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
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# DAILY TELEGRAPH.

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WASHINGTON:

WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, OCT. 13, 1852.

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## NATIONAL WHIG NOMINATIONS.

FOR PRESIDENT,

**GENERAL WINFIELD SCOTT,**

OF NEW JERSEY.

FOR VICE PRESIDENT,

**WILLIAM A. GRAHAM,**

OF NORTH CAROLINA.

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## The Armistice at Mexico.

NUMBER ONE.

### An Appeal from Pillowism to the Record.

Last spring the assembling of the Democratic Convention at Baltimore having drawn nigh, that doughtiest of modern heroes, General Leonidas Redivivus, feeling that Tennessee had been sufficiently cared for by him, turned his attention to the wants of the Union at large, in the way of President-making, by an expert of the proper calibre. That this paramount national interest might not, in those less favored regions, altogether perish from the absence of the light of his countenance at the critical turning point, he started at the right moment, and wended his way to the North and East, proceeding as far as New Hampshire,—in his transit to which, through “Modern Athens,” he, (such was then the talk in her political circles,) together with a most congenial spirit that dwells in that latitude, one of the prominent among the worthies of Massachusetts, engaged in the task vulgarly called “putting heads together,” for the purpose of bringing about the nomination of General Franklin Pierce. And, as might have been anticipated by any one acquainted with the skill evinced on a former occasion of the same sort by this modern Warwick—this king-maker of ours—a most successful conjunction of heads did it turn out to be. Pierce was nominated, “and no mistake.”

By way of interlude to this task of President-making, was a labor of the opposite kind: not President-unmaking, exactly, but President-preventing. The hero's passage through New York




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
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was signalized by the appearance in the Herald of a production strikingly characteristic of its author. So perfect was it in the latter respect, that, wheresoever met with, it would have been impossible not to recognise it at a glance as a genuine "Leonidas" production; impossible not to feel, at every line, that there is but one soul sufficiently heroic in its temper for the thing to have emanated from; although it is not meant to call in question the improvement it evinced over its elder brothers, born in days of yore, under the disadvantages of camp life, and when the parent was not within reach of editorship, so incomparably appropriate.

On this occasion, besides that general object, which, being never lost sight of by him, is prominent in all his doings, Leonidas had a special purpose in view, namely: *To deter the Whig party from taking up Gen. Scott as their candidate for the Presidency.* As to the means employed for effecting this object, these were of such a character that it could never have occurred to any but a Leonidas to make them available. Even on the supposition that the pretended disclosures there made had been founded in strict truth; even on this supposition none but an individual absolutely case-hardened to the shame—to say nothing of the wrongfulness attaching everywhere to utter faithlessness—could have been bold enough to venture into the attitude there assumed by him. Such an exhibition of himself—even supposing, as we have just said, all his statements to be true—nothing short of heroism of the true Leonidas stamp can qualify a man for.

He felt, too, no doubt, that he would, in all probability, have the game all in his own hand; for, supposing his whole story to be a tissue of downright falsehoods and egregious misrepresentations, from beginning to end, this could be made apparent only by making the truth of the matter known. And how could this be done? Let the thing, as it actually happened, be ever so creditable to Gen. Scott, (and to Mr. Trist likewise, who is deeply involved in the odium which this fabrication casts upon the former,) still how could it be reconcilable with good faith towards others that they should give publicity to the details of a transaction of this nature? Dead, as he knew himself to be to considerations of this kind, Leonidas knew them to be otherwise.












Hence his sense of security in indulging without stint in the unscrupulousness which belongs to his character.

This no doubt was his calculation; and the event, thus far, has justified his sagacity. The poison has been allowed to work freely upon those whose mental constitution is such as to permit them to be affected in their beliefs by such as this.

And, if the continuance of this state of things, however unjust towards General Scott's honest fame, and however grating to the commonest sense of right, had its only alternative in a deviation on his part, from the course required by good faith, even though it were toward such a being as Santa Anna—if this were the only alternative to the confirmed triumph of this Bennett-Pillow compound over all who have not, in the honest instincts of their moral sense, a safeguard against it, we should be perfectly willing to look on and see that triumph consummated. This, however, is not its only alternative. For all men, sufficiently honest to be desirous of knowing the truth of the matter, or to be willing to have it demonstrated to them, abundant means are in existence for the purpose. There is no necessity whatever for General Scott's breaking silence upon the subject, nor for Mr. Trist's uttering a word in regard to it. Official documents long ago published, abound in proofs of the utter falsity of this reproduction under Bennett—revamping of Leonidas matter, which, all but in one single point, (the million dollar bribe feature) is altogether old and stale. The whole thing—the armistice, and how General Scott was bamboozled by Santa Anna, and what Leonidas' heroism (and sagacity to boot) was manifested in opposition thereto—being as "Father Ritchie's" columns will testify, contemporaneous with the "private" letters with which, at that juncture, the "Executive Mansion" was copiously supplied from the bosom friend of its inmate.

The story, as told at that day, was, that General Scott, hoodwinked by Santa Anna, had been bamboozled into the armistice; said armistice being a mere expedient of the latter to gain time. As now reproduced, it appears with the million dollar bribe addition; and except as to this, it is "the same old coon." That is, not only was









General Scott thus hoodwinked and bamboozled, but, in order to his getting Santa Anna to place him in this predicament, he (General Scott) was party to the offer of a bribe of a million of dollars to Santa Anna, by way of inducement to enter into the negotiation, the preliminary step to which was that same armistice. All the while General Leonidas was the guardian angel of the occasion, exerting himself—though fruitlessly, such was Scott's blindness—to prevent that most disastrous measure, and avert the dire consequences with which he saw it to be fraught.

Such is the story, (all but the bribe part) which is now brought up again "as good as new."

And now for the documents—those apparently long-forgotten documents—which bear upon the reliability of that story. Before entering upon these proofs, let us point out one thing, to which the attention of every candid reader is especially invited, namely: Supposing that the armistice had been (what it was not—for it originated with Gen. Scott and Mr. Trist) a device of Santa Anna; and supposing that Gen. Scott had been deceived by Santa Anna, (which he never was, for a single instant:) even on this supposition, the whole blame would—as the documents do most conclusively prove—lie at the door of the Administration (Polk & Co.) *through whose doings it was* that Santa Anna returned to Mexico, and through whose doings it was, therefore, that Gen. Scott and Mr. Trist had to deal with that notoriously faithless personage. If anybody on our side was duped by him, the *original* dupe (the one to whom all the others, whoever they may have been, were but consequential) was PRESIDENT POLK.

By way of preparing the reader's mind to seize their import, we shall precede each link in this chain of documentary proof with a short summary showing what we propose to prove by it. Our first link will be an extract from President Polk's Message of December 8, 1846, and extracts from journals of those times, to show beyond a reasonable doubt Mr. Polk's collusion with Santa Anna. This will be given to-morrow.









# DAILY TELEGRAPH.

WASHINGTON:

THURSDAY AFTERNOON, OCT. 14, 1852.

## The Armistice at Mexico.

NUMBER TWO.

FIRST LINK.

**Mr. Polk's Collusion with Santa Anna**

Extract from Doc. No. 4, p. 18, 2d sess., 29th Congress—President Polk's message of December 8, 1846:

"When he [our Minister] reached Vera Cruz, on the 30th of November, 1845, he found that the aspect of affairs had undergone an unhappy change. The government of General Herrera, who was at that time President of the republic, was tottering to its fall. General Paredes (a military leader) had manifested his determination to overthrow the government of Herrera by a military revolution; and one of the principal means which he employed to effect his purpose, and render the government of Herrera odious to the army and people of Mexico, was by loudly condemning its determination to receive a minister of peace from the United States to dismember the territory of Mexico by ceding away the department of Texas. The government of Herrera is believed to have been well disposed to a pacific adjustment of existing difficulties; but, probably alarmed for its own security, and in order to ward off the danger of the revolution led by Paredes, violated its solemn agreement, and refused to receive or accredit our Minister—and this, although informed that he had been invested with full powers to adjust all questions in dispute between the two governments.

"On the 30th December, 1845, Gen. Herrera resigned the Presidency, and yielded up the government to Gen. Paredes without a struggle. Thus a revolution was accomplished solely by the army commanded by Paredes, and the supreme power in Mexico passed into the hands of a military usurper, who was known to be bitterly hostile to the United States."

"Although the prospect of a pacific adjustment with the new government was unpromising, from the known hostility of its head to the United States, yet, determined that nothing should be left undone on our part to restore friendly relations between the two countries, our Minister was instructed to present his credentials to the new government, and asked to be accredited by it in the diplomatic character in which he had been










commissioned. These instructions he executed by his note of the first of March, 1846, addressed to the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs; but his request was insultingly refused by that Minister in his answer of the 12th of the same month. No alternative remained for our Minister but to demand his passports, and return to the United States.

"Scarcely a hope of adjusting our difficulties, even at a remote day, or of preserving peace with Mexico could be cherished while Paredes remained at the head of the government. He had acquired the supreme power by a military revolution, and upon the most solemn pledges to wage war against the United States, and to reconquer Texas, which he claimed as a revolted province of Mexico. He had denounced as guilty of treason all those Mexicans who considered Texas as no longer constituting a part of the territory of Mexico, and who were friendly to the cause of peace. The duration of the war which he waged against the United States was indefinite, because the end which he proposed, of the reconquest of Texas, was hopeless. Besides, there was good reason to believe, from all his conduct, that it was his intention to convert the Republic of Mexico into a monarchy, and to call a foreign European prince to the throne. Preparatory to this end, he had, during his short rule, destroyed the liberty of the press, tolerating that portion only which openly advocated the establishment of a monarchy. The better to secure the success of his ultimate designs, he had, by an arbitrary decree, convoked a Congress—not to be elected by the free voice of the people, but to be chosen in a manner to make them subservient to his will, and to give him absolute control over their deliberations.

