


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THE PHILADELPHIA GRAYS'

COLLECTION OF

51
2020

OFFICIAL REPORTS

OF

BRIGADIER-GENERAL GEORGE CADWALADER'S

Services during the Campaign of 1847,

IN MEXICO.



PHILADELPHIA:

T. K. AND P. G. COLLINS, PRINTERS.

1848.

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* General Cadwalader's report of CONTRERAS and CHURUBUSCO is a single dispatch, of which the first part is printed on pages 23 to 25, and the residue on pages 33 to 35. They were entirely distinct engagements, though the second was commenced at a subsequent hour of the same day on which the first was terminated.

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* Here also, in the case of CHAPULTEPEC and the CITY GATE, a single report of General Cadwalader is divided. The portion relating to CHAPULTEPEC is on pages 51 to 54; the residue of the report relating to the ENTRANCE OF THE CITY on pages 55 to 58.

† A subsequent part of this report, in which General Scott recapitulates the occurrences of the successive victories in the valley of Mexico, is extracted and set forth in the Report of the Committee (page 7).

RESOLUTION.

At a meeting of the Artillery Corps of Philadelphia Grays, held on Tuesday evening, April 25th, 1848, it was unanimously

Resolved, that a committee be appointed who shall cause to be printed, for the private use of the members of this company and their friends, the official reports by BRIGADIER-GENERAL GEORGE CADWALADER of the United States Army, of the battles of the NATIONAL BRIDGE, LA HOYA, CONTRERAS, CHURUBUSCO, MOLINO DEL REY, CHAPULTEPEC, and the SAN COSME GATE of the city of Mexico; with such portions of other official documents, as may assist in exhibiting and explaining the part taken by our Captain* in those engagements.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE.

The committee appointed under the foregoing resolution, have fulfilled their pleasing duty, in printing, from the executive documents transmitted to Congress by the Secretary of War in December and January last, four reports of Brigadier-General Cadwalader, dated respectively July 12th, August 22d, and September 10th and 18th, 1847, and numerous extracts from reports of the General-in-chief and other officers, arranged in the manner which the committee conceived most suitable to the purpose expressed in the resolution of the company.

The first report of the series relates to the engagement, in June, 1847, at the National Bridge, and a subsequent skirmish at La Hoya,

* On the organization of the Philadelphia Grays, in January, 1832, George Cadwalader was elected their captain. He still holds the appointment. At the outset of the present war with Mexico, in 1846, he commanded the Brigade composed of the volunteers and enrolled militia of the city of Philadelphia. Disregarding considerations of rank, he tendered to the President the services of the Philadelphia Grays, with their field battery of six pounders, and offered, as their captain, to accompany them to the seat of war. The company was not called into service under this offer. In the spring of 1847, he was appointed a Brigadier-General in the army of the United States. It is the desire of the company to possess and to preserve an authentic memorial of his career of active service in the successful campaign which followed.

on both which occasions Brigadier-General Cadwalader was the successful commander of the American forces. If the affair at the National Bridge, compared with many battles of this extraordinary war, should also bear the name of a *skirmish*, it ought, perhaps, to be remembered that the ease and rapidity of the victory was probably attributable to the promptness and decision with which artillery was brought to bear, unexpectedly, upon the forces of the enemy by whom the passes had been obstructed. The result of the engagement was, we believe, the almost entire dispersion of the masses of irregular troops, by means of whose frequent attacks and resistance, in favorable positions along the route, the enemy had confidently expected to prevent, or materially impede, the progress, from the seaboard, of reinforcements of men, money, provisions and ammunition, without which General Scott could not have advanced from Puebla upon the capital.*

The remaining reports relate to the more important battles in the valley of Mexico, in August and September, 1847. In all of these; the VILLAGE OF CONTRERAS on the 19th, the FORTRESSES OF CONTRERAS AND CHURUBUSCO on the 20th, of August, the MOLINO DEL REY on the 8th, CHAPULTEPEC on the 12th and 13th, the CITY GATE on the 14th, of September, General Cadwalader actively participated. His brigade was the second of the third division under Major-General Pillow. It is believed that *no other brigade* in the army was so fortunate as thus to take part in *every one of the battles*. In two of them, General Cadwalader, detached, with his brigade, from its division, rendered useful service in other parts of the field. In consequence of General Pillow's wound, and the illness of General Pierce, he was, on two other important days, and at more than one important crisis, in the actual command of the third division of the army.†

The General-in-chief of the American army, in his concluding report,‡ thus recapitulates these successive victories.

* Major-General Pillow subsequently, on the 1st of July, reached Perote, with a small force, without having encountered any opposition. Brigadier-General Pierce, who afterwards conducted his brigade upon the same route, and for the safety of whose command General Scott had expressed great anxiety, reported, that though he had been five times attacked, he had really encountered nothing that could be considered regular resistance. (Ex. Doc. No. 1, Report 6 Jan. 1848, page 25.)

If it is correctly reported that the Mexicans, who, after partially succeeding in their attack upon Colonel McIntosh, attempted to dispute General Cadwalader's passage of the National Bridge, were four thousand strong, their discomfiture must have been complete, or their forces would have been rallied and concentrated to oppose the advance of General Pillow and General Pierce.

† See the Committee's note under the head of CHAPULTEPEC (*post*).

‡ Pp. 384-5.

“ Leaving, as we all feared, inadequate garrisons at Vera Cruz, Perote, and Puebla—with much larger hospitals; and being obliged, most reluctantly, from the same cause (general paucity of numbers) to abandon Jalapa, we marched [August 7-10] from Puebla with only 10,738 rank and file. This number includes the garrison of Jalapa, and the 2,429 men brought up by Brigadier-General Pierce, August 6.

“ At Contreras, Churubusco, &c., [August 20,] we had but 8,497 men engaged—after deducting the garrison of San Augustin, (our general depot,) the intermediate sick and the dead; at the Molinos del Rey (September 8) but three brigades with some cavalry and artillery—making in all 3,251 men—were in the battle; in the two days—September 12 and 13—our whole operating force, after deducting, again, the recent killed, wounded, and sick, together with the garrison of Mixcoac (the then general depot) and that of Tacubaya, was but 7,180; and, finally, after deducting the new garrison of Chapultepec, with the killed and wounded of the two days, we took possession (September 14) of this great capital with less than 6,000 men! And I reassert, upon accumulated and unquestionable evidence, that, in not one of those conflicts, was this army opposed by fewer than three and a half times its numbers—in several of them, by a yet greater excess.

“ I recapitulate our losses since we arrived in the basin of Mexico:

“ AUGUST 19, 20.—*Killed*, 137, including 14 officers. *Wounded*, 877, including 62 officers. *Missing*, (probably killed,) 38 rank and file. *Total*, 1,052.

“ SEPTEMBER 8.—*Killed*, 116, including 9 officers. *Wounded*, 665, including 49 officers. *Missing*, 18 rank and file. *Total*, 789.

“ SEPTEMBER 12, 13, 14.—*Killed*, 130, including 10 officers. *Wounded*, 703, including 68 officers. *Missing*, 29 rank and file. *Total*, 862.

“ Grand total of losses, 2,703, including 383 officers.

“ On the other hand,—this small force has beaten, on the same occasions, in view of their capital, the whole Mexican army, of (at the beginning) thirty-odd thousand men—posted, always, in chosen positions, behind entrenchments, or more formidable defences of nature and art; killed or wounded, of that number, more than 7,000 officers and men; taken 3,730 prisoners, one-seventh officers, including 13 generals, of whom 3 had been presidents of this republic; captured more than 20 colors and standards, 75 pieces of ordnance, besides 57 wall-pieces, 20,000 small arms, an immense quantity of shots, shells, powder, &c., &c.

