march than that necessary to take off their hospitals, trains, &c., and pass the rivers, considering as an infraction of this agreement the delay, which, without just motives, should be noted.

ART. 8th. This agreement shall be forwarded by speedy express to Vicente Filisola, general of division, and to general T. J. Rusk, commander of the army of Texas; that they may remain obligated as far as appertains to them; and being mutually agreed, may arrange the speedy and due execution of the stipulations.

ART. 9th. That all the Texian prisoners at this time in the power of the Mexican army, or in that of any of the authorities of the government of Mexico, be immediately placed at liberty, and passports given to them, so that they may return to their homes; it being the duty on the part of the government of Texas, also to place at liberty a corresponding number of Mexican prisoners, of the same rank and station; and to treat the remainder of said Mexican prisoners which may remain in the power of the government of Texas, with all due humanity; charging the government of Mexico for the expenses caused in their behalf, when any extra convenience should be afforded them.

ART. 10th. General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, shall be sent to Vera Cruz as soon as may be thought proper.

And for its fulfilment and consequent effects, the contracting parties sign it by duplicate in the port of Velasco, on the 14th May, 1836. *Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, David G. Burnet, J. Collinsworth, secretary of state, Bailey Hardiman, secretary of treasury, P. W. Grayson, attorney general.*

Rivulet of Mugerero, on the 26th day of the month of May, of the current year, Benjamin F. Smith, colonel in the army of Texas, Henry Teal, captain in the same, having presented themselves in the tent of his excellency, Vicente Filisola, general-in-chief of the Mexican army of operations; the said gentlemen

delivering a paper which, through them, was directed to said general Filisola by his Excellency the president general, Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna; and colonel Smith making known at the same time, that he came competently authorized, according to his credentials, which he exhibited for the purpose, signed by his general, Thomas J. Rusk, in order to ratify in his name the fulfilment of the papers referred to, which contain the treaty of armistice concluded between general Santa Anna and the government of Texas on the 14th inst. In consequence, general Filisola on receiving these documents, named for their examination and explanation with the commissioners, Eugene Tolsa, general of the Mexican army, and colonel Augustine Amat, who, after having fulfilled their commission in the specified terms, informed his Excellency: and after having heard them, agreed on his part to religiously comply, as far as in the ten articles of which it consists; *it has reference to the army*, in the same manner as the general and army of the Texans are bound on their part.

Both contracting parties also agreed, that some commissioners might be named on the part of general Rusk, who should march, either with the Mexican army, or separate from it, with the information necessary, in order that they might make the just remonstrances, conformably to what is expressed in the said treaties, with the understanding that everything belonging to them that exists in the army of operations shall be delivered to them. And for the evidence and compliance by both parties, the two belligerent parties agreed to extend in duplicate the present document with the commissioners. General quarters on the rivulet Mugerero, 26th May, 1836. *Eugene Tolsa, Augustine Amat, Henry Teal, Vicente Filisola, Benjamin F. Smith.*

NO. 7.

Army of Operations.—Brigade of Reserve.—Excellent Sir:—When about arriving to this town, a courier delivered me open the annexed communication, from colonel Francisco Garay, to your Excellency, and enclosed in it that directed to myself by Augustine Alcerrica, commander of the battalion of Tres Villas, by which, your Excellency will learn the evacuation of Matagorda in consequence of the enemy having presented themselves with superior force in said post; and as from the reconnoitre of their movements, which the said colonel Garay ordered to be

made, it does not appear that they would remain in the place; I am of opinion that they may have gone to Brazo de Santiago and Matagorda, with the expectation that by the mere apparition of their little band, even without committing acts of hostility on account of the armistice which is at this time in force, movements might be occasioned amongst ourselves, which may tend to favor the cause that they sustain; for which reason it appeared precedent to me to send forward some troops in that direction. Your Excellency will determine whatever may seem most fit, taking this occasion to re-assure him of my consideration and esteem. God and liberty. Victoria, 12th May, 1836. *Jose Urrea*.—To his Excellency Don Vicente Filisola, commander-in-chief of the army of operations.

NO. 8.