"Under all these circumstances, it was believed that any revolution in Mexico, founded upon opposition to the ambitious projects of Paredes, would tend to promote the cause of peace, as well as prevent any attempted European interference in the affairs of the North American continent—both objects of deep interest to the United States. Any such interference, if attempted, must have been resisted by the United States. My views upon this subject were fully communicated to Congress in my last annual message. *In any event, it was certain that no change whatever in the government of Mexico, which would deprive Paredes of power, could be for the worse, so far as the United States were concerned, while it was highly probable that any change must be for the better.*

"This was the state of affairs existing when Congress, on the 13th of May last, recognized the existence of the war which had been commenced by the government of Paredes; and it became an object of much importance, with a view to a speedy settlement of our difficulties and the restoration of an honorable peace, that PAREDES should not retain power in Mexico.







"Before that time there were symptoms of a revolution in Mexico, favored, as it was understood to be, by the more liberal party, and especially by those who were opposed to foreign interference and to the monarchical form of government. Santa Anna was then in exile in Havana, having been expelled from power and banished from his country by a revolution which occurred in December, 1844; but it known that he had still a considerable party in his favor in Mexico. It was also equally well known that no vigilance which could be exerted by our squadron would in all probability, have prevented him from effecting a landing somewhere on the extensive gulf coast of Mexico, if he desired to return to his country. He had openly professed an entire change of policy; had expressed his regret that he had subverted the federal constitution of 1824, and avowed that he was now in favor of its restoration. He had publicly declared his hostility, in the strongest terms, to the establishment of a monarchy, and to European interference in the affairs of his country. Information to this effect had been received, *from sources believed to be reliable, at the date of the recognition of the existence of war by Congress, [May 13, 1846]* and was afterwards fully confirmed by the receipt of the despatch of our consul in the city of Mexico, with the accompanying documents, which are herewith transmitted." [A letter of Santa Anna's of March 8, 1846, and his plan of a new Mexican constitution, are to be found in the same documents with this message.] "Besides, it was reasonable to suppose that he must see the ruinous consequences to Mexico of a war with the United States, and that it would be his interest to favor peace."

"It was under these circumstances and upon these considerations that it was deemed expedient *not to obstruct* his return to Mexico, should he attempt to do so. Our object was the restoration of peace; and, with that view, no reason was perceived why we should take part with Paredes, and aid him, by means of our blockade, in preventing the return of his rival to Mexico. On the contrary, it was believed that the intestine divisions which *ordinary sagacity* could not but anticipate as the fruit of Santa Anna's return to Mexico, and his contest with Paredes, might strongly tend to produce a disposition with both parties to restore and preserve peace with the United States. *Paredes was a soldier by profession*, and a monarchist in principle. He had but recently before been successful in a military revolution by which he had obtained power. He was the sworn enemy of the United States, with which he had involved his country in the existing war. Santa Anna had been expelled from power by the army; was known to be in open hostility to Paredes, and publicly pledged against









foreign intervention and the restoration of monarchy in Mexico. In view of these facts and circumstances it was, that, when orders were issued to the commander of our naval forces in the gulf, on the *thirteenth day of May* last, the same day on which the existence of the war was recognised by Congress, to place the coasts of Mexico under blockade, he was directed not to obstruct the passage of Santa Anna to Mexico, should he attempt to return."

"A revolution took place in Mexico in the early part of August following, by which the power of Paredes was overthrown, and he has since been banished from the country, and is now in exile. Shortly afterwards Santa Anna returned. *It remains to be seen* whether his return may not yet prove to be favorable to a pacific adjustment of the existing difficulties, it being manifestly his interest not to persevere in the prosecution of a war commenced by Paredes, to accomplish a purpose so absurd as the reconquest of Texas to the Sabine. *Had Paredes remained in power, it is morally certain that any pacific adjustment would have been hopeless.*"

We ask any candid reader if Santa Anna himself could have better pleaded the propriety of his return, had he sent an agent, as we shall see he did, to the government at Washington, about the time he sent his plan of a constitution to his followers in Mexico? A letter of Santa Anna dated March 8, 1846, together with his plan, is to be found, Ex. Doc. No. 4, second session, 29th Congress, pages 36-'7-'8 and '9, with the following:

"NOTE.—This plan being the only one proper for the regeneration of the republic, and for placing it in the way of preservation, I could not and would not conform to the fourteen articles which I have seen printed, and which not only modify, but almost destroy the preceding ones. I therefore now write to my correspondents, requesting them to urge my friends and those who are sincerely attached to my country, to adhere strictly to this plan for the promotion of the regeneration of our country, with the understanding that neither my honor, solemnly pledged, nor my patriotism, allow me to accept the slightest alteration either in its letter or in its spirit. I make this frank and honest explanation because I do not wish my patriotic intentions to be abused, nor to have myself placed in contradiction with myself, by the presentation of different plans. I, in consequence, answer by writing this to which I give authority by my signature. (Signed,)

"A. L. DE SANTA ANNA.

"HAVANA, APRIL 8, 1846."

From these documents it will be apparent that, prior to the order of May 13, 1846, to Commo-










dore Conner, to let Santa Anna pass the blockading squadron, he (Santa Anna) was busy machinating for his return to power. Mr. Black's letter communicating these papers, "the despatch of our Consul in the city of Mexico, with the accompanying documents herewith transmitted," referred to in the message of December 8, 1846, was dated April 26, city of Mexico. "*The sources believed to be reliable*," referred to in the same document, remain to be shown. Who were they? Was Mr. Campbell, our Consul at Havana, among them? It was a matter of public notoriety that he was in constant communication with Santa Anna. Lieut. Raphael Semmes, United States navy, in giving an account of Santa Anna's arrival at Vera Cruz, says, page 117 of "Service Afloat and Ashore," "General Campbell, our Consul at Havana, was in the habit of visiting 'the fallen chieftain,' [Santa Anna;] 'and as 'on such occasions the war between their respective countries became naturally a topic of conversation, Gen. Santa Anna, apparently with much frankness, expressed himself, in one or more of those conversations, as decidedly opposed to the war. Like a sensible man as he was, he could not but see the folly, as well as hopelessness, of such a struggle on the part of his countrymen, and he took no pains to conceal his sentiments; on the contrary, he seemed desirous to impress Gen. Campbell with the belief that, if he were again at the head of affairs, he would speedily re-establish friendly relations between the two countries. As a matter of course, our government was made acquainted with these dispositions on the part of Gen. Santa Anna." If Mr. Campbell did not do what it is here stated he did, perhaps the following, from the *Courier des Etats Unis* of July 9, 1846, may indicate "*the sources believed to be reliable*" referred to in President Polk's message of December 8, 1846. We translate as follows: "We must mention, as bearing on this subject, that the *Union*, of Washington, in its last number, has declared that the American Cabinet had not had any sort of connexion with the plans having for their object a revolution in Mexico for the benefit of Santa Anna or any other person whatsoever. 'But about three months since,' (adds the official journal,) 'there came to Washington an ad-








‘venturer who desired to obtain the support of  
 ‘the government to some plan with which the  
 ‘name of Santa Anna was mixed up. But it de-  
 ‘clined every sort of relation, co-operation, or  
 ‘participation in such a business. The govern-  
 ‘ment of this country disdains such intrigues  
 ‘and bargains. It has made the war openly in  
 ‘the face of the world. It intends to pursue it  
 ‘with all possible vigor, and force Mexico to  
 ‘render it justice at the point of the sword.’”  
 About three months from July 9, 1846, would  
 bring us back exactly to about April 8, 1846,  
 when Santa Anna wrote the note above given of  
 April 8, 1846. Perhaps this *agent* was one of  
 “the sources believed to be reliable.”

If, as the Union stated, Mr. Polk had no under-  
 standing *with* Santa Anna, he had one *from*  
 him. In this message, Mr. Polk's horror of mere  
 soldiers *by profession* is first developed. This  
 has now passed into a part of the creed of the  
 Democratic leaders, and is one of the *most fre-*  
*quently reiterated arguments* used by them at this  
 time.

In our next we shall present our second link  
 to prove from the same sources, that after  
 May 13, 1846, Mr. Polk did have an understand-  
 ing *with* Santa Anna; that, in his message of  
 January 12, 1848, in reply to a resolution of in-  
 quiry by the House of Representatives, in which  
 he is generally understood as *wholly and entirely*  
 denying collusion with Santa Anna, as to his re-  
 turn to Mexico, he, President Polk *only* denies it  
*prior* to May 13, 1846. We shall give an account  
 of Mackenzie's mission to Havana and its results,  
 and indicate the application of the system of su-  
 perseding, considered so appropriate, in the case  
 of PAREDES, for the sake of “the intestine divi-  
 sions,” to Taylor, Scott, and others, who seemed  
 dangerous.









# DAILY TELEGRAPH.

WASHINGTON:

FRIDAY AFTERNOON, OCT. 15, 1852.

## The Armistice at Mexico.

NUMBER THREE.

### Summary.

By this link we shall show that in Mr. Polk's message of January 12, 1848, wherein President Polk is generally understood by the people of the United States as *wholly and entirely denying* any collusion with Santa Anna, he, President Polk, *only denies it prior to May 13, 1846*. We shall show that Commander Alexander Slidell Mackenzie, United States Navy, visited Havana on a *secret mission* July 6, 1846. That by the intervention of the government of Cuba, a Spanish war schooner, the *Habanero*, brought despatches, undoubtedly from him to the government, while he, Mackenzie, went to Commodore Connor and General Taylor, and gave them their *cue*, and then returned to Washington, via New Orleans, with despatches *said at that time* to be from the Mexican government to General Taylor, proposing peace, which we *now* know was not the fact. The effect at Monterey of this interview on the mind of General Taylor, we will also develop, as well as the mode by which Mr. Polk got rid of those who were likely to be unwilling agents in his dirty work, or from whom he had reason to fear he might be denounced, viz: *by superseding them*.

He began by *machinating* to supersede Paredes by Santa Anna; then superseded Taylor by Scott; then attempted to supersede Scott by Benton—did supersede Connor by Perry; did supersede Scott by Butler; and Mr. Trist by Sevier and Clifford.

### SECOND LINK.

Mr. Polk having seen Santa Anna's messenger, has stated that up to the *thirteenth of May, 1846*, he did nothing but, from "*views of policy*," direct Commodore Connor not to stop Santa Anna, if he attempted to return to Mexico, which he did in the following order, viz:







152  
[No. 1.]