“ Of that enemy, once so formidable in numbers, appointments, artillery, &c., twenty-odd thousand have disbanded themselves in despair, leaving, as is known, not more than three fragments—the largest, about 2,500—now wandering in different directions, without magazines or a military chest, and living at *free quarters* upon their own people.”

It is not the purpose of the committee, in language of their own, to detail the part taken by Brigadier-General Cadwalader during these occurrences, to recount his achievements, or attest the merit of his services. They know that he would not approve of their doing so,—even in his absence. This knowledge would suffice to prevent them, if the language of the resolution of the company did not impliedly prohibit them, from adopting such a course.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES HANNA,
GEORGE W. BRIGGS, } *Committee.*
M. HASTINGS,

May 2d, 1848.

NATIONAL BRIDGE.

Brigadier-General Cadwalader's Official Report of the Engagements at the National Bridge and La Hoya.

HEAD-QUARTERS, 1ST BRIGADE, 3D DIVISION,
Puebla, Mexico, July 12, 1847.

SIR:—In reply to your letter dated the 11th instant, requesting to be furnished with a report of the incidents which occurred on my march from Vera Cruz to this place, including combats with the enemy, I respectfully submit the following for the information of the general-in-chief.

On the 7th of June, whilst awaiting at Vera Cruz the arrival of a portion of the troops of my brigade, I received a letter, by express, from Colonel McIntosh, dated the 6th June, 11 P. M., at Paso de Ovejas, stating that he had been “constantly attacked since 10 A. M., to-day, and that the immense train under the escort of my (his) troops “is so extensive, that it is impossible, without a considerable additional force, to guard it and proceed.” A copy of the letter is herewith enclosed.*

Immediately, orders were communicated for so many of the troops as could be provided with transportation, to be put in marching order; and early on the morning of the 8th, one company of the 3d dragoons, one section of the howitzer battery from the regiment of voltigeurs, and a detachment of infantry, in all about five hundred, were en route to reinforce the column awaiting support.

On coming up with Colonel McIntosh, which was on the 10th of June, it was found that we would be unable to proceed without delay, in consequence of the crippled condition of his train,† while, at

* *Note by the Committee.*—See this dispatch (Ex. Doc. Sen., No. 1 (2) 13-4). In a subsequent report, (*ib.*, p. 4,) Col. McIntosh wrote that it had been noised abroad that the train contained specie and ammunition, and that before it started, “preparations were already reported to be making by the enemy to attack it.” By the field report of the detachment for the evening of 7th June, (*ib.*, 9-10,) it appears that his aggregate force was less than 700 men. In the attack of the 6th of June, he lost 19, killed and wounded.

† *Note by the Committee.*—The quartermaster of the detachment on the 8th of June, reported as follows:—“There has “been left on the road, by casualties, “twenty-four wagons; their contents, “however, have generally been brought “forward. “I have not been able to learn from “the conductor of the pack-train the “amount of his loss; he reports that six “of his men were killed, and some ran “away, abandoning the mules they had “in charge.”

Brigadier-General Cadwalader's Report.

the same time, the scarcity of forage, and the limited supply of provisions for the troops to Jalapa, rendered it necessary for me to direct that every effort should be made to put the train in marching condition, and for the troops to be in readiness to leave at the earliest practicable moment.

On the following afternoon, the column resumed its march. Before leaving Paso de Ovejas, we had reason to believe that the enemy, in considerable numbers,* were occupying the commanding positions in our front, at the National Bridge, and were prepared to resist us at that point.

On approaching the bridge, they were found to be in possession of the fort on the left of the road, from which they could deliver their fire with effect upon the train at several points, from the circuitous course of the road in its descent to the bridge, before reaching the foot of the ravine. The enemy were also in possession of the heights on the opposite side of the bridge, from which point they would have a raking fire upon our columns during the passage of the river. These heights I found it impracticable to reach, except by crossing the bridge.

The bridge itself was barricaded. Under these circumstances, it appeared to be necessary to detach a sufficient infantry force to drive the enemy from the fort overhanging the road, before reaching the bridge; and, simultaneously with that movement, to order forward the howitzers to breach the barricade, and a company of cavalry, and two of infantry, to force the bridge, as soon as a passage was prepared for them. Lieutenant and Adjutant Henry Prince, of the 4th infantry, who had been assigned to command the howitzers, rendered me highly valuable service at this critical moment. He advanced with the battery, and succeeded in breaching the barricades, and preparing the way for our troops to charge, which was done under a heavy fire from the enemy. The heights upon the right, after crossing the bridge, were carried by Captain Pitman's company of the 9th infantry, and a small detachment from other companies,—under a fire from the enemy,—handsomely led by Brevet Captain Hooker, the chief of my staff. Having thus gained possession of the points on which it was necessary for us to encamp, both on account of water and the security of the train, the latter was ordered forward, and parked for the night.

I have to regret the loss of 32 officers and men, killed and wounded, belonging to the service, with others employed with the train, whose names are not known. We have reason to be-

* *Note by the Committee.*—The private accounts transmitted for the newspapers from Vera Cruz to New Orleans, men-

tion their number as 4000. See ante, p. 6.

Brigadier-General Cadwalader's Report.

lieve that the enemy suffered severely, although no positive information has been communicated to me with regard to their loss, or the numbers engaged.* In consequence of our delay in marching from Paso de Ovejas, we were compelled to accomplish a part of our work under cover of the night; and to this I mainly attribute the limited loss we sustained. Had those positions been forced by daylight, the list of killed and wounded would have been unquestionably greatly augmented.

On the 13th, after sending back the wounded with a suitable escort, we proceeded to Plan del Rio, with no other interruption or annoyance than an occasional discharge of escopettes at small portions of our troops and train. The discharges usually proceeded from behind dense thickets, almost impracticable for our flankers to penetrate, and not unfrequently resulted in the loss of men, horses and mules.

We passed Cerro Gordo the 14th, having previously taken possession of the commanding positions; and on the 15th reached Jalapa, where we were joined by the brigade under Colonel Childs.

Before leaving that city on the 18th, information reached us that the enemy were in force at La Hoya, prepared to resist our advance, in a strong position; and we encamped at the village, before entering the pass on the 19th. On approaching it, on the 20th at an early hour, our advance found it occupied with a considerable force, apparently determined to dispute the passage of the train. Four companies, under Captain Winder, of the 1st artillery, were sent in advance, with written instructions to occupy the successive heights in the pass. On gaining the mountain on the left, with two companies, he reported the enemy to be also in force upon the intermediate height that he had already gained, from which only, the other height, which commanded the road, could be approached. Major Dimick, with two companies, was sent to reinforce him. The approach of this detachment upon the rear of the enemy was unexpected; and they were driven precipitately from the mountains across the road. Captain Winder succeeded in killing four, and taking three prisoners; and three prisoners were taken by Major Dimick. The enemy, falling in with a portion of the 1st regiment Pennsylvania volunteers, and Captain Walker's company of mounted riflemen, under the command of Colonel Wynkoop, † a brisk fire was opened by both parties. The

* *Note by the Committee.*—See ante, p. 6, 10.

† *Note by the Committee.*—Extract from Col. Wynkoop's report.—“Upon the ap-

proach of the infantry, the Mexicans broke, and I turned the battalion rapidly so as to cut off their retreat. I followed them for several miles, fighting them

Brigadier-General Cadwalader's Report.

advance of the 2d brigade, under Colonel Childs, drove the enemy in confusion for more than two miles, they leaving seven or eight dead upon the field, several who were wounded having made their escape, the enemy admitting a loss of over thirty men. The force of the enemy seen by us, was estimated at about seven hundred, although it was said to have been much greater. The command encamped that night at Rio Frio, and on the 21st reached Perote, at 12 o'clock, M.