Having arrived at San Patricio on the 17th inst, I there met General Joseph Urrea, who, knowing that I was proceeding onward in order to place myself under the orders of your Excellency, ordered me to return to this city with the subaltern who was accompanying me, for the reason (as his worship told me) that the army was retiring to Monterey, and that my services could be of more utility at Brazo de Santiago, of which I inform your Excellency, as I conceive it my duty so to do, adding thereto, that as there is at present in this place an engineer commander of the station, lieutenant colonel Don Francisco Vecelli, I cannot, without breaking our by-laws, which regulate his duties, act in any affair of our science. In consequence, your Excellency will please determine if I should remain here or march to the line which he occupies, in order to commence my journey either by land or sea, as soon as I can have the means.—I am glad of this occasion which affords me the honor of offering to your Excellency, my respects and high consideration.—Matamoros, May 30th, 1836.—Luis Tola.—To his Excellency, Don Vicente Filisola, commander-in-chief of the army of operations against Texas.

NO. 9.

Office of the commandant general of Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas.—Excellent Sir:—In charge of lieutenant colonel Don Luis Tola, and escorted by sixty infantry and thirty dragoons,

I this day forward, subject to the orders of your Excellency, one hundred and forty thousand dollars. This officer has orders to halt at Goliad, with the object of awaiting the advices that your Excellency may be pleased to send to him, regarding the continuation of his march with the money, which will arrive in very fit time, inasmuch as fourteen days at least ought to be spent in their march from this to that port, according to the day-journies of the itinerary, which I have the honor to annex, to your Excellency.

The balance of the money which was deposited in the commissary's office here, still remains there, as it has been impossible to find a sufficient number of beasts of burthen, capable of making so long a journey, and with the object, that should your Excellency see fit to dispose of it in this place, he might have it in his power to do so. If your Excellency should adopt other measures on the subject, from that moment they shall be punctually complied with.

I entreat your Excellency, to please to give orders that the escort that lieutenant colonel Tola carries for the custody of the money, may be relieved at Goliad, so that it may return to this place, where I have not a single dragoon left.

May your Excellency condescend to accept my constant sentiments of esteem and profound respect.

God and liberty.—Matamoros, April 29th, 1836. *Francisco V. Fernandez.*

To his Excellency, general Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, president of the republic and commander of the national army.

ITINERARY of the day-journies to which lieutenant-colonel Luis Tola ought to conform, in conducting the amounts of money which are sent under his responsibility, to the order of his Excellency, general Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, president, and chief of the national army

DAYS.	PLACES.	LEAGUES.
1. . .	From Matamoros to Fresnitos.	. 7
2. . .	To Colorado 7
3. . .	" Carrisitos 6
4. . .	" Chiltipin 6
5. . .	" Jaboncillos 7
6. . .	" Santa Rosa 7
7. . .	" Salado 5

DAYS	PLACES	LEAGUES
8. . . .	" Santa Gertrudis	5
9. . . .	" Las Pintas	6
10. . . .	" San Patricio	6
11. . . .	" El Papelote	6
12. . . .	" Las Rositas	6
13. . . .	" Goliad	3

A true copy.—Matamoras, April 29th, 1836.—*Luis Noriega*, secretary.

Office of the commandant-general of Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas.—Excellent Sir:—With Don Manuel Hernandez, captain of dragoons, I send to colonel Domingo Ugartechea, commandant at Goliad, subject to the orders of your Excellency, thirty thousand dollars, because, although I had forwarded a larger amount, the danger which the rising of the Indian presents, and the not having a sufficient escort, has determined me to order that it should remain in this place, where your Excellency may dispose of it as may seem most fit.

May your Excellency receive my considerations.

God and Liberty.—Matamoras, May 7th, 1836.—*Francisco V. Fernandez*.—To his Excellency, general-in-chief of the army against Texas.

NO. 10.