[Private and Confidential.]

NAVY DEPARTMENT, May 13, 1846.

COMMODORE: If Santa Anna endeavors to enter the Mexican ports you will allow him to pass freely.

Respectfully, yours,

GEORGE BANCROFT.

Commodore DAVID CONNOR,

Commanding Home Squadron.

Ex. Doc. 17, p. 5, 1st session, 30th Congress.

But in doing he took that awful first step which the French proverb, "*C'est le premier pas qu'on coûte*," says costs: for, about June 20, 1846, a rumor became general that Commander Mackenzie, of the Navy, had been sent on a secret mission to Santa Anna. The *Courrier des Etats Unis*, under date of June 20, 1846, from which we translate, says: "A correspondent from Washington ordinarily well versed in affairs, informs us that Captain Mackenzie, celebrated for the bloody drama of which the brig Somers was the theatre, has set out for Havana, and that his mission is, at once, both to buy the two Mexican steamers, the *Montezuma* and *Guadaloupe*, which are for sale, and to offer to conduct Santa Anna to Mexico, if he is willing to make an honorable peace with the United States. We do not doubt but that this last offer will be rejected by the Mexican General, for we know that a similar proposition has been three times made to him, and three times rejected by him."

The same paper says, June 27, 1846: "It is to be hoped that the secret mission of Mr. Slidell Mackenzie, whose departure for Havana the *Courrier des Etats Unis* revealed before all of its contemporaries, will have a prompt and happy issue. In reference to this mission, the *American* of Baltimore announces that an agent of Santa Anna has already proposed to the government at Washington an arrangement which Mr. Mackenzie was charged to conclude, embracing three principal points: First, peace between Mexico and the Union; second, the recognition of the Rio Grande as the frontier of the United States; third, the acquisition by these last of California, on the payment of a sufficient indemnity."

"Perhaps Mr. Mackenzie only went to tell Santa Anna the fleet had been ordered not to stop










him. Let us read what Lt. Semmes says on this subject. ("Service Afloat and Ashore," p. 117.) "In June or July, 1846, Commander Mackenzie, of the navy, was dispatched to Cuba on a secret mission, the object of which has never been officially made known; but from certain circumstances attending and following his visit, we are at no loss to conjecture it.

"Commander Mackenzie, who spoke the Spanish language like a native—and Santa Anna spoke no English—was sent" "on his mission to Havana. What transpired we do not know, but Santa Anna, being recalled from his banishment about this time by the Mexican people, with the view of his being restored to power, and assuming the conduct of the war, Commodore Connor was instructed not to molest him, should he desire to return to Mexico."

Santa Anna left Havana in the English steamer Arab, August 8, 1846, says the *Courrier des Etats Unis* of August 22, 1846. Lieutenant Semmes gives an account of the Arab being boarded "early in August," and that, with the compliments of the Commodore, General Santa Anna was informed that "*he could proceed to Vera Cruz, with his suite, as he desired.*" The impression that something more than "views of policy" were involved in this phenomenon, was not confined to the *Courrier des Etats Unis*, the American, of Baltimore, and Lieutenant Semmes—for we find a resolution of inquiry, passed by the House of Representatives, January 4, 1848, quoted in Mr. Polk's message of January 12, 1848, (Ex. Doc. No. 25, p. 1, 1st session 30th Congress,) asking for "any instructions which may have been given to any of the officers of the army or navy of the United States, or other persons, in regard to the return of President General Lopez de Santa Anna to the republic of Mexico." The following extract shows how well adapted Mr. Polk and his Cabinet were to play at any game requiring deceit. Though the resolution called for all instructions that had been given in reference to Santa Anna's return, Mr. Polk, so far as Congress at that time was concerned, by dwelling upon the order to admit Santa Anna, dated May 13, 1846, which was only then made public, cleverly avoided hinting at any thing subsequent to May 13, 1846. That is, he







kept out of view any instructions given to Commander Mackenzie, but after referring to the reports of the different Secretaries, among which that of the Secretary of the Navy is worthy of special notice, Mr. Polk, with an air of injured innocence, goes on to say:

[*Message of Mr. Polk, dated January 12, 1848.*]

"For further information relating to the return of Santa Anna to Mexico, I refer you to my annual message of December 8, 1846. The facts and considerations stated in that message induced the order of the Secretary of the Navy to the commander of our squadron in the Gulf of Mexico, a copy of which is herewith communicated. *This order was issued simultaneously with the order to blockade the coast of Mexico, both bearing date the 13th of May, 1846, the day on which the existence of the war with Mexico was recognised by Congress. It was issued solely upon the views of policy presented in that message, and without any understanding on the subject, direct or indirect, with Santa Anna or any other person.*" (Ex. Doc. No. 25, page 1, 1st session, 30th Cong., Jan. 12, 1848.)

THAT IS, PRIOR TO MAY 13, 1846!

The Secretary of the Navy then says:

NAVY DEPARTMENT, Jan. 12, 1848.

SIR: In compliance with the direction contained in your endorsement on the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 4th inst., I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of *all papers* in this department, which it is believed are within the purview of the resolution.

A list of the accompanying papers is hereunto annexed.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. Y. MASON.

To THE PRESIDENT.

[Ex. Doc. No. 25, 1st sess., 30th Cong., p. 4.]

In all of this there is nothing said about Mackenzie. The orders to him were not *believed within the purview of the resolution, and doubtless were not on paper*; but, if after all we have said, any sane man will continue to believe Mr. Polk did not send him (Mackenzie) to arrange with Santa Anna his return to Mexico, he must be blind indeed, and we will presently give him "more light." If he believes with us that he did so, he will agree it was not without an object and an understanding. Singularly enough, too, the very condition:

1st. Peace between Mexico and the United States. 2d. The recognition of the Rio Grande as the frontier of the United States. 3d. The









acquisition by these last of California on the payment of a sufficient indemnity, stated in the Baltimore American prior to June 27, 1846, as the subject of Mackenzie's secret mission, constituted the basis of Mr. Trist's instructions when sent as Commissioner, and were the objects attained by *his treaty of peace*. Very strange indeed, was it not? Doubtless nothing was said about Mackenzie, because, among other things, he was ordered to purchase the steamers "Montezuma" and "Guadalupe," and see that privateers were not fitted out from Havana, and hence there was no necessity of saying that he was sent to purchase Santa Anna!!! *This could not be put upon paper*. But it is very certain that shortly after, his (Mackenzie's) arrival at Havana, July 6, 1846, is shown by the following extract:

[From the Baltimore Republican & Argus, July 20, 1846.]

"From Havana—Interesting Intelligence.

"The brig Truxton, Com. Carpenter, arrived at Havana from Norfolk on the 6th, and sailed again on the 8th instant. Capt. Slidell Mackenzie went out in her as passenger. A Spanish vessel-of-war came from Havana, having sailed on the 18th of July, and arrived at New York in time to send its despatches to Washington on Sunday, July 26, 1846."

Same paper, July 29, 1846:

"What is she here for? There appears to be no little curiosity to learn the character and contents of the despatches brought to this port by the Spanish armed schooner Habanero, and forwarded to Washington last Sunday [July 26, 1846.] It is supposed that they relate to the Mexican question, and have something to do with mediation. We shall see."—*N. Y. Herald*.

Same paper, July 28, 1846, says:

"The Spanish schooner of War at New York.—The Spanish schooner-of-war Habanero, arrived at New York on Monday, [July 27] in eight days passage from Havana with despatches for the Spanish Consul."

This date is from the N. Y. Sun, and is evidently incorrect as the preceding extract from the Herald shows, which was copied into the Republican and Argus, July 29, to correct or confuse its readers. The Sun goes on to say there was no danger now of privateers being fitted out from Havana, &c., &c. Any one observing the date in the Sun can see the propriety of its helping the administration out of its dilemma.

Had Commander Mackenzie returned directly to Washington, it would never have done; so the







government of Cuba had, at the opportune moment, despatches for the Spanish Consul at New York, and he despatched them July 26, 1846, to Washington. July 27, 1846, Mr. Polk, overcome by the desire to re-establish peace, causes a letter to be written by the Secretary of State to a nameless "Minister of Foreign Relations of the Mexican Republic" offering the olive branch, and, August 4, 1846, asked for a sum of money, amount not stated, to be placed at his disposal to make it acceptable. It now becomes necessary to follow Commander Mackenzie's movements.

The *Courrier des Etats Unis*, August 11, 1846, says: "The cutter *Forward* arrived at New Orleans July 30, having sailed from Brazos Santiago on the 24th of July. On board the *Forward* arrived Commander Slidell Mackenzie charged with despatches for the government."

From these journals, we very plainly see Mackenzie first visited Havana, had an interview with Santa Anna, and communicated his *oral* instructions; then proceeded to the squadron, had an interview with Commodore Conner; thence went to Brazos Santiago, and at Matamoras had an interview with General Taylor, and receiving from him despatches, it was adroitly circulated—on his arrival at New Orleans, to hide the connexion between his visit to Havana, an interview with Santa Anna, and his giving their *cue* to Commodore Connor and General Taylor—that these despatches were a proposition from the Mexican government to General Taylor to make peace. This we *now* know was not the fact. We shall presently have occasion to advert to the results of this interview with General Taylor, far more pregnant of consequences than has been, as yet, perceived by any one. Commander Mackenzie was doubtless returning to Washington to make everything in the despatches brought by the Spanish schooner *Habanero* clear. But it may be said the government at Havana had nothing to do with Santa Anna's return. On this head, the *Courrier des Etats Unis*, of August 22d, gives us a gleam of light:

"On the 8th, at midnight, Santa Anna is to depart on the *Arab*, in virtue of an order of the Governor, which permits him to set out at this UNUSUAL hour. The ship has been declared at the CUSTOM HOUSE as bound for Sisal. This is a little finesse that has not and will not deceive any one."

We return now to the consequences of Mr.