I refer you to the report of Colonel Thomas Childs, in command of the 2d brigade of the division under my command, herewith enclosed, from whom I received valuable assistance from the time he joined me.

The miserable mustang ponies, by which our train was drawn, rendered it difficult, over a mountainous country, to keep the train closed up, and to afford proper protection to it in the face of an enemy, without attention to the management of the train by the proper officers, and the assistance of persons of experience and industry.

At Perote, it became necessary to purchase a number of mules for the train; and on the 23d June, as I was about to march for Puebla, I received an order from Major-General PILLOW, by express from Vera Cruz, directing me not to proceed beyond Perote until his arrival at that place.

On the 1st July, General PILLOW arrived at Perote, and assumed the command previously to our march to this place.

Enclosed you will find a return of the killed and wounded during the march from Paso de Ovejas to Perote.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. CADWALADER,

*Brigadier-General U. S. Army, commanding.**

Capt. H. L. SCOTT,
Act'g Ass't-Adjutant-General, head-quarters of the army.

upon every favorable piece of ground upon which they rallied, and killing a number. All this time, General Cadwalader, with Colonel Childs, were engaged in pursuing them. A most complete rout was the consequence. As near as I can estimate, the loss on the part of the enemy was at least 50 men killed; among the killed was an officer."

* *Note by the Committee.*—At the date of this dispatch, General Cadwalader's brigade was the first of the division. In the subsequent actions he commanded the second brigade; the senior Brigadier-General, Pierce, having, in the mean time, joined the army.

CONTRERAS.

On the 7th of August, 1847, the several divisions of the American army, commanded by Major-General Scott, advanced from Puebla, towards the capital of the Mexican Republic. The second division, under Brigadier-General Twiggs, marched on that day; the fourth division, under Major-General Quitman, composed of volunteers, with a battalion of marines, on the following day; the first division, under Brevet Major-General Worth, on the 9th; and the third division, composed of regulars of the new regiments, under Major-General Pillow, on the 10th of that month. The first brigade of this division was commanded by Brigadier-General Pierce, the second by Brigadier-General Cadwalader. The whole number of officers and men was less than eleven thousand. General Cadwalader was the junior Brigadier-General in the line of the army in that part of Mexico. Brevet Brigadier-General Smith, a colonel in the line, had been assigned to the command of one of the brigades of the second division, and was therefore entitled to precedence from the date of his brevet commission.

At Chalco all the divisions of the army were united on the 13th, after which, some days were occupied in making examinations of the works of the enemy, and of the various routes by which the city might be approached. The main road leading between the lakes Tezcuco and Chalco was commanded by the heights of El Peñon, which were found to be fortified so strongly that the General-in-chief decided to move round, by a route previously deemed impracticable, to the south of Lake Chalco, towards San Agostin, a fortification on the main route from the city of Mexico to Acapulco. At San Agostin, the works were reconnoitered, and were also found too strong to be carried without an enormous sacrifice of life. General Scott, therefore, turned his attention to a route towards the north, leading over almost impassable rocks of lava, in the direction of the village of CONTRERAS.

In the attempt to gain a position here, the battle began on the 19th of August, the date of the report of General Scott, of which the committee here insert the concluding and most important portion.

REPORT OF GENERAL SCOTT—BATTLE OF CONTRERAS.

Extract from the Official Report of Major-General Scott, No. 31, dated "HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY, SAN AUGUSTIN, ACAPULCO ROAD, nine miles from Mexico, August 19, 1847."

* * * * *

By three o'clock this afternoon, the advanced divisions came to a point where the new road could only be continued under the direct

Report of General Scott.

fire of 22 pieces of the enemy's artillery (most of them of large calibre) placed in a strong entrenched camp to oppose our operations, and surrounded by every advantage of ground, besides immense bodies of cavalry and infantry, hourly reinforced from the city, over an excellent road beyond the volcanic field, and consequently entirely beyond the reach of our cavalry and artillery.

Arriving on the ground an hour later, I found that PILLOW's and TWIGGS's division had advanced to dislodge the enemy, picking their way (all officers on foot) along his front, and extending themselves towards the road, from the city and the enemy's left. Captain Magruder's field battery, of 12 and 6-pounders, and Lieutenant Callender's battery of mountain howitzers and rockets, had also, with great difficulty, been advanced within range of the entrenched camp. These batteries, most gallantly served, suffered much, in the course of the afternoon, from the enemy's superior metal.

The battle, though mostly stationary, continued to rage with great violence, until nightfall. Brevet Brigadier-General P. F. SMITH's and Brevet Colonel Riley's brigades (TWIGGS' division), supported by Brigadier-Generals PIERCE's and CADWALADER's brigades (PILLOW's division), were more than three hours under a heavy fire of artillery and musketry along the almost impassable ravine in front and to the left of the entrenched camp. Besides the 22 pieces of artillery, the camp and ravine were defended closely by masses of infantry, and these again supported by clouds of cavalry at hand and hovering in view. Consequently, no decided impression could be made by day-light on the enemy's most formidable position; because, independent of the difficulty of the ravine, our infantry, unaccompanied by cavalry and artillery, could not advance in column without being mowed down by the grape and canister of the batteries, nor advance in line without being ridden over by the enemy's numerous cavalry. All our corps, however, including Magruder's and Callender's last batteries, not only maintained the exposed positions early gained, but all attempted charges upon them, respectively—particularly on Riley, twice closely engaged with cavalry in greatly superior numbers—were repulsed and punished.

From an eminence, soon after arriving near the scene, I observed the church and hamlet of CONTRERAS (or Ansaldo) on the road leading up from the capital, through the entrenched camp, to Magdalena; and seeing, at the same time, the stream of reinforcements advancing, by that road, from the city, I ordered (through Major-General PILLOW) Colonel Morgan, with his regiment, the 15th, till then held in reserve by PILLOW, to move forward, and to occupy CONTRERAS (or Ansaldo)—being persuaded, if occupied, it would arrest the enemy's reinforcements, and ultimately decide the battle.*

* *Note by the Committee.*—This was the village at which the brigade of General Cadwalader held in check the advancing army of Santa Anna: (see post.)

Report of General Scott.

Riley was already on the enemy's left, in advance of the hamlet. A few minutes later, Brigadier General SHIELDS, with his volunteer brigade (New York and South Carolina regiments—QUITMAN's division—) coming up, under my orders, from San Augustin, I directed SHIELDS to follow and to sustain Morgan. These corps, over the extreme difficulties of ground—partially covered with a low forest—before described, reached Contreras, and found CADWALADER's brigade in position, observing the formidable movement from the capital, and much needing the timely reinforcement.

It was already dark, and the cold rain had begun to fall in torrents upon our unsheltered troops; for the hamlet, though a strong defensive position, can hold only the wounded men; and, unfortunately, the new regiments have little or nothing to eat in their haversacks. Wet, hungry, and without the possibility of sleep, all our gallant corps, I learn, are full of confidence, and only wait for the last hour of darkness, to gain the positions whence to storm and carry the enemy's works.

Of the seven officers dispatched, since about sundown, from my position opposite to the enemy's centre, and on this side of the field of rocks and lava, to communicate instructions to the hamlet, not one has succeeded in getting through those difficulties, increased by darkness. They have all returned. But the gallant and indefatigable Captain Lee, of the engineers, who has been constantly with the operating forces, is just in from SHIELDS, SMITH, CADWALADER, &c., to report as above, and to ask that a powerful diversion be made against the centre of the entrenched camp towards morning.