Office of the commissary-general of the department of Tamaulipas.—Excellent Sir:—With Juan Cuevas, lieutenant-colonel of permanent cavalry, I forward to the order of your Excellency, fifty-six thousand nine hundred and eighty-eight dollars two rials three grains, for the assistance of those meritorious troops. I would like that said remittance were of a larger amount, but the great scarcity which we yet suffer, does not permit my particular desires, on this occasion, to be satisfied. Of the one hundred and seventy-three thousand eight hundred and ten dollars two rials, which were deposited in this office, for the army of operations, I have forwarded thirty thousand to the order of his Excellency, the president general; and the commandant general has disposed of some amounts here, and to-day there is not enough to complete the fifty-five thousand eight hundred and seventy-five dollars seven rials and five grains, which is required by general Joseph Urrea, who arrived yesterday.—All of which I inform your Excellency of, and entreat him to

receive the protestations of my constant adherence to his person.
—God and Liberty.—Matamoros, 28th May, 1836.—*Pedro J. de la Garza.*—To his Excellency general Vicente Filisola.

NO. 11.

Office of the commandant-general of Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas.—Be pleased to detain the express, which, coming from the army of operations, has arrived at this city, destined to the capital of the republic, inasmuch as this office has business interesting the public service, to communicate to the supreme government.—God and Liberty.—Matamoros, May 24th, 1836.—*Francisco Vital Fernandez.*—To the postmaster of this city.

I certify the above to be a true copy.—Matamoros, July 1st, 1836.—*Francisco Garcia.*

NO. 12.

Office of the commandant-general of Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas.—Be pleased to order that in this moment, and with the annexed papers for Victoria, San Luis, and the capital of the republic, the express that was detained at your office, according to the order which was communicated by this office, on the 24th inst., may proceed on his journey.

God and Liberty.—Matamoros, May 30th, 1836.—*Francisco Vital Fernandez.*—To the postmaster of this city.

I certify the above to be a true copy.—Matamoros, July 1st, 1836.—*Francisco Garcia.*

NO. 13.

Office of the secretary of war and marine.—Central section.—First bureau.—Excellent Sir:—In my communication of the 15th, I had the honor to transmit to your Excellency, the wishes of his Excellency, the president *pro tem.*, in relation to the serious affairs treated on in your Excellency's despatches of 25th and 28th ult., and now, by his order, I must repeat ~~that~~ his Excellency, the president, has not been at liberty since he has been made a prisoner, and that no other sacrifices should be

made than those absolutely necessary to place under cover his existence, without detriment to the national honor.

He exacts that your Excellency endeavors, at all hazards, to preserve the conquests of the army, and not to give cause to the enemy to grow bold, on account of a retrograde movement, which they may mistake for a flight. Consider, your Excellency, how much it will cost to obtain possession again, of the posts that are abandoned; and for this purpose, his Excellency, the president *pro tem.* desires that your Excellency should concentrate the forces in sustainable posts, and that no others than those at a great distance should be abandoned, in which their garrisons would be very much exposed. Whilst the force of the army is most imposing, the existence of his Excellency, the commander-in-chief, will be more secure, as being deprived of his liberty, he cannot determine upon what is best, and most suitable to the nation. To it, is your Excellency highly responsible, and ought to consult no other principle but the public convenience, nor act by other rules than those wisely laid down in the general ordinance of the army.

The preservation of the advantageous positions of the army is so much the more necessary, because, the government, operating with the activity and energy which their duty exacts, is occupied in organizing a division of four thousand men, which will embark at Vera Cruz, destined for Matamoros, in order to reinforce the army, and place it in formidable action against the enemy. I repeat to your Excellency, the order to make a formal intimation to the enemy's general, concerning the liberty and good treatment of the president general, and of the prisoners, so that the national honor, and even that of your Excellency, may appear in a favorable light.

The eyes of the nation are fixed on your Excellency, and are compromised to make their honor respected, and this is not done by presenting the army in an unfavorable manner, which may enliven the pride of the enemy.

Bexar, in one direction, and the ports, in another, will be the support of future operations, and whilst they can be preserved, ought to be preserved, under all the responsibility of your Excellency, as general-in-chief, to whom I present my respects.

God and Liberty.—Mexico, May 19th, 1836.—Tornel.—
To his Excellency, general Vicente Filisola, second in command of the army of operations.

NO 14.