Mackenzie's interview with Gen. Taylor. Duly informed of Santa Anna's arrival in the country, and, doubtless, of the understanding between Santa Anna and Mr. Polk, he did not, as the chief officers in his army were aware, expect to meet any resistance at Monterey. So absolutely was this the case, that he advanced directly towards the "citadel," evidently expecting some overture, until warned away by a shot that killed one of his sumpter mules far in rear of his own position. Having taken the city, and having *good* reason to believe Ampudia's statement that there was an early prospect of peace, from his interview with Mackenzie, confirmed by Santa Anna's return, he made an armistice. The government was down upon him: he answered sharply, and in a way they understood. He wrote, "November 8, 1846," to the Adjutant General of the army, (Ex. Doc. No. 60, page 360, 1st sess. 30th Congress:)

"In the conference with Gen. Ampudia, I was distinctly told by him that he had invited it [the armistice] to spare the further effusion of blood, and because Gen. Santa Anna had declared himself favorable to peace."

Again, same document, same page:

"My grand motive in moving forward with very limited supplies had been to increase the inducements of the Mexican government to negotiate for peace. Whatever may be the actual views or disposition of the Mexican rulers, or of GENERAL SANTA ANNA, it is NOT UNKNOWN to the government that I had the VERY BEST REASON for believing the statement of General Ampudia to be true."

If this does not refer to Mackenzie's interview with him at Matamoros, what does it refer to?

Now, had the three-million bill been passed, this armistice would have been exactly the thing. As it was, it was a blunder, in the eyes of the government. Taylor must be superseded by Scott. But, afraid of Taylor, it must be made to appear by the administration that *this* was Scott's *machination*. But the secret of it all was, Taylor knew too much: he had seen *Mackenzie*; he must be superseded. Here began that system. Every one who was so unfortunate as to learn too much of Polk's and Santa Anna's collusion, or who came in contact with Mr. Polk's selected agents, had to be superseded—Taylor by Scott, Connor (*who had also seen Mackenzie*) by Perry. Scott learns too much from Mr. Trist: Scott is superseded by Butler; Mr. Trist, for having taught Scott so much, by Mr. Sevier and Clifford; and poor

Handwritten text in a vertical column, likely a list or index, with some entries appearing to be names or titles. The text is faint and difficult to read due to the quality of the scan.





Santa Anna! he was superseded altogether. Scott advanced on Mexico. He won a battle or two, and made an armistice. The government was down upon him. The beauty of this superseding system was, that *if in anger* any of these men let Mr. Polk's cat out of the bag, it was the raving of a vain, empty fool, angry at being superseded!

A general make an armistice! What sort of a general is that? Generals were sent to fight, not to make armistices. Oh, what a grand argument to be used against those generals with the people; especially if the falsehood of a million of dollars bribe were added. Taylor made to believe it was Scott's machinations that had caused him to be superseded, and the public also made to believe the same, Scott was deprived of the people's sympathy. How excellent! Scott was a difficult tool to manage—but Scott, being put in this predicament, and a quarrel picked between him and the administration, what a grand chance to have Lieutenant General Benton *clothed with diplomatic powers*, ready, on the passage of the three million bill, to go out and bribe Santa Anna! It would be all proper for *him* to make an armistice—for the others it was very wrong. They might have the credit of making a peace, as well as fighting successfully. But as this would not do, all of those not of the right political stripe had to be superseded, as we have stated, and written down in the Union, &c., &c., by the agency of Polk's bosom friend and worthy coadjutor, on the plea of being *duped* into an *armistice* by Santa Anna, and now, as not only having been duped into it, but as having offered a bribe of a million of dollars to Santa Anna to induce him to enter into said armistice.

This concludes our second link. We shall pass to the third, containing Mr. Buchanan's letter, written the day after the despatches of the Habanero were sent from New York, and consequently on their receipt at Washington. (This letter, it will be observed, is addressed to a nameless "Minister of Foreign Relations of the Mexican republic," and would therefore answer as well for Santa Anna's minister as for the minister of Paredes.) This letter, and the message of President Polk of August 4, 1846, asking for money to make peace with Mexico, and the proceedings thereon in the Senate of the United States, will constitute link No. 3.









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# DAILY TELEGRAPH.

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WASHINGTON:

SATURDAY AFTERNOON, OCT. 16, 1852.

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## The Armistice at Mexico.

NUMBER FOUR.

### Summary.

This third link is to show that immediately after the receipt of the despatches by the *Habano*, July 26, 1846, as we have shown, Mr. Buchanan, Secretary of State, wrote a letter to the nameless "Minister of Foreign Relations of the Mexican Republic," (the words "*the Mexican Republic*," as if in irony, being in italics,) July 27, 1846, offering the olive branch, and that Mr. President Polk, August 4, 1846, asked for a sum of money with which to guild that olive branch. This was very cleverly done, as Santa Anna was still at Havana. As we have seen, he left that place on August 8, 1846. The proceedings on this message in the Senate go far to show that there was a strong impression that corruption was going on.

We shall begin this with Mr. Buchanan's letter of July 27, 1846, to that nameless minister, which will be followed by the message of August 4, 1846, and the proceedings thereon in the Senate.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, July 27, 1846.

SIR: The President of the United States, no less anxious to terminate than he was to avoid the present unhappy war with the Mexican Republic, has determined to make an effort to accomplish this purpose. He has accordingly instructed the undersigned, Secretary of State, to propose through your excellency to the Mexican government that negotiations shall forthwith commence for the conclusion of a peace, just and honorable for both parties. Should this offer be received and responded to by the Mexican government in the same frank and friendly spirit by which it has been dictated, he will immediately despatch an envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to the city of Mexico, with instructions and full powers to conclude a treaty of peace which shall adjust all the questions in dispute between the two republics." \* \* \* \*







\* \* \* "The occasion, however, may be embraced to state that the President has ever cherished the kindest feelings for Mexico, and that one of the first wishes of his heart is that she may be a powerful and prosperous republic, in perpetual amity with the United States." \* \*

JAMES BUCHANAN.

His Excellency, Minister of the Mexican Republic.

*To the Senate of the United States:*


I herewith communicate to the Senate the copy of a letter, under date of the 27th ultimo, from the Secretary of State of the United States to the Minister of Foreign Relations of the Mexican Republic, again proposing to open negotiations and conclude a treaty of peace, which shall adjust all the questions in dispute between the two republics. Considering the relative power of the two countries, the glorious events which have already signalized our arms, and the distracted condition of Mexico, I did not conceive that any point of national honor could exist which ought to prevent me from making this overture. Equally anxious to terminate, by a peace honorable for both parties, as I was originally to avoid, the existing war, I have deemed it my duty again to extend the olive branch to Mexico. Should the government of that republic accept the offer in the same friendly spirit by which it was dictated, negotiations will speedily commence for the conclusion of a treaty.

The chief difficulty to be anticipated in the negotiation is the adjustment of the boundary between the parties, by a line which shall at once be satisfactory and convenient to both, and such as neither will hereafter be inclined to disturb. This is the best mode of securing perpetual peace and good neighborhood between the two republics. Should the Mexican government, in order to accomplish these objects, be willing to cede any portion of their territory to the United States, we ought to pay them a fair equivalent—a just and honorable peace, and not conquest, being our purpose in the prosecution of the war.

Under these circumstances, and considering the exhausted and distracted condition of the Mexican republic, it might become necessary, in order to restore peace, that I should have it in my power to advance a portion of the consideration-money for any cession of territory which may be made. The Mexican government might not be willing to wait for the payment of the whole until the treaty could be ratified by the Senate, and an appropriation to carry it into effect be made by Congress; and the necessity for such a delay might defeat the object altogether. I would, therefore, suggest whether it









might not be wise for Congress to appropriate a sum such as they might consider adequate for this purpose, to be paid, if necessary, immediately upon the ratification of the treaty by Mexico. This disbursement would of course be accounted for at the treasury, not as secret service money, but like other expenditures.

Two precedents for such a proceeding exist in our past history, during the administration of Mr. Jefferson, to which I would call your attention. On the 26th of February, 1803, Congress passed an act appropriating two millions of dollars "for the purpose of defraying any extraordinary expenses which may be incurred in the intercourse between the United States and foreign nations," "to be applied under the direction of the President of the United States, who shall cause an account of the expenditure thereof to be laid before Congress as soon as may be;" and on the 13th of February, 1806, an appropriation was made of the same amount and in the same terms. The object, in the first case, was to enable the President to obtain the cession of Louisiana; and in the second, that of the Floridas. In neither case was the money actually drawn from the treasury; and I *should* hope that the result might be similar, in this respect, on the present occasion, though the appropriation is deemed expedient as a precautionary measure.

I refer the whole subject to the Senate in executive session. If they should concur in opinion with me there, I recommend the passage of a law, appropriating such a sum as Congress may deem adequate, to be used by the Executive if necessary, for the purpose which I have indicated.

In the two cases to which I have referred, the special purpose of the appropriation did not appear on the face of the law, as this might have defeated the object; neither, for the same reason, in my opinion, ought it now to be stated.

I also communicate to the Senate the copy of a letter from the Secretary of State, to Commodore Connor of the 27th ultimo, which was transmitted to him on the day it bears date.

JAMES K. POLK.


WASHINGTON, August 4, 1846.

(Senate Document, 29th Congress, 2d session, Doc. 107, pp. 1 and 2.)

The Committee of Foreign Relations, to whom this message and documents were referred on the 4th of August, 1846, reported to the Senate on the 5th of August, 1846, through Mr. McDuffie, the following resolutions:

"Resolved, That the course adopted and proposed by the President, as indicated in his message of the 4th instant, for the speedy termination of the war with Mexico, receives the approbation of the Senate.







*"Resolved, That, in the opinion of the Senate, it is expedient to place two millions of dollars at the disposal of the President, to be used at his discretion in the event of a treaty of peace with Mexico, satisfactorily adjusting the boundaries of the two countries; and that the Committee on Foreign Affairs be instructed to report to the Senate in open session a bill for that purpose, in conformity to the provisions of similar acts passed in 1803 and 1806."*

The above resolutions were modified on motion of Mr. McDuffie, and then recommitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations and reported August 6, 1846,

*"1st. Resolved, That the Senate entertain a strong desire that the existing war with Mexico should be terminated by a treaty of peace just and honorable to both nations; and that the President be advised to adopt all proper measures for the attainment of that object."*

*"2nd. Resolved further, That the Senate deem it advisable that Congress should appropriate a sum of money to enable the President to conclude a treaty of peace, limits, and boundaries with the republic of Mexico, and to be used by him in the event that such treaty should call for the expenditure of the money so appropriated, or any part thereof."*

These resolutions were adopted August 6, 1846.