Brigadier-General TWIGGS, cut off, as above, from the part of his division beyond the impracticable ground, and Captain Lee, are gone, under my orders, to collect the forces remaining on this side, with which to make that diversion, about 5 o'clock in the morning.

And here I will end this report, commenced at its date; and, in another, continue the narrative of the great events which then impended.

I have the honor to be, sir, with high respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

HON. WM. L. MARCY,
Secretary of War.

Extracts from the Report of Major-General Scott, No. 32, dated
 "HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY, Tacubaya, at the gates of Mexico,
 August 28, 1847."

SIR :—My report No. 31, commenced in the night of the 19th instant, closed the operations of the army with that day.

The morning of the 20th opened with one of a series of unsurpassed achievements, all in view of the capital. * * * *

In the night of the 19th, Brigadier-Generals SHIELDS, P. F. SMITH, and CADWALADER, and Colonel Riley, with their brigades, and the 15th regiment, under Colonel Morgan, detached from Brigadier-General PIERCE, found themselves in and about the important position—the village, hamlet, or *hacienda*, called, indifferently, CONTRERAS, Ansalda, San Geronimo,—half a mile nearer to the city than the enemy's entrenched camp, on the same road, towards the factory of Magdalena.

That camp had been, unexpectedly, our formidable point of attack the afternoon before, and we had now to take it, without the aid of cavalry or artillery, or to throw back our advanced corps upon the road from San Augustin to the city, and thence force a passage through San Antonio. * * * *

* * * *

SHIELDS, the senior officer at the hamlet, having arrived in the night, after SMITH had arranged with CADWALADER and Riley the plan of attack for the morning, delicately waived interference; but reserved to himself the double task of holding the hamlet, with his two regiments (South Carolina and New York volunteers), against ten times his numbers on the side of the city, including the slopes to his left, and in case the camp in his rear should be carried, to face about, and cut off the flying enemy.

At 3 o'clock, A. M., the great movement commenced on the rear of the enemy's camp, Riley leading, followed, successively, by CADWALADER'S and SMITH'S brigades, the latter temporarily under the orders of Major Dimick, of the 1st artillery—the whole force being commanded by SMITH, the senior in the general attack, and whose arrangements, skill, and gallantry always challenge the highest admiration.

The march was rendered tedious by the darkness, rain, and mud; but about sunrise, Riley, conducted by Lieutenant Tower, engineer, had reached an elevation behind the enemy, whence he precipitated his columns; stormed the entrenchments, planted his several colors upon them, and carried the work—all in seventeen minutes.

Conducted by Lieutenant Beauregard, engineer, and Lieutenant Brooks of TWIGGS'S staff—both of whom, like Lieutenant Tower, had, in the night, twice reconnoitered the ground—CADWALADER

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brought up to the general assault, two of his regiments—the volti-guers and the 11th; and at the appointed time, Colonel Ransom, with his temporary brigade, conducted by Captain Lee, engineer, not only made the movement to divert and to distract the enemy, but, after crossing the deep ravine in his front, advanced, and poured into the works and upon the fugitives, many volleys from his destructive musketry.

In the meantime, SMITH's own brigade, under the temporary command of Major Dimick, following the movements of Riley and CADWALADER, discovered, opposite to, and outside of, the works, a long line of Mexican cavalry, drawn up as a support. Dimick having at the head of the brigade the company of sappers and miners under Lieutenant Smith, engineer, who had conducted the march, was ordered by Brigadier-General SMITH to form line faced to the enemy; and in a charge against the flank, routed the cavalry.

SHIELDS, too, by the wise disposition of his brigade, and gallant activity, contributed much to the general results. He held masses of cavalry and infantry, supported by artillery, in check below him, and captured hundreds, with one general (MENDOZA), of those who fled from above.

I doubt whether a more brilliant or decisive victory—taking into view ground, artificial defences, batteries, and the extreme disparity of numbers—without cavalry or artillery on our side—is to be found on record. Including all our corps directed against the entrenched camp, with SHIELDS's brigade at the hamlet, we positively did not number over 4,500 rank and file; and we knew, by sight, and since, more certainly, by many captured documents and letters, that the enemy had actually engaged on the spot, 7,000 men, with at least 12,000 more hovering within sight, and striking distance—both on the 19th and 20th. All, not killed or captured, now fled with precipitation.

Thus was the great victory of CONTRERAS achieved; one road to the capital opened; 700 of the enemy killed; 813 prisoners, including, among 88 officers, 4 generals; besides many colors and standards; 22 pieces of brass ordnance—half of large calibre;—thousands of small arms and accoutrements; an immense quantity of shot, shells, powder and cartridges; 700 pack mules, many horses, &c. &c.—all in our hands.

* * * * *

The battle being won before the advancing brigades of WORTH's and QUITMAN's divisions were in sight, both were ordered back to their late positions—WORTH, to attack San Antonio in front, with his whole force, as soon as approached in the rear by PILLOW's and TWIGGS's division—moving from CONTRERAS, through San Angel and Coyoacan. By carrying San Antonio, we knew that we should open another, a shorter and better, road to the capital, for our siege and other trains.

Report of General Scott.

Accordingly, the two advanced divisions and SHIELDS's brigade marched from CONTRERAS, under the immediate orders of Major-General PILLOW, who was now joined by the gallant Brigadier-General PIERCE of his division, personally thrown out of activity, late the evening before, by a severe hurt received from the fall of his horse.

After giving necessary orders on the field, in the midst of prisoners and trophies, and sending instructions to Harney's brigade of cavalry, left at San Augustin, to join me, I personally followed PILLOW's command.

Arriving at Coyoacan,—two miles, by a cross road, from the rear of San Antonio,—I first detached Captain Lee, engineers, with Captain Kearney's troop, 1st dragoons, supported by the rifle regiment, under Major Loring, to reconnoitre that strong point; and next dispatched Major-General PILLOW, with one of his brigades, (CADWALADER's,) to make the attack upon it, in concert with Major-General WORTH on the opposite side.

* * * * *

REPORT OF GENERAL TWIGGS.

Extract from the Official Report of General Twiggs, dated "HEAD-QUARTERS, 2D DIVISION OF REGULARS, San Angel, near Mexico, August 23d, 1847."

* * * * *

General SMITH's brigade was ordered to proceed in the direction of our batteries, and Riley's, by inclining to the right, to get a position, if possible, in the enemy's rear. The route he was compelled to take was most difficult and tedious, passing over volcanic rocks and crossing large fissures barely narrow enough to permit the men to get over by leaping. Accompanied by Lieutenant Tower, of the engineers, this brigade finally reached the main road, and got in position in rear of the enemy's position, having driven before it a large body of lancers, who attempted to check its progress. Having become separated by seven or eight hundred yards from any reinforcement, a large body of the enemy (ten or twelve thousand) was discovered coming from the direction of the city, and closing on Riley's rear. At the same time, from the field-work at CONTRERAS, came out two or three thousand men on the road which the brigade had crossed, entirely cutting off Riley's from SMITH's brigade. Notwithstanding the very great disparity in numbers in favor of the enemy, this fine brigade kept its ground, occasionally driving from its vicinity, with loss, bodies of the enemy who had rashness enough to approach within musket range.