Post of Goliad.—Year 1836.—Army of operations against Texas.—Information concerning the result of the commission, to which were named Manuel Escalera, frontier soldier of this post, and citizen Antonio Sanchez, respecting the person of his Excellency, general Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, president.—Commissioner, captain Mariano Rodriguez; secretary, sub-lieutenant Manuel Sanchez.

I, Mariano Rodriguez, captain of the army, and aid-de-camp to the general of the second brigade of the first division of the army of operations against Texas—certify: that by virtue of a verbal order of Don Vicente Filisola, commander-in-chief of the said army, to take the declarations of two individuals of confidence, who were sent to the place where Don Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, president of the republic, was held prisoner, with the object of delivering to him some private papers, and for this purpose, his Excellency, the said commander-in-chief, named as secretary, sub-lieutenant Don Manuel Sanchez, who, being present, said that he accepted, and offered, under his word of honor to preserve secrecy and fidelity in whatever I acted; and in order that it may be evident, signed it with me, in the town of Goliad, on the 25th May, 1836.—*Mariano Rodriguez.*—*Manuel Sanchez.*

Immediately the commissioned officer caused to appear before him Antonio Sanchez, and made him take oath, which he did by God, and sign of the cross, by which he offered to speak truth in all that he should know and be asked, and having been so, as to his name and occupation, answered that he is called as is above stated, and that he is employed as a laborer in the fields.

Being asked what was the result of the commission which general Urrea gave him, relating to the person of the president general, expressing minutely every thing that had occurred of importance in it, said: that on the 15th day of the present month, his companion Manuel Escalera, received the commission from general Urrea to conduct secretly some papers to his Excellency the president, and that on the 18th he marched for that purpose in company of the man he speaks of; but at Navidad they met a party of Americans, in number thirty, who impeded their passage, notwithstanding their having presented the respective passport signed by general Urrea, and pretended to them that the object was to ask the president if his baggage should be

sent to him or not; so that, seeing the impossibility of advancing, he who is speaking resolved, with his companion, to counter-march to Guadalupe, because, although they could execute their commission by other roads, they refused to do it, as in the instruction which were given to them, it was expressly ordered that they should take no other than the high-road: that in fact, on the 20th, they arrived at the said town of Guadalupe, and on the 22nd, he who is speaking went to see Don Jose Maria Carbajal, inhabitant of that place, who was informed of the secrecy of the commission, which was advised him by the person who is speaking; answering, that in consequence of the impossibility that there was, he should carry to Mr. Urrea a letter, which he delivered in this place to Don Vicente Filisola, commander-in-chief, as general Urrea had marched forward; and after that, the deponent returned to Guadalupe, by order of said commander-in-chief, with the object of observing the movements and strength of the enemy, giving due information of every thing: the result being, that he who is speaking could not pass to the settlement of Guadalupe, but remained on this side of the river, being informed by the wife of a brother of his companion, Manuel Escalera, who speaks English, that an American had communicated, that on the night of the day of this date, the Americans were to come to attack the troops who were at Goliad, with which news the deponent returned with his companion Escalera, whom he met there, and gave information of every thing to his Excellency, the commander-in-chief, making known to him also that a large portion of the enemy's force was encamped on this side of the river, and that according to what Mr. Carbajal had said from the beginning, the whole of their force was composed of eighteen hundred men, and of these, three-hundred are cavalry; that an inhabitant of Guadalupe had also informed him that Mr. Carbajal had been arrested by the Americans; and in the other news that he gave him, he only said that the forces of said Americans were in great numbers; that there was also an advanced party in the first farm of the Coletto, and another close to the rivulet, their number being, in the opinion of the person speaking, about twenty men in both parties; that this is all he has to say upon the subject, and this his declaration being read to him, he affirmed and ratified it, saying that he was twenty years old, and not knowing how to write, signed it with a cross, the commissioner and secretary also signing it.—*Mariano Rodriguez.*—In my presence, *Manuel Sanchez.*

Afterwards, the commissioned officer caused to appear before

him, Manuel Escalera, from whom, before me the secretary, he received an oath, which he made by God and a sign of the cross, by which he offered to speak truth in all that he should know, and that should be interrogated; and having been so, as to his name and occupation, said that he is called as is above expressed, and that he is a soldier of the frontier company of this post.