Among the amendments proposed and rejected was one by Mr. Morehead to the second resolution.

*"Provided, That before the appropriation is made the President of the United States shall inform the two Houses of Congress, in confidence, of the object or objects to which the money shall be applied."*

A bill was reported, conforming to the tenor of these resolutions as modified, but Congress adjourned August 10, 1846, without passing it. It struggled on through the next session, and March 3, 1847 became a law, with a condition that full and accurate accounts for the expenditure of the \$3,000,000 should be given to Congress, at as early a day as practicable. Our third link will be this bill as it finally passed, March 3, 1847.

The first part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the  
 various methods which have been proposed for the determination of  
 the rate of reaction between a solid and a liquid. It is shown that  
 the most reliable method is that of measuring the change in the  
 weight of the solid as the reaction proceeds. This method is  
 applicable to all cases in which the solid is insoluble in the  
 liquid, and it is the only method which gives a direct measure  
 of the rate of reaction. The other methods, such as the  
 measurement of the volume of gas evolved, or the change in the  
 concentration of the liquid, are only applicable to special cases.  
 The second part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the  
 factors which influence the rate of reaction. It is shown that the  
 rate of reaction is influenced by the nature of the solid, the  
 nature of the liquid, the temperature, and the surface area of the  
 solid. The rate of reaction is also influenced by the presence of  
 catalysts, and by the presence of inhibitors. The third part of  
 the paper is devoted to a discussion of the mechanism of the  
 reaction. It is shown that the reaction proceeds by the attack of  
 the liquid on the surface of the solid, and that the rate of  
 reaction is determined by the rate at which the liquid can reach  
 the surface of the solid.







# DAILY TELEGRAPH.

WASHINGTON:

MONDAY AFTERNOON, OCT. 18, 1852.

## The Armistice at Mexico.

NUMBER FIVE.

Link No. 4.

The three million bill, as passed, with the conditions that it should not be expended until a treaty of peace was ratified by "Mexico," and that the expenditure should be accounted for to Congress.

The object of doing this is to show eventually how Mr. Polk's administration got over the first of those conditions, and to place these conditions clearly before the reader.

"An act making further appropriation to bring the existing war with Mexico to a speedy and honorable conclusion.

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That whereas a state of war now exists between the United States and the republic of Mexico, which it is desirable should be speedily terminated upon terms just and honorable to both nations; and whereas assurances have heretofore been given to the government of Mexico that it was the desire of the President to settle all questions between the two countries on the most liberal and satisfactory terms, according to the rights of each and the mutual interests and security of the two countries; and whereas the President may be able to conclude a treaty of peace with the republic of Mexico prior to the next session of Congress, if means for that object are at his disposal; and whereas, in the adjustment of so many complicated questions as now exist between the two countries, it may possibly happen that an expenditure of money will be called for by the stipulations of any treaty which may be entered into; therefore, the sum of three millions of dollars be, and the same is hereby, appropriated out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated, to enable the President to conclude a treaty of peace, limits, and boundaries with the republic of Mexico, to be used by him in the event that said treaty, when signed by the authorized agents of the two governments, and duly ratified by Mexico, shall call for the expenditure of the same, or any part thereof; full and accurate accounts for which expenditure shall be by him transmitted to Congress at as early a day as practicable.

"Approved March 3, 1847."

[Statutes at Large, 1846-'7, p. 174.]

Having procured the money, our next link will show the state of affairs which caused a commissioner to be sent to Mexico, and what that state of affairs tended to on the part of Mexico, as shown by private advices, by way of Havana, received by the *Courrier des Etats Unis*, but bear-







# DAILY TELEGRAPH.

WASHINGTON:

TUESDAY AFTERNOON, OCT. 19, 1852.

## The Armistice at Mexico.

NUMBER SIX.

### Link No. 5—Summary.

This link is to present certain newspaper articles which appeared without date *by way of Havana*, and which were probably prepared for the occasion to justify the instructions given or to be given to the Commissioner to Mexico.

ACCOUNTS FROM MEXICO, received by the New York Courier des Etats Unis, "private advices by the way of Havana" to the effect that the clergy in Mexico, their property being menaced by the war, were engaged in a plan to bring about the restoration of peace: said plan being to subvert once more the constitutional government and to establish in its stead "AN ABSOLUTE POWER strong enough to FORCE Mexico to agree to peace. \* \* \* \* And it is Santa Anna upon whom they are reported to have cast their eyes. That general would then be sure of arriving once more at the DICTATORSHIP, supported by the clergy, and on the express condition of respecting its property, and promptly concluding a treaty of peace."—March 11, 1847.

*The state of affairs in Mexico which led to the appointment of Commissioner Trist.*

[From the New York Courier des Etats Unis, March 11, 1847.]

"Quant aux affaires intérieures du Mexique, nous n'avons reçu aucune nouvelle. Toutefois, une lettre particulière, arrivée par voie de Havane, est venue nous faire quelques révélations importantes sur le travail de réaction qui s'opère sourdement dans la capitale. Il paraît que le clergé, menacé dans ses biens par le parti de la guerre, serait décidé à faire de sa cause celle de la république et à faire triompher le système de la paix. Son plan pour y parvenir est des plus simples: renverser le congrès fédéral duquel il n'a rien à espérer et y substituer un pouvoir absolu assez fort pour contraindre le Mexique à subir la paix, telle est la double route qui doit le conduire à son but et c'est, sur Santa Anna ajoute-t-on, qu'il aurait jeté les yeux. Le généralissime serait donc sur le point d'arriver encore une fois à la dictature, soutenu par le clergé, et à la condi-









‘ tien expresse de respecter ses biens et de conclure promptement la paix. Il n’y a rien dans cette combinaison qui ne soit tres vraisemblable, en égard a la situation actuelle. La personne de qui nous tenons ces renseignements est d’ailleurs dans une position qui donne un certain poids a ses paroles, et nous ne serions nullement surpris de voire une revolution nouvelle eclater au Mexique, tandis que tous les regards exclusivement fixés sur le theatre de la guerre, semblent oublier les complications politiques.”


Which article is presented in the following language in the Baltimore Patriot, March 13, 1847.


“ACCOUNTS FROM MEXICO.—The New York Courier des Etats Unis says it has received, by the way of Havana, private advices relative to the internal affairs of Mexico, which contain several important revelations with regard to the *reaction* now going on secretly in the capital. It seems (says the Courier) that the clergy, whose property has been menaced by the war party, is disposed to make its own cause that of the republic, and permit the project of *peace* to triumph. Its plan is to replace the Federal Congress, from whose action it has nothing to hope for, by an *absolute* power strong enough to force Mexico to agree to a peace. Such (continues the Courier) is the double road leading to this end, and it is Santa Anna upon whom they are also reported to have cast their eyes. That General would then be sure of arriving once more at the dictatorship, supported by the clergy, and on the express condition of respecting its property, and promptly concluding a treaty of peace. There is nothing in this combination which is at all improbable, due regard being had to the actual condition of Mexico; and, besides, the person who communicates this intelligence is in a position which gives to it weight.”—March 11, 1847.

This being the prospect, every thing was about to assume the state of things looked for by Mr. Polk, we may say since May 13, 1846. Santa Anna dictator, and the three millions appropriated, there was no obstacle in the way of carrying out his long-cherished scheme, except the conditions that the treaty should be ratified by “Mexico,” and an account given of the expenditure of the money.

April 15, 1847.—Mr. Trist, Commissioner, &c., &c., received his instructions—and *such* instructions! They will constitute our next link, and will show how these difficulties were GOT OVER. *We believe the above newspaper accounts were prepared in the State Department, to give a coloring for the instructions about to be prepared for Mr. Trist.*







# DAILY TELEGRAPH.

WASHINGTON:

WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, OCT. 20, 1852.

## The Armistice at Mexico.

NUMBER SEVEN.

### Link No. 6—Summary.


Mr. Trist sent as Commissioner to Mexico, April 15, 1847, as soon as practicable after the passage of the three million bill of March 3, 1847. Instructions to Mr. Trist, April 15, 1847, to treat with Santa Anna.

[Senate Document, 1st session 28th Congress; Executive Doc. 52, p. 81.]

Said instructions were to the effect that, in the event of the Mexican constitutional government's being overturned, and "a *DICTATORSHIP again existing in its stead*," he, the said Commissioner, must "not hesitate to conclude a treaty with 'whatsoever government you [he] shall find there upon your [his] arrival, provided it presents a reasonable prospect of being able to maintain itself. Should a dictator be established who has subverted the constitution of 1824, and acquired the supreme power, his ratification of the treaty will be sufficient.'" In other words, it was made imperative upon said Commissioner, in the case here contemplated, to draw to the order of whatsoever tool of Santa Anna might be named for the purpose by the said usurper, "*the draft*" referred to in the following words: "You will herewith receive a certificate from the Secretary of the Treasury, that your draft in favor of the Mexican government for the whole or any part of the three millions of dollars appropriated by the act of Congress, will be duly honored." And furthermore, the same instructions made it imperative upon the said Commissioner, in the event of its being in his judgment "necessary to the conclusion of the treaty," to bind the United States to place in the possession of the said usurper, by the hands of whatsoever tool of his he should see fit to name as his Minister of Finance, the enormous sum of TWENTY SEVEN MILLIONS of dollars *more*, over and above the *cash* payment of three millions; the









27  
said payment of twenty-seven millions of dollars to be made by delivering to the said "dictator" certificates of "a ~~six~~ per cent. stock, similar to that created for the purchase of Louisiana."

And to show how precisely these instructions tally with the proposals already quoted from the Baltimore American, prior to June 27, 1846, as those carried out to Santa Anna by Commander Mackenzie, with evidence that no mind can resist, that one of the conditions presented by Mackenzie was, that Santa Anna was to make himself dictator, and on his individual ratification of the treaty, receive the \$3,000,000 carried out by Mr. Trist, subsequent to April 15, 1847.