During this state of affairs, SMITH's brigade was ordered to form a

Report of General Twiggs.

junction with Riley's, whilst General PIERCE's brigade occupied the left of the trail, and remained as a support to the batteries. Much credit is due to Col. Ransom, by whose untiring exertions and zeal the 9th and 12th infantry were placed in position near the batteries late in the night of the 19th. Late in the evening, the two brigades joined near the road—Riley having manœvered, in the face of the enemy, so as to join SMITH's. Still later, SHIELDS's and CADWALADER's brigades formed a junction with my division, then under the immediate command of Gen. SMITH. I, being unable, from a lame foot, to follow the route taken by my troops, returned to the vicinity of Taylor's battery, where I passed the night. General SMITH made his arrangements to attack the enemy's work the next morning.

For the particulars of this affair I would respectfully refer the general-in-chief to the reports of Gen. SMITH and Col. Riley, to whom and to the other officers engaged, is due all the credit that attaches. I was unable, for the reason given above, to come up to my division till the affair was over, and the road opened for my horse.

* * * * *

REPORT OF GENERAL SMITH.

Extracts from the Report of Brevet Brigadier-General Persifor F. Smith, dated "HEAD-QUARTERS, 1ST BRIG. 2D DIVISION OF REGULARS, San Angel, near Mexico, August 23, 1847."

* * * * *

Accounts from Mexican officers, intercepted since the battle, inform us that there were seven thousand in and about CONTRERAS, (*the entrenched camp,*) commanded by General VALENCIA, and upwards of twelve thousand in front of Encelda, (or the *hamlet* of CONTRERAS,) in reserve, commanded by General SANTA ANNA. We killed seven hundred, and took fifteen hundred prisoners, among them several generals. We captured 22 pieces of brass ordnance, viz: four Spanish 16-pounders, four 8-inch howitzers, two 5½-inch howitzers, six 6-pounders, and 6 smaller pieces, with a large amount of shells and other ammunition. We also took 700 pack mules and many horses, and an immense number of small arms, which we destroyed. After directing the prisoners and property to be collected, I directed the pursuit to be continued, and was forming the column when General TWIGGS arrived. He immediately ordered the most vigorous pursuit, and we moved forwards. As we approached San Angel, the rifles were again thrown forward as skirmishers, and entered the town at the heels of the enemy's lancers, capturing an ammunition wagon. Here General PILLOW assumed command, and at Coyoacan the commander-in-chief came up.

* * * * *

Report of General Smith.

The troops, in the actions in the pedregal, on the afternoon of the 19th, and at CONTRERAS and CHURUBUSCO on the 20th, distinguished themselves far beyond my capacity to do them justice. The difficulties they overcame, supposed by the enemy to be insuperable, the hardships they endured, and the fatigue they suffered, contrasted with the manner in which they did their work, raises their character as soldiers highly towards perfection.

Brigadier General CADWALADER (in the morning) brought his corps up from his intricate bivouac in good order, formed the head of his column to support Riley's, and led it forward in the most gallant style under the fire directed at the latter.

* * * * *
* * * * *

NOTE.

The Committee here insert the following passage from a later account of this engagement, given by Brigadier-General SMITH, as a witness before a Court of Inquiry, in the city of Mexico, on the 4th of April, 1848. It applies to the crisis at which the enemy's entrenchments were swept by the assault of the morning of the 20th of August.

EVIDENCE OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL P. F. SMITH.

* * * * *
"Just as Riley's column was formed for attack, cavalry were seen moving out from Valencia's position, up towards the mountains. As they might, in that way, attack Riley on his right flank, and as it was no longer necessary to pay any attention to Santa Anna's force, I directed that CADWALADER's brigade should also form in two

"columns — one to move on Riley's right flank and rear, and the other on his left flank. This order was communicated to the senior officer, who marched with the two first regiments of CADWALADER; and just at this moment CADWALADER came up with the other two; and immediately the attack commenced.

"Seeing that there was no necessity for reserving any troops to meet the force under Santa Anna, Dimick was ordered to face to the left, and advance in line, across the ravine, against Valencia's entrenchments; at the same time (I forgot to mention that) the engineer company and Rifles were thrown upon Riley's left and front, under the brow of the hill, to clear his front of the enemy's skirmishers. The whole of the enemy's works and position were carried at *one sweep*."

REPORT OF GENERAL PILLOW.

*Extracts from the Report of Major-General Pillow, dated "HEAD-
QUARTERS, THIRD DIVISION, Mixcoac, August 24, 1847."*

* * * * *

Colonel Riley's command, having now crossed the vast broken-up plain of lava, passing the village on the right, and whilst in the act of turning the enemy's left, was confronted by several thousand lancers, who advanced to the charge; when a well-directed fire from the brigade, twice compelled them to fall back in disorder, under cover of their artillery. About this time, Brigadier-General CADWALADER's command had also crossed the plain, when some 5,000 or 6,000 troops of the enemy were observed moving rapidly from the direction of the capital to the field of action. Colonel Morgan, with his large and fine regiment, which I had caused to be detached from the rear of PIERCE's brigade, was now ordered to the support of CADWALADER, by direction of the general-in-chief, who had now arrived upon the field. This general, having discovered this large force moving upon his right flank, and to the rear, with decided military tact and promptitude, threw back his right wing, and confronted the enemy, with the intention to give him battle, notwithstanding his overwhelming force.* This portion of the enemy's force moved steadily forward until a conflict seemed inevitable, when Col. Morgan's regiment, having reached this part of the field, presented a front so formidable, as to induce the enemy to change his purpose, and draw off to the right and rear of his former position.

During all this time, the battle raged fiercely between the other portions of the two armies, with a constant and destructive fire of artillery. Magruder's battery, from its prominent position, was much disabled by the heavy shot of the enemy, as were also Callender's howitzers. A part of the enemy's artillery had been turned upon Riley's command, whilst actively engaged with large bodies of lancers; but even these combined attacks could only delay the purpose of the gallant old veteran and his noble brigade.

* *Note by the Committee.—Extract from the Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Graham, commanding 11th Infantry.*

"So soon as the head of our column arrived on the plain, the enemy were seen advancing towards us in great force from the direction of the city, whose evident design was either to attack us in the rear, or else to reinforce their numbers in the fortifica-

tions. Fortunately, however, General CADWALADER's brigade (my regiment leading), arrived on the opposite eminence to that occupied by the enemy, who were in force from 6 to 7,000 men, and took position in a corn-field, in order to secure our men, as far as possible, from the enemy's view. This unexpected movement upon our part entirely frustrated their designs."

Report of General Pillow.

The general-in-chief having arrived upon the field, with General SHIELDS's brigade of volunteers—consisting of the New York and South Carolina regiments—ordered them to move up to the support of the forces under Brigadier-General CADWALADER; but it had now grown so late in the evening, that General SHIELDS did not get into position until after dark.

* * * * *

[After describing the storming of Contreras, on the morning of the 20th, the report proceeds as follows:—]

The retreating enemy was compelled to pass through a severe fire, both from the assaulting forces and CADWALADER's brigade, as well as SHIELDS's command, who had remained at the position occupied by the former general the previous night, with the purpose of covering the movement upon the battery. The forces of the enemy engaged at this place, including the reinforcements of the preceding evening, constituted a force of about 16,000 men, 5,000 of whom were cavalry; the whole were under the immediate command of General SANTA ANNA in person, assisted by Generals VALENCIA, SALAS, BLANCO, MENDOZA, GARCIA, and others; the last four mentioned were taken prisoners.

* * * * *

Brigadier-General SMITH, the senior officer, who remained across the plain and disposed the forces for the final assault, deserves, and will doubtless receive, the thanks of the army, and the honor due to the constancy of purpose and daring which distinguished his conduct on this great occasion.

Brigadier-General CADWALADER displayed great judgment and high military skill and heroic courage, in the manner in which he met the sudden and trying emergency, when all parties were in great anxiety for the safety of his comparatively small command, when about to be assailed by the overwhelming reinforcements of the enemy, on the preceding evening;* and also, in the manner in which he brought up his command to the support of the gallant Riley.