Being asked for the results of his commission in relation to his Excellency the president general, said: that on the 15th day of the current month, he received the commission from general Urrea, to pass to San Jacinto or Galveston, where they would fall in with his Excellency the president general, with the object of delivering to him a paper, which, according to what Mr. Urrea advised him, was nothing more than to ask him to what place he wished his baggage to be sent, with which pretext he was to deliver a small paper privately, and for this purpose the deponent received the respective passport; commencing afterwards his march as far as Guadalupe, where he was to see Don Jose Maria Carbajal, in order that this person might give him some instructions on the subject, which individual handed a letter to the deponent, telling him not to advance further, and to send it to Mr. Urrea; therefore he delivered it to his companion Antonio Sanchez, who carried it; that said letter contained advice, that an American captain, called John Linn, had communicated to Mr. Carbajal, that their force, composed of eighteen hundred men, was coming with the object of attacking the troops that were in Goliad; that on seeing this, the deponent remained in Guadalupe until yesterday, when at eight o'clock at night he commenced his march to this place, to communicate to the commander-in-chief, that the largest portion of the enemy's force had passed the river, and were encamped on the edge of the woods; that by one of the Americans who had arrived at the farm of the father of the speaker, he was informed that Mr. Carbajal was made prisoner by them, and would probably be shot, inasmuch as he had ordered the deponent, as courier, to general Santa Anna: they also exacted from the father of the speaker, that he should deliver them up, because they knew that he was the courier, and that in case he did not do so, they would destroy the farm; that on his return to this place, he met on the Coleta fifteen or twenty men encamped at Epcinal, that he also gave information to his Excellency, the said commander-in-chief, that the American who spoke with his father, told him, that in the night of this date they were coming to attack this place; that the papers and passport of which he has spoken at the com-

mencement of his declaration, are those which he now exhibits to the captain and commissioner; which I, the secretary, certify, were received, composed of a letter sealed and directed to his Excellency the president General: a little piece of paper, the sixteenth of a sheet, and a passport, all countersigned by me; the originals of which the said commissioned officer ordered to be inserted in this testimony; that he has nothing more to say, that what he has said is true, according to the oath made, and this his declaration being read to him, he affirmed and ratified it, expressing that he was twenty-six years old, and not knowing how to write, he signed it with a cross, the commissioned officer signing with the present secretary.—*Mariano Rodriguez.*—In my presence, *Manuel Sanchez.*

I, the undersigned notary, testify, that the captain and commissioner, on having concluded these measures, went, accompanied by me to the residence of his Excellency Don Vicente Filisola, commander-in-chief of the army, in order to make a delivery of it, composed of three leaves without the cover, without including the letter, the little piece of paper, or the passport which the commissioner delivered separately, and in order that it may serve as testimony, he signed with me.—*Manuel Sanchez.*—*Rodriguez.*

NO. 15.

Excellent Sir:—The provisions that existed in this port were sent to Copano, on board the schooner Watchman, as I have informed your Excellency, and as at present there are no provisions whatever in this place, I cannot comply with, as I would desire, the order which I yesterday received from your Excellency for this purpose.

From Copano to Lipantitlan, which is the point where your Excellency advises me to send them, is a shorter distance to the army than from here, and may be conducted in less time to the said Lipantitlan. Your Excellency, if it should seem proper, can give orders that they should be sent to him to the great advantage of the army under his command; because, although I should determine to order them to be returned by sea to this port, I find myself without any vessel at my disposal; and as they ought at this time to be discharged at Copano, therefore such a

measure would always cause a delay, which would make them unnecessary by the time they could be in your Excellency's power.

I have the honor to say this to your Excellency, in due answer to the despatch referred to, also protesting to him my attention and sincere esteem.

God and Liberty.—Matamoros, May 31st, 1836.—*Francisco V. Fernandez.*—To his Excellency the commander-in-chief of the army of operations.

C. J. Sumner
June 22 1869.