*Instructions to Mr. Commissioner-Plenipotentiary Trist.—(April 15, 1847.)*


EXTRACTS.

"You will herewith receive a certificate from the Secretary of the Treasury that your draft in favor of the Mexican government for the whole or any part of the three millions of dollars appropriated by the act of Congress of the 3d of March, 1847, entitled 'An act making further appropriation to bring the existing war with Mexico to a speedy and honorable conclusion,' will be duly honored. You will be exceedingly careful not to draw for any part of this sum until the conditions required by that act shall have been fully complied with, and the treaty which you may sign with the authorized agent or agents of the Mexican government has been '*duly ratified by Mexico.*' As the disbursement of so large a sum is a matter of great importance, you should use every precaution to be certain that your drafts shall be drawn in favor of the proper functionary of the Mexican government, and the whole business transacted in such a manner that no difficulty will hereafter arise on the subject. You will take receipts in triplicate for any draft or drafts which you draw; which ought, if possible, to be signed by the President of Mexico, and countersigned by the Minister of Finance."

The above constitutes the closing paragraph of the instructions. On the same page and the one preceding are the following paragraphs:

"So rapidly does revolution follow revolution in Mexico, that it would be difficult to conjecture what form of government you may find in existence over that ill-fated country, on your arrival at the head-quarters of the army. The constitution of 1824 may then have been abolished, and a dictatorship be again existing in its stead. You will not hesitate, however, to conclude a treaty with whatever government you shall find there upon your arrival, provided it presents a reasonable prospect of being able to maintain itself. Should a Dictator be established, who has subverted the constitution of 1824, and acquired the







supreme power, *his ratification will be sufficient, without the previous approbation of the general Congress.* Were this government to refuse to conclude a treaty of peace until the Mexican government shall assume a permanent constitutional form, the war might yet continue for many years to come."

"You will not fail to observe that the sums of thirty, twenty and twenty-five millions of dollars respectively, which you are authorized to offer, are all maximums; and you will not go to the extent of either, unless you shall find this absolutely necessary to the conclusion of a treaty."

\* \* \* \*

"Whilst it would be most convenient for the treasury of the United States to pay any sum for which you may stipulate, in annual payments of three millions each, yet this is not indispensable. *If necessary, therefore, the conclusion of the treaty you may agree, that, for the remainder of the sum, above the three millions of dollars to be paid upon the ratification by Mexico, the government of the United States shall create a six per cent. stock, similar to that created for the purchase of Louisiana to be transferred to the government of Mexico.*

\* \* \* \*

"The extension of our boundaries over New Mexico and Upper California, for a sum not exceeding twenty millions of dollars, is to be considered a *sine qua non* of any treaty. You may modify, change, or omit the other terms of the *projet* if needful, but not so as to interfere with this ultimatum."

The *projet* was peace between the United States and Mexico, the Rio Grande as the boundary, and the cession of Upper California to the United States, the very terms Mr. Mackenzie was said by the Baltimore American (prior to July 27, 1846,) to have been instructed to propose to Santa Anna.

The three million bill having been passed, Mr. Trist is named and sent as Commissioner, he also "speaking the Spanish language like a native," with the \$3,000,000 in his pocket to be paid to a Dictator, which Dictator public prints in the United States announce must be *Santa Anna*. The person giving that information writes by way of Havana, and his position gave great weight to this statement. There can be no doubt it was a United States government agent, probably the United States Consul at Havana, or some one in the State Department, writing by way of preparing the public mind for a commissioner to be sent out to conclude Mackenzie's bargain. Let the reader consider this well.

Our next link, No. 7, will be the instructions received by General Scott relative to co-operating with Mr. Trist.









# DAILY TELEGRAPH.

WASHINGTON:

THURSDAY AFTERNOON, OCT. 21, 1852.

## The Armistice at Mexico.

NUMBER EIGHT.

### Link No. 7—Summary.

This link will consist of the instructions to General Scott to co-operate with Mr. Trist, and to Mr. Trist to co-operate with General Scott.

INSTRUCTIONS TO GENERAL SCOTT.

[Ex. Doc. No. 60, page 940, 30th Con. 1st Sess.]

(Confidential.)

WAR DEPARTMENT, }  
Washington, April 14, 1847.

SIR: The signal successes which have attended our military operations since the commencement of the present war, would seem to justify the expectation that Mexico will be disposed to offer fair terms of accommodation. With a view to a result so desirable, the President has commissioned Nicholas P. Trist, esq., of the State Department, to proceed to your head-quarters or to the squadron, as to him may seem most convenient, and be in readiness to receive any proposal which the enemy may see fit to make for the restoration of peace.

Mr. Trist is clothed with such diplomatic powers as will authorise him to enter into arrangements with the government of Mexico for the suspension of hostilities. Should he make known to you in writing, that the contingency has occurred, in consequence of which the President is willing that further active military operations should cease, you will regard such notice as a direction from the President to suspend them until further orders from this department, unless continued or recommenced by the enemy; but in so doing, you will not retire from any place you may occupy, or abstain from any change of position which you may deem necessary to the health or safety of the troops under your command, unless, on consultation with Mr. Trist, a change in the position of your forces should be deemed necessary to the success of the negotiations for peace. Until hostilities, as herein proposed, shall be intermitted, you will continue to carry on your operations with energy, and push your advantages as far as your means will enable you to do.

Mr. Trist is also the bearer of a despatch to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the government of Mexico, in reply to one addressed to







the Secretary of State here. You will transmit that despatch to the the commander of the Mexican forces, with a request that it may be laid before his government, at the same time giving information that Mr. Trist, an officer from our department for foreign affairs, next in rank to its chief, is at your head-quarters or on board the squadron, as the case may be.

You will afford Mr. Trist all the accommodation and facilities in your power to enable him to accomplish the objects of his mission.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. L. MARCY,

Secretary of War.

Major General WINFIELD SCOTT,  
Commanding the Army of the United States,  
Mexico.

WAR DEPARTMENT,

May 31, 1847. }

\* \* \* \*

A still more serious misconception has seized your mind in regard to an armistice. Before this time it is quite probable you will have read the instructions to the Commissioner, whom you see fit to denominate "the chief clerk of the State Department," and I trust that a knowledge of what they contain has dissipated all your distressing apprehensions of being degraded by me. My letter informed you that Mr. Trist was "clothed with diplomatic powers," and his instructions and the project of a treaty which he carried with him have ere this apprised you that he is a Commissioner, with full power to negotiate a peace. The treaty which he was authorized to conclude contains an article, as you will have perceived, which provides for a suspension of hostilities, but not until the treaty shall have been ratified by the Mexican government. Neither the considerations of humanity, nor sound policy, would justify the continuance of active military operations after a treaty of peace had been concluded and ratified on the part of Mexico, until the information of the fact could be communicated from Mexico to this place, and an order for the suspension of hostilities hence transmitted to the commanding general in that country. It will not be questioned that a Commissioner of peace may be properly vested with the power of agreeing to a suspension of hostilities in a definite treaty, negotiated and already ratified by one party, while waiting the ratification of the other. As the negotiator is the first to know the fact that a treaty has been concluded and so ratified, it is beyond dispute proper that he should be directed to communicate the knowledge of that fact to the commanding general; and it cannot, in my view of the case, be derogatory to that officer to be placed under instructions to act with reference









to that fact, when duly notified of it by the Commissioner. The case cannot be made plainer, or your misapprehensions in regard to it more clearly pointed out, than by simply stating it as it must exist, if the contingency should fortunately happen on which you will be required to suspend hostilities. A Commissioner of peace is sent by the President to your headquarters, and he makes known to you his authority to receive from Mexico offers for concluding a peace. You are informed, by his instruction and the project of a treaty of peace by Mexico, hostilities immediately thereafter are to cease. With all these facts fully made known to you in advance, you are directed by the President to suspend hostilities on receiving written notice from the Commissioner that the contingency—the conclusion and ratification of a treaty of peace by Mexico—has happened. Under these circumstances you can conceive that, as commanding general of the force in Mexico, you have the right to raise a question upon your duty to obey this direction, coming as it does, through a proper channel, from your superior—the Commander-in-chief.

I am, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

W. L. MARCY,

Secretary of War.

Major General WINFIELD SCOTT,

Commanding U. S. Army, Mexico.

(Ex. Doc. No. 60, page 962, 30th Congress, 1st session.)

WAR DEPARTMENT, }  
Washington, July 12, 1847. }

EXTRACT.

SIR: Since my letters of the 31st of May and 14th of June, pointing out your entire misapprehension in regard to the mission of Mr. Trist, so far as it was assumed by you to be an interference with your military command, a part of his communications to you, as well as your letter to him of the 29th of May, has been received. This correspondence discloses a state of things between yourself and him most deeply regretted, as it is much to be feared that your personal relations are such as may compromise the most important national interests.

\* \* \* \* \*

No two agents of the government could have been charged with duties more distinct and non-conflicting—duties less likely to bring on personal collision, where any sort of communication was required. To you was entrusted the conduct of military operations—to him the business of negotiating a peace, if a favorable opportunity should occur. Only a very limited official intercourse between you and him was required, and that was of such a character as to preclude, as







it was supposed, the possibility of any misunderstanding. He was required, in the first place, to deliver to you a despatch from your government to the Minister of Foreign Relations of Mexico. When thus delivered, all his agency in regard to it was ended. It was committed to you to be forwarded: not even the President's order to you to send it forward was communicated through him, but through this department. To this course the most over-wrought sensitiveness could not properly take the slightest exception. Your false alarm in regard to the power of the Commissioner, and the misstep consequently taken—the first in the series of blunders—led him to interfere, in an unauthorized and improper manner, with an affair exclusively your own—the transmission of of that despatch to the Mexican authorities.

\* \* \* \* \*

Should you receive from these authorities an intimation of a willingness to enter upon negotiations, you will, as a matter of course, apprise Mr. Trist of that fact, and do what may be deemed proper to facilitate the conclusion of a peace.

\* \* \* \* \*

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. L. MARCY,

Secretary of War.