* * * * *

* *Note by the Committee.*—See, on the manner in which General Cadwalader last page, General Pillow's notice of the confronted the enemy at this crisis.

OFFICIAL REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL CAD-
WALADER.HEAD-QUARTERS, 2D BRIGADE, 3D DIVISION,
Mixcoac, Mexico, August 22, 1847.

SIR: In obedience to orders from division head-quarters, I have the honor to report that, on the morning of the 18th instant, the 11th regiment of infantry, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Graham, attached to my brigade, was detached with two companies of dragoons, under the command of Captain Kearny, for the purpose of covering a reconnoissance to be made near San Augustin by Captain Lee, of the engineer corps. After proceeding about three miles, a heavy discharge of musketry was suddenly opened upon the column, by a party of the enemy from the front and flank. A charge from the dragoons and infantry effectually routed and dispersed the enemy, with some loss in killed and wounded, and the capture of five prisoners. After the engineer officer had completed his observations, the column returned to the head-quarters of the brigade at San Augustin.

On the 19th, my brigade, consisting of the voltigeur regiment under the command of Colonel T. P. Andrews, to which is attached the rocket and howitzer battery, under the command of Lieutenant F. D. Callender, of the ordnance; the 11th regiment of infantry, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Wm. M. Graham; and the 14th infantry, under the command of Colonel William Trousdale, took up the line of march from the village of San Augustin; being the advanced brigade of the 3d division, which had been ordered towards the position of the enemy at Contreras. Having received orders to that effect, I threw forward the 11th regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Graham, to occupy the road, when within sight of the advanced position of the enemy; at the same time extending the voltigeurs, under Colonel Andrews, and the 14th, under Colonel Trousdale, up the side of the hill, which was on our right; the howitzer and rocket battery being placed near the summit to command the road.

In this position, the brigade remained until the arrival of TWIGGS'S division, which moved forward and attacked the position of the enemy in front; when, by the orders of Major-General PILLOW, I followed in support of Riley's brigade, which was on its way towards the left of the entrenched camp of the enemy. After a difficult march over a bed of lava rock, and passing two deep ravines and creeks, we came upon the road leading from Contreras to the city of Mexico. As my advance arrived at this point, a very large force of the enemy—cavalry, artillery, and infantry—was observed coming up the road from the city, and approaching along the brow of the hills in our front—to repel which, I made immediate dispositions of my command, by taking advantage of favorable ground for forming my line of bat-

Report of General Cadwalader.

tle, hastening up the remaining regiments for that purpose—the enemy numbering at least six times the force of my command.* A volley from three companies of the 11th regiment drove back a body of cavalry supporting a reconnoitering party; and the enemy perceiving our preparation, halted, and subsequently joined a very considerable force which was observed advancing on the right of the road.

Colonel Riley's brigade having turned to the left, at the village of Contreras or Encelda, I deemed it proper to take a stronger position, and accordingly moved my command to the crest of the hill upon which the village is situated. Not long after this, I was joined by the 15th regiment, under Colonel Morgan—which regiment had been temporarily detached from the 1st brigade and placed under my orders†—and, subsequently, Brigadier-General P. F. SMITH arrived with his command. The movement of my brigade, in conjunction with that of Colonel Riley, caused the enemy to halt in our front, (towards the city.) Their intention, evidently, was to reinforce the command in the works near Contreras. Although exposed to the fire of the enemy's artillery, both in front and from their fortified position in our rear, we effectually resisted any such attempt.

The brigade remained in this place, exposed to a heavy rain, without shelter, until about three o'clock on the morning of the 20th, when it was ordered forward, with the other troops sent for that purpose, under the command of Brigadier-General P. F. SMITH, to assault the works and camp of the enemy. After leaving the village, and gaining sufficient ground to the left and rear of the enemy's camp, a general assault took place, which resulted in the capture of

* *Note by the Committee.*—See page 21, text and note; and page 22.

† *Note by the Committee.*—Extract from the official report of Lieut. Col. Howard, commanding this regiment.—“When the enemy's batteries opened upon us, and the division moved forward on it, the 15th regiment was held in reserve, where it remained until directed by General PILLOW to move to the support of General CADWALADER's brigade, which had passed to the right of the battery about three-quarters of a mile. The regiment very rapidly marched for its position, and soon gained the rear of General CADWALADER's brigade, which

was at a halt, with the battery playing upon its rear, and an immense force of infantry and dragoons drawn up in its front. In crossing a deep ravine which interposed between General CADWALADER's position and the regiment, the enemy threatened an attack upon our front while separated from the rear, but Colonel Morgan promptly placed the front of his regiment in position to defend itself, and cover that portion of it yet to cross the ravine. The enemy, upon discovering this, abandoned the attempt and fell back upon the main force.”

Report of General Cadwalader.

their works, containing twenty-three pieces of artillery of various calibre, and a large quantity of ammunition. Here we had the pleasure of finding the two six-pounder guns captured by the enemy at Buena Vista, now recaptured by the 4th artillery, who had lost them in that action.* The enemy fled in every direction, closely pursued by our troops, leaving a great number dead and wounded upon the field, the ground strewn with their arms, lances, and flags, and in our hands, upwards of a thousand prisoners, and a very large train of pack mules.

In this brilliant exploit, the voltigeurs and 11th regiment bore a conspicuous part. The 14th and 15th regiments, from their position in rear, were unable, with every exertion on their parts, to join in the immediate attack; but, by their support, materially assisted in the success of our arms on this occasion.

The capture of this fort, commanding the road, opened our communication with the main body of the army, and our field artillery.

[This report of Brigadier-General Cadwalader will be resumed from this point, under the head of CHURUBUSCO, where it will be concluded. To carry out the views of the Resolution of the Company, the Committee think it best thus to divide it; closing the present extract at the end of the operations connected with the village and entrenched camp of CONTRERAS.]

* *Note by the Committee.*—In the language of General Scott, *lost without dishonor, and recovered with glory.* Captain Hunger, acting Chief of Ordnance, in a subsequent report of operations in front of EL MOLINO DEL REY, (Ex. Doc., 1 (1), 375,) states, that “never were pieces served with better judgment and effect” than were these recaptured

guns, on the 8th of September, in the attack upon that fortress.

Particular details of the use there made of them, are contained in the report of Captain Drum, of the 4th artillery—afterwards killed—under whose immediate orders they were served (*lb.*, (2), 154).

NOTE.

From the testimony subsequently given by Brigadier General Cadwalader, as a witness before a Court of Inquiry in the city of Mexico, the Committee here append those questions and answers which apply particularly to the transactions at and near CONTRERAS. The Court appear to have recognized

the testimony of the witnesses as matter which should not be withheld from public knowledge during the pendency of the proceedings. The Committee, therefore, do not conceive that any rule of propriety or delicacy is infringed, in making use of the report in the newspaper in which the examinations have,

Note.

from time to time, been published. They have, therefore, already (p. 20) inserted a portion of the testimony of General Smith.

In answer to the inquiries of others, General Cadwalader, as a witness, was necessarily required to mention things which it might have been, to some extent, inappropriate to have stated in his own official dispatches.

Testimony of Brigadier-General Cadwalader, 1 April, 1848.

Question.—Witness will state if he was not in the battle of Contreras, in command of a brigade, and what orders he received from Gen. Pillow on the 19th of August, before engaged in that battle?

Answer.—I was in that battle, and received an order from Gen. Pillow to proceed with my brigade in the direction, and to the support, of Col. Riley, who was then crossing the pedregal. I received instructions to follow Col. Riley.

Question.—Were the orders of battle and the orders given to the different commanders of brigades explained to you at the time you received the orders above referred to from Gen. Pillow?

Answer.—I had been with Gen. Pillow from the commencement of the battle; I heard, I believe, all the orders given. I understood that from the impracticability of the ground in front of Valencia's camp, and finding it impossible to get a rear or flank position when I was sent to his support, I presumed it was to do the best I could, from the instructions previously received. I don't recollect receiving any further special instructions. It had been de-

termined by Col. Riley to make a demonstration upon the flank or rear of the enemy.

Question.—Did witness understand that the movement in sending Riley and himself to the rear was to make a demonstration or an attack upon the rear of the enemy?

Answer.—I think that the order was to do either that might seem best. I considered myself at liberty either to make a demonstration or an attack. I was not ordered to make an attack, or not to make one. It was a very important object to gain the position.* I considered my instructions to take a position either in the flank or rear of the enemy, and to make an attack or not, as circumstances might dictate. It did not appear to be the object of the instructions to limit my discretion in that respect.

Question.—Did the witness know that Smith's brigade had attacked the enemy in front, that Riley had moved to turn the enemy's left and gain his rear; and did he understand that he was ordered to support Col. Riley in that movement; and did he derive this understanding from Gen. Pillow's instructions? Say also if General Pillow directed him to take the church as a guide in crossing the pedregal.

Answer.—Yes. I know also that Riley was instructed to support him by Gen. Pillow's order. I don't recollect having received instructions to take the church as a guide in crossing the pedregal.

Question.—Were you also instructed to cut off any reinforcements which might make their appearance on your right?

Answer.—I don't remember that I

* See p. 14, and General Smith's testimony, post, p. 29.

Note.

was. I certainly would have considered it a point of duty to do so.*

Question.—State whether, from what you saw of the movements of the different corps on the field on the 19th, and from your instruction from Gen. Pillow, you understood that the plan of attack was to assault the enemy in front and rear at the same time.

Answer.—The attack had already been made in front, and it was manifest that the attack from the front would be kept up, and that an attack would be made in the rear and flank, and I considered that it was obviously the intention of the general that that should be the case if found to be practicable.

Question.—State what steps or movements, in execution of this plan of attack, were taken on the 19th of August; and whether, under those orders, Col. Riley gained the enemy's rear, and your command had taken possession of the village of Ansalda.

Answer.—The attack was made in front; Col. Riley moved round to the enemy's left; and I followed him; he passed through the village; and I, observing the large force under Santa Anna coming out from the right to the village from San Angel, saw the propriety of holding the village instead of following Col. Riley; which I did,—depending upon Col. Riley to come up and support me the moment the attack commenced, which I supposed would be immediate, as it was; Col. Riley, however, moved on through the village, and was masked from my view. My force held in check the force of Santa

Anna, which never advanced beyond my position.†

Question.—Had the troops, by occupying the village in rear of, or on the flank of, Valencia's camp, on the 19th of August, seized the only direct communication of the enemy to and from the capital, and must or must not, in your opinion, the secure holding of these positions have decided the day in favor of the American forces?

Answer.—The position was one which the troops from the city must necessarily have passed, or made a long circuit near the mountains; it also kept open the communication with our own troops, and was therefore an important one.‡

Question.—What timé did Gen. Smith arrive at the village? Was it before or after you took possession of it?

Answer.—About an hour after I had been in position, and Santa Anna's forces had been checked. Gen. Smith arrived about half an hour before dark. Capt. Lee was there, and was proposing an attack; there was a conversation as to whether it was possible to take troops over the ground. Night set in, however, and put an end to it.

Question.—What time did Gen. Shields's brigade arrive at the village of Ansalda? Was it after dark; if so, how long after?

Answer.—I never saw them§ and don't know, except that it was late at night. It was a dark night, and raining.

Question.—State if, in your opinion, the possession of that village did not,

* General Cadwalader was recalled on a subsequent day; and having, in the meantime, refreshed his memory by a reference to his written memoranda, deposed that General Pillow had referred to a previous order to Col. Riley, as to intercepting reinforcements, which order the witness was to follow.

† See p. 24.

‡ See General Scott's Report, p. 14., ante.

§ The diagram of the field shows the relative position of the two Brigades. See General Smith's testimony, post, p. 29.

Note.

by cutting off the enemy's reinforcements, render it almost certain that the renewed assault, as soon as daylight would admit of it, upon the entrenched camp, must prove successful?

Answer.—Yes.

Question.—What, in your opinion, prevented the plan of attack, to which you have already referred, from being carried into effect on the 19th? Was it the near approach of night or the large reinforcements of the enemy?

Answer.—The large reinforcements of the enemy fully occupied my command, and prevented any other movement until after dark. We maintained the same position for an hour and a half, to impede the advance of the enemy. I have no doubt if Santa Anna's force had not come out, I would have joined Col. Riley, and the movement spoken of would have been made. The attack upon Valencia's camp would have been made that afternoon by myself and Col. Riley, whether Gen. Smith had come up or not. Santa Anna's force, however, fully occupied me. I was anxious to avail myself of the handsome command Col. Riley had, together with my own. From what I saw of Valencia's camp, afterwards, I have no doubt the attack would have been successful. The same force carried the work by assault the next morning.

Question.—Have you reason to believe that no additional means were thrown into Valencia's camp after you seized the village before mentioned, or not—and what were they, if you chance to know? If not, did your presence prevent it?

Answer.—I have no reason to think that any additional reinforcements were thrown into Valencia's camp after I had taken possession of the village. I believe that the two brigades, Riley's and mine, would have been sufficient to

carry the work, though I am confident that the force which made the diversion or attack aided materially in carrying the work.

Question.—Where were the reinforcements of the enemy on the morning of the 20th of August, when Gen. Smith's attack was made upon the entrenched camp?

Answer.—We moved out before it was day, from the village, to the attack; and did not see them; we supposed they were on the hill where we saw them the night before. We moved off under the supposition that we were making a secret movement, and would attack Valencia's camp unknown to Santa Anna. It was universally believed, since, that Santa Anna withdrew some, if not all, his force to San Angel, that night.

Question.—Was there a conference of officers, during the night of the 19th, at the village of Ensalda, or other place, at which Col. Riley was present? What was the result of that conference, and was it then and there determined upon to make the attack the next morning? And was the plan of attack the original view of any officer of that conference?

Answer.—Not that I know of; there was a conversation between Gen. Smith, Capt. Lee and myself (Col. Riley not being present), which resulted in a message from Gen. Smith to Gen. Scott; this was about dark; it was too late to attack Santa Anna; and as we stood upon the ground Capt. Lee left us with the message to Gen. Scott; I considered the attack as the result of the train of events that had preceded: I would [add] that Gen. Smith had decided upon attacking Santa Anna's forces, but the darkness prevented it; that had there been half an hour more of light, Gen. Smith's command and my own would have made the attack. Gen. Smith had given the order to that effect.

Note.

Question.—What was the plan of attack finally agreed upon on the evening of 19th; and was it the same as that agreed upon at that conference?

Answer.—It was.

[The witness having been afterwards recalled, the following among other questions and answers appear in the report of his testimony.]

Question.—Were Santa Anna's reinforcements checked by your command before Gen. Smith reached Eusaldo?

Answer.—They were entirely so, and had been so for half an hour.

Question.—Had you, previously to the arrival of Gen. Smith, made your dispositions to receive Santa Anna; and was any change in those dispositions made after the arrival of Gen. Smith?

Answer.—I had established my command in position, to resist the forces under Santa Anna; and no change in that position took place until Col. Morgan's regiment reinforced me, when I moved my command a sufficient distance round the village to give him a position on the line which I defended; and I do not recollect subsequently having changed that position—certainly not materially—having occupied the wall and maguey bushes surrounding the exterior of the village—the 11th and voltigeur regiments facing the north, and the 14th and 15th regiments facing in the direction of San Angel. The wall spoken of was a very low one.

Question.—If Santa Anna's forces had not been checked by your command, would they not have reached the village, and prevented Gen. Smith from reaching it?

Answer.—They certainly would have done so, if Col. Riley, who was further advanced than I was, had not checked them. If this had not been done, Santa Anna would have passed into the vil-

lage. Col. Riley was on the other side of the village.

[In addition to these answers of General Cadwalader, the committee insert the following portions of the testimony afterwards given before the same court by Brigadier-General Smith, a portion of whose evidence has been already inserted in a note at the close of his official report, (ante p. 20.)]

Evidence of Brigadier-General Persifor Frazer Smith.

Question.—When you arrived at the villages of Ansaldo and Geronimo on the 19th August, did you find Col. Riley and Gen. Cadwalader in possession of those villages, and had the former already repulsed a large cavalry force; and the latter checked a large Mexican force under Santa Anna?

Answer.—I found Gen. Cadwalader in possession of the village. I could not find Col. Riley; it appears he had gone through it, and had moved further up, towards Valencia's position. I learned in regard to the cavalry, from Col. Riley, that he had repulsed a large body of the enemy's cavalry, and killed Gen. Frontera, at the upper end of the village, towards Valencia, and finding the enemy too strong, was, as he reported to me, on his way back to the pedregal, not knowing there were other troops over. I conceive that taking possession of the village was an important movement. It did not interpose any obstacle as the road was open yet; though it did not prevent his joining Valencia, it had such influence upon Santa Anna as to prevent his throwing himself into Valencia's camp, lest our army should be interposed between him and the capital. Holding the village ought to have so influenced Santa Anna as to prevent him from throwing himself outside of the vil-

Note.

lage, in respect to the capital. I found Gen. Cadwalader already in possession of the right flank of the village, fronting what was Santa Anna's then front.

Question.—Had the force under Santa Anna been brought to a stand before you got to the village?

Answer.—Yes, sir, formed perpendicularly to the road before I reached it, and then moved around parallel to it, after I got there.

* * * * *

Question.—As you regard the possession of the village as a key to the operations of the 20th, will the witness say whether he does not regard its possession on the 19th as ensuring the success

of the operations on the morning of the 20th?

Answer.—The whole operation on the 20th was based upon the possession of the village. The whole plan of attack on the 20th was formed after the possession of the village was secured, and was founded upon that; but the proper attack, in my opinion, was on Santa Anna, as was intended the evening before; that is the proper attack for one being in the situation I was in. The attack on Valencia was determined upon merely as an alternative; because the night offered me the means of reaching his position with certainty, and the darkness had prevented us taking the first.

CHURUBUSCO.

REPORT OF GENERAL SCOTT.

*Further Extracts from the Account of the Battles of the 20th of August, contained in the Report of the General-in-chief, No. 32, of which portions have been inserted under the head of Contreras.**

General Scott, after describing the operations of General Worth in "the forcing of San Antonio," "the *second* brilliant event of the day," proceeds as follows to recount the events of CHURUBUSCO.

* * * * *
* * * * *

WORTH's division being soon reunited in hot pursuit, he was joined by Major-General PILLOW, who, marching from Coyoacan and discovering that San Antonio had been carried, immediately turned to the left, according to my instructions, and, though much impeded by ditches and swamps, hastened to the attack of CHURUBUSCO.

The hamlet or scattered houses bearing this name, presented, besides the fortified convent, a strong field work (*tete du pont*) with regular bastions and curtains, at the head of a bridge over which the road passes from San Antonio to the capital.

The whole remaining forces of Mexico—some 27,000 men—cavalry, artillery and infantry, collected from every quarter—were now in, on the flanks, or within supporting distance of, those works, and seemed resolved to make a last and desperate stand; for, if beaten here, the feebler defences at the gates of the city—four miles off—could not, as was well known to both parties, delay the victors an hour. The capital of an ancient empire, now of a great republic, or an early peace, the assailants were resolved to win. Not an American—and we were less than a third of the enemy's numbers—had a doubt as to the result.

The fortified church or convent, hotly pressed by TWIGGS, had

Report of General Scott.

already held out about an hour, when WORTH and PILLOW—the latter having with him CADWALADER's brigade—began to manœuvre closely upon the *tete du pont*, with the convent at half gun-shot to their left. Garland's brigade, (WORTH's division,) to which had been added the light battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, continued to advance in front, and under the fire, of a long line of infantry, off on the left of the bridge; and Clarke, of the same division, directed his brigade along the road or close by its side. Two of PILLOW's and CADWALADER's regiments, the 11th and 14th, supported and participated in this direct movement; the other (the voltigeurs) was left in reserve. Most of these corps—particularly Clarke's brigade—advancing perpendicularly,—were made to suffer much by the fire of the *tete du pont*, and they would have suffered greatly more by flank attacks from the convent, but for the pressure of TWIGGS on the other side of that work.

This well-combined and daring movement at length reached the principal point of attack; and the formidable *tete du pont* was at once assaulted, and carried by the bayonet. Its deep wet ditch was first gallantly crossed by the 8th and 5th infantry, commanded, respectively, by Major Waite, and Lieutenant-Colonel Scott—followed closely by the 6th infantry (same brigade), which had been so much exposed on the road—the 11th regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Graham, and the 14th, commanded by Colonel Trousdale, both of CADWALADER's brigade, PILLOW's division. About the same time, the enemy in front of Garland, after a hot conflict of an hour and a half, gave way, in a retreat towards the capital.

The immediate results of this *third* signal triumph of the day were, three field-pieces, one hundred and ninety-two prisoners, much ammunition, and two colors taken at the *tete du pont*.

Lieutenant J. F. Irons, 1st artillery, aid-de-camp to Brigadier-General CADWALADER, a young officer of great merit, and conspicuous in battle on several previous occasions, received, in front of the work, a mortal wound. (Since dead.)*

* * * * *

So terminated the series of events which I have but feebly presented. My thanks were freely poured out on the different fields—to the abilities and science of generals and other officers—to the gallantry and prowess of all—the rank and file included. But a reward infinitely higher—the applause of a grateful country and government—will, I cannot doubt, be accorded, in due time, to so much merit, of every sort, displayed by this glorious army, which has now overcome all difficulties—distance, climate, ground, fortifications, numbers.

It has, in a single day, in many battles, as often, defeated 32,000

* Note by the Committee—See post, p. 34.

Report of General Cadwalader.

men ; made about 3,000 prisoners, including eight generals, (two of them ex-presidents,) and 205 other officers ; killed or wounded 4,000 of all ranks—besides entire corps dispersed and dissolved ; captured 37 pieces of ordnance—more than trebling our siege train and field batteries—with a large number of small arms, a full supply of ammunition of every kind, &c. &c.

* * * * *

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL CADWALADER.

[This is the continuation of the dispatch, of which the previous portions, ending on page 25, terminated with the capture of CONTRERAS. The report proceeds as follows:—]

After leaving a sufficient force to secure the captured camp and property, we took up the line of march in the direction of the city of Mexico, now in full view. After proceeding about two miles, I received an order to turn to the right, on the road from San Angel to San Antonio, to assist in the attack upon that place, to be made by General WORTH's division, from the other side of the road. I had not proceeded far