Major General WINFIELD SCOTT,  
Commanding U. S. Army, Mexico.

(Ex. Doc. No. 60, page 998, 30th Congress, 1st session.)

*Instructions to Mr. Trist.*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
WASHINGTON, June 14, 1847. }

[Senate Doc. 52, 1st Sess. 30th Congress,  
pp. 113.]

[Mr. Buchanan to Mr. Trist.]

"You have been despatched to Mexico by your government as a minister of peace; and to accomplish the great object of your mission, a hearty co-operation between the general and yourself may be indispensable. Under these considerations I am directed by the President, in case amicable relations shall not in the meantime have been restored, to instruct you to call upon General Scott and offer to communicate to him, confidentially, the instructions and the projet of a treaty with which you have been intrusted, and to report to this department without delay the circumstances and result of your interview."

In our next we will show the steps taken by Mr. Trist under these instructions and the state of affairs in the city of Mexico.









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# DAILY TELEGRAPH.

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## WASHINGTON:

FRIDAY AFTERNOON, OCT. 22, 1852.

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### The Armistice at Mexico.

NUMBER NINE.

#### Link No. 8—Summary.

Having presented the instructions of the administration to Mr. Trist and Gen. Scott, and the instructions to them to co-operate, we will now show Mr. Trist's proceedings relative to the proposition to make peace. This was carried on through the friendly agency of H. B. M. Minister Plenipotentiary at Mexico, Charles Bankhead, esq.

Mr. Trist's first letter to Mr. Bankhead was dated Puebla, June 6, 1847. (Sen. Doc. 52, p. 181, 1st sess. 30th Cong.) In answer to this application for Mr. Bankhead's friendly offices, Mr. Thornton, secretary to the British embassy, came down to see Mr. Trist. The following letter of June 11, 1847, was the result of Mr. Trist's interview with Mr. Thornton.

With this letter we will present one written to the *London Morning Chronicle*, dated Mexico, June 11, 1847, which shows *Mr. Thornton* made a second visit to *Puebla*, and, at the same time, the state of things in Mexico at this time—particularly a Mexican *caricature* relative to the *three-million-dollars* bribe of Mr. Polk to Santa Anna:

[Mr. Trist to Mr. Bankhead Minister Plenipotentiary of H. B. M. at Mexico.]

PUEBLO, JUNE 11, 1847.

"Sir: I need not say how truly obliged I feel to yourself and Mr. Thornton for the mode adopted to afford me an opportunity to place the enclosed in your hands; although my first emotion was one of mingled surprise and regret, that he should have exposed himself to the very serious personal risk attending such a journey; a point upon which my anxiety cannot but be intense, until I shall learn that he is again safely through the dangers of the road.

"The conversation I have had the pleasure to hold with him, has confirmed the correctness of the grounds of the regret expressed in my







former letter, that the communication for the minister of foreign relations of this republic had not been transmitted to him early last month."

[Senate Doc. 52, page 184.]

Santa Anna not being firmly seated in power, Mr. Bankhead had evidently recommended delay at that moment in the delivery of Mr. Trist's propositions. In reply Mr. Trist says:

"My legitimate discretion with reference to it does not, as I conceive, go further than to authorize me to postpone the delivery of the communication in one case, and one case only; that it to say, for want of a government having an actual and positive existence, to *whom* [not to which] it could be delivered, and by *whom* it could be considered and acted upon, under the responsibility to their own country and to the world, proper to all determinations upon questions of such deep import.

"This I consider to be the limit of my discretion on the subject, unless I had the strongest reason to believe both that the actually existing administration of the government was one from whom a fair and rational consideration of the communication could not be expected; *and that it was, at no remote period, to be succeeded by a new administration of a different complexion.*

\* \* \* \* \*

"In availing myself of the friendly readiness evinced by you to take charge of this communication, I have to request, therefore, that you will govern yourself in regard to its delivery by the view here presented of my duty with respect to it, were I on the spot to see and act for myself."

\* \* \* \* \*

We now pass to the letter in the London Morning Chronicle of August 6, 1847, dated "Mexico, June 28, 1847."

State of affairs in Mexico, when Mr. Trist through Mr. Bankhead, the British Minister, presented the proposition from our government to treat. [See Senate Doc. No. 52, 1847-'48.] National Intelligencer, August 31, 1847.

Extract from a letter to the London Morning Chronicle, August 6, 1847.

[It will be observed this is from an entirely uninterested party.]

"MEXICO, June 28, 1847.

"In the beginning of the past week a despatch from Washington of the 15th of April reached here in which Mr. Buchanan announced to this government, in the most amicable terms, that an ambassador with plenary power to conclude peace would arrive in the quarters of the American Commander, and it is supposed that it was this









very plenipotentiary who brought the despatch. But Santa Anna is sadly *afraid* of his Mexican enemies, and already a coalition of six of the States has been formed, who have declared in their Congress that peace is not to be talked of, and who declare every one a traitor to his country, who, under present circumstances, should talk of peace. The General Congress before whom Santa Anna wished to place the abovementioned despatch, that he might either admit the plenipotentiary, or decline seeing him, refuses, to meet from the most unworthy and despicable motives. A large number of the Deputies have, in fact, already left Mexico, and it is very probable that even now the necessary number to constitute a house is no longer in the capital. *In this wretched strife—FOR SANTA ANNA IS WITHOUT DOUBT ANXIOUS FOR PEACE—he* announced to the American commander that he should lay the despatch before Congress; and, curious to relate, Mr. THORNTON, the secretary of the British legation, was chosen as the bearer of his answer to Puebla. It is generally believed that England continues her efforts to mediate between the two nations, and there still exists a party who persist in believing that the American forces will not enter Mexico, and that peace will speedily be concluded. I do not believe Santa Anna will take upon himself the responsibility of such a step—acting, as he then would do, in direct opposition to public opinion.

*“A very clever caricature has been published and sold here during the last few days, representing Santa Anna laid on a table of the anatomical theatre, AN ENORMOUS YANKEE amputating his second leg, WHILE MR. POLK applies the ether apparatus; but, instead of sponges containing the ether, you see A NUMBER OF MONEY BAGS, marked three millions of pesos,” (dollars.)*

How Santa Anna was affected by this state of things, we will show by his farewell address to his army, thus introduced in the Union of November 22, 1847:

“We gave yesterday (says the Picayune) the order of the new government, depriving him (Santa Anna) of his command, and we now add here is a translation of his farewell address to his troops. One brief passage in it, which we italicize is significant.

“HEADQUARTERS, HUAMANTLA,

“October 16, 1847.

“The General-in-chief (Santa Anna) to his companions in arms.

\* \* \* \* \*

“I depart from you and the theatre of war, perhaps to sacrifice myself to the vengeance of my enemies, or to effect an *inglorious peace*, which I did not wish to grant because it was repugnant to my conscience.”







Will any sane man suppose that Santa Anna, like a drowning man, did not still hope to seize the dictatorship, and by the aid of the three millions of dollars, held out as a bribe by Mr. Polk, re-establish his broken political fortunes at the expense of his conscience by signing a treaty of peace. We wish the reader to observe that the date of this letter to the London Chronicle is June 28, 1847, and that Mr. Thornton, Secretary to the English embassy, was the bearer of Santa Anna's reply to Gen. Scott, or rather as Mr. Trist's despatches show, to Mr. Trist. By those despatches it appears the first communication from Mr. Bankhead was oral; but from Mr. Trist's reply it is evident that, among other things, Mr. Trist was to ascertain whether the American army could not be detained some time longer at Puebla to allow Santa Anna time to get a Congress together, as stated by this writer. What Santa Anna's reply, conveyed by Mr. Thornton on his second visit to Puebla, was, we do not learn, but may infer from the next link.

In our next we will show that at a council of war, held at Puebla, July 17, 1847, Mr. Trist either developed the views of the administration in reference to the \$3,000,000, as we have shown them, or some portion of them—doubtless the \$1,000,000, adverted to in this Leonidas charge; and that whatever it was, Gen. PILLOW, *though governed by no instructions as Scott was*, WAS IN FAVOR OF THE APPLICATION OF THE MONEY AS PROPOSED.

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# DAILY TELEGRAPH.

WASHINGTON:

SATURDAY AFTERNOON, OCT. 23, 1852.

## The Armistice at Mexico.

NUMBER TEN.

### Link No. 9—Summary.

Having already given the instructions to Mr. Trist and General Scott, we will in this link present Mr. Trist's letter to the Secretary of State, speaking of the patriotic manner in which General Scott had acted under them. To this letter we subjoin a letter, signed "Gomez," giving an account of a certain council of war held in Puebla. The writer of this letter was G. T. M. Davis, a member of General "Shield's military family. From Mr. Trist's letter and that of "Gomez," no one can fail to perceive why Mr. Trist says that General Scott had assumed "responsibility of the gravest kind, in utter disregard of consequences to himself." The fact that only a portion of the three million of dollars is adverted to, and the evidence we have had of the intercourse between Mr. Trist and Santa Anna, through the British Minister, shows that this must have been some proposition from Santa Anna, who felt that he could not make himself dictator, sign a treaty and get the *three millions*; and who was willing to make an effort to make peace on different terms, and whose proposition, whatever it was, General Scott was in duty bound to consider. What did he do? He presented it to a council of war, and the plan not being approved, the army moved upon Mexico, when General Pierce arrived with reinforcements. Though a desire for peace was, we cannot doubt from the terms of Santa Anna's proclamation relative to the armistice and the appointment of leading members of the peace party to settle the terms of the treaty, earnest and sincere on the part of Santa Anna, he could not face the popular feeling as expressed in the caricature of the peculiar *ether* used by Mr. Polk when people undergo painful operations, and was forced to try the issue of a battle. Having been beaten, the Mexican capital must fall if the battle







was followed up, and with it must fall every vestige of a government and all hope of peace. To avert this evil, the only course was to offer an armistice in accordance with the instructions of the United States government—that its object was peace and not conquest. Neither can there be a doubt that the subject matter of the council of war is the basis of the charge of the million of dollars bribe to Santa Anna, which charge General Scott, in his letter to the Secretary of War, dated at Mexico, February 6, 1848, thus meets:

"I have not reported on the subject of secret communications since I left Jalapa—first, because of the uncertainty of our communications with Vera Cruz; and secondly, the necessity of certain explanations, which, on account of others, ought never to be reduced to writing. I may, however, briefly add that I have never tempted the honor, conscience, or patriotism of any man, but have held it lawful in morals, as in war, to purchase valuable information or services voluntarily tendered me."

—Which confirms the conclusion we came to, that some offer was made by Santa Anna. Whatever the proposition before the council of war may have been, it is clear that, whether advisedly or unadvisedly, "Gomez" indicated, *before the fact*, precisely the plan the administration and its worthy coadjutors have pursued in this matter; and Mr. Trist, whose patriotic devotion was evinced in disobeying his recall, lest peace might become hopeless, was, by Mr. Polk, even when obliged to accept the treaty made by him, (doubtless for bearing testimony to Gen. Scott's patriotism,) presented to the Senate as having written much that was "irrelevant, highly improper," &c., &c. Mr. Trist's conduct in these matters needs no defence. The acceptance of the treaty made by him by Mr. Polk's administration, and the ratification of it by the Senate of the United States, on the ground that, if this treaty were rejected, there was no hope of any other, is a more than sufficient defence for his whole conduct, and proves that he acted from an earnest desire for peace throughout.

*Mr. Trist to Mr. Buchanan.*

"PUEBLA, July 23, 1847."

"SIR: \* \* \* "In my No. 8, under date of the 7th instant, I transmitted a copy of a letter addressed by me to General Scott, under date









of the 25th of June and his reply to the same. This constituted the commencement of our official intercourse with reference to the duties with which I am charged. Justice—to say nothing of my own feelings towards a gentleman and a public servant, whose character I now believe that I had entirely misconceived—demands that I should embrace the early opportunity to say that his whole conduct in this regard has been characterized by the purest public spirit, and a fidelity and devotion, which could not be surpassed, to the views of the government in regard to the restoration of peace. This spirit on his part—as will clearly appear when the details are communicated—has manifested itself, not in a passive way merely, (as might be supposed from the nature of our relative positions and duties,) but in a disposition to assume responsibility—and responsibility of the gravest kind—in utter disregard of consequences to himself.”—Senate Doc. 52, 1st. session, 30th Congress, p. 302.

This must undoubtedly refer to the council of war held July 17, 1847, at Puebla, relative to a treaty, &c., &c., an account of which “Gomez” gives.


[From the “Baltimore Sun” of Dec. 6, 1847—*Extract*.]

“THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN.—We find in the St. Louis Republican, of the 22d ult., an interesting letter from Puebla, giving a narration of the secret history of the last campaign in Mexico—some of the details of the councils of war held on the march from Vera Cruz to the Halls of the Montezumas. The letter in the Republican, although an old date, (“Puebla, Aug. 6, 1847,”) contains intelligence which is even now of a novel and startling nature. Many of the expressions of the writer are evidently dictated by a party bias, and he may be entirely mistaken as to the particular fund proposed to be appropriated, but, for the sake of the story, we overlook all these, and proceed to quote as follows:

“I observe from the papers, that an idea is prevalent among the more intelligent portions of the United States, that Gen. Scott is vested with high diplomatic powers. Whatever may have been the case, previous to the arrival of Mr. Trist, since then all such powers have been vested in Mr. Trist alone. He was sent here as a confidential political friend of the administration as the disburser of the three million fund, and with the expectation that, by a judicious application of it, a peace could be speedily purchased from a people over whom our standard had floated victorious in every engagement we had had with them. I MENTION THIS, BECAUSE I BELIEVE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION, FEARING THE INFAMY THAT WILL ATTACH TO A PEACE PROCURED UPON SUCH TERMS, HAVE CUNNINGLY DEVISED THE PLAN TO CREATE, AND ALLOW THE IMPRESSION TO BECOME PREVA-







LENT, THAT GEN. SCOTT POSSESSED THE DIPLOMATIC POWER, AND THAT UPON HIM MUST REST THE RESPONSIBILITY OF ANY SUCH TERMINATION OF THE WAR.

"A short time since things were in a fair way thus to be ended. The application of this fund was to be, upon certain contingencies, in bringing about the appointment of commissioners to treat with us for peace; and those who had secured this result were to be the recipients of certain portions of the fund. To this Mr. Trist was committed in full, and, so far as consent went, General Scott in part. A council of war was decided upon and called. It convened at the headquarters of the army on Saturday evening, the 17th of July last past. Those who were present at this council were, the General-in-Chief, Major Generals Pillow and Quitman, Brigadier Generals Twiggs, Shields, and Cadwallader. The justly distinguished General Worth was not present, in consequence of a most unfortunate disruption of the friendly relations that had existed for thirty-five years between him and General Scott. But of this more anon."

"The principal topic of discussion at this council was, *whether the application of a portion of the \$3,000,000 fund to the PURCHASE of a peace, would be justifiable under the peculiar circumstances of the case?* The deliberations on this point are thus described in the letter of Gomez:

"The General-in-Chief, with his usual, impressive, and, I may add, eloquent manner, first went over the whole ground, bringing in support of his position every argument to which tact, much reflection, and a strong mind could give birth. To these considerations he added the great and pressing anxiety urged in all their communications by the administration to terminate, *by any means*, if possible, this war. Upon his concluding, the opinions of the different generals present were called for, according to rank. GENERAL PILLOW'S WAS FIRST GIVEN, AND WAS FAVORABLE TO THE PLAN PROPOSED. General Quitman followed, but objected in toto to it, on the ground that it would inflict a stain upon our national escutcheon that centuries could not wipe out. Of the brigadier generals, Twiggs was the first to express his views, and by regarding it to a great extent as a '*political question*,' he declined giving any opinion. General Shields was next required to give his views: he at once arose from his seat, his whole countenance lit up with animation, and in that bold, fearless, uncompromising manner that so strikingly illustrates his whole public career, denounced the whole scheme in the most unqualified terms. He insisted that the application of this fund, for any such purpose, was not only immoral, but debasing. That, while for purposes of self-defence, it was, according to the usages of modern warfare, justifiable in one nation to employ as spies the subjects of the other belligerent power, yet there was no state of cir-













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circumstances that ever had or could exist, that would warrant our bribing or hiring the officers or functionaries of that belligerent power, for the sake of benefiting us, to cut the throats of their own subjects. And he boldly declared, that rather than see the country of his adoption thus disgraced, he would prefer by far to witness the continuation of the war for ten years, and in every battle we fought lose five thousand men. The one would admit a remedy; the other was an evil, from the consequences of which, as a nation, we never could recover.

"General Cadwallader simply remarked that General Shields had exhausted the subject, and he fully concurred with him in the conclusions to which he had come. Thus terminated the council of the evening of the 17th of July. What followed is soon related:

"The next day General Shields had a long interview with Mr. Trist. What occurred at that interview I have no means of ascertaining, but the subsequent acts of Mr. Trist can leave but little doubt upon that subject. Two days afterwards, Mr. Trist withdrew all papers connected with *this* manner of terminating the war. And from that hour to this, an immediate march upon the capital, so soon as General Pierce came up, was determined upon, and all hopes of an early peace abandoned.

"I have been thus particular in relating the proceeding of what I regard by far the most important council of war that has convened since the existence of hostilities between the United States and Mexico, because I believe my country has been saved from being plunged into an abyss of infamy from which there would be no extrication, and for the reason that those who, regardless of consequences to themselves, have reverted that blow, should receive the credit of it. For myself, I sincerely hope that the hand that shall ever be extended in offering as a bribe, either directly or indirectly, any portion of this three millions to Santa Anna or any other Mexican, for the purpose of procuring a peace, may, before it accomplishes its object, fall palsied by his side, and that a mark more distinguishable than that placed upon the brow of Cain may be indelibly fixed upon his, that, so long as his unworthy life is spared, he may be the object of execration of all his indignant countrymen."

The writer of this was G. T. M. Davis, of the volunteers, at the time one of the military family of Gen. Shields. Now, we here perceive that this, unquestionably, adverts to the same matter that Gen. Redivivus and the Herald refer to, except that from Gen. Leonidas we learn the amount was a "million of dollars." We perceive that its use was to effect or purchase, (as you please,) *not an armistice, but a peace.* And he states "that the administration, fearing the infamy that will



‘attach to a peace procured upon such terms,  
 ‘have cunningly devised the plan to create, and  
 ‘allow the impression to become prevalent, that  
 ‘Gen. Scott possessed the diplomatic power, and  
 ‘that upon him must rest the responsibility of  
 ‘any such termination of the war.”

We do not believe any man will doubt that the subject of “Gomez’s” letter, and the million dollar bribe charge, are one and the same.

In the foregoing papers it has been our desire to show how strong the evidences were of a design on the part of Mr. Polk’s administration to hold out \$3,000,000 as an inducement to Santa Anna to seize the dictatorship and make a peace. To show how precisely in keeping with these instructions was the presentation of some proposition in reference to a portion of the \$3,000,000 to Mr. Trist by Santa Anna, when he feared he could not get the whole because he could not make himself dictator. To show the honorable course taken by General Scott in submitting the proposition or propositions of Santa Anna or the government of the United States to a council of war, and to show that at the very time this was being done, some cause or causes, to us unknown, had led a Democrat to indicate in advance the plan of the administration to persecute General Scott on this subject. This has been done, first, through the official organ; second, by an attempted SECRET INQUISITION; the first ever employed by the government of the United States, and which had it resulted in anything to the prejudice of General Scott, we should long since have had it trumpeted from one end of the land to the other; lastly by Pillowism and the Herald. And all this about a proposition that at the time was voted for by Gen. Pillow himself. General Towson, General Cushing, and General Belknap constituted the secret inquisition to which we refer, and were a part of the machinery employed to carry out the plan proposed to itself by the administration. No officer of any government has ever for an honest and upright discharge of his duty suffered such a wicked persecution, that the corrupt conduct of an administration might be hidden from public knowledge, as has been attempted against General Scott, and if these papers do nothing else, they will show that it is fully capable of resorting to such means to screen its conduct, even to the sacrifice of an innocent and injured man.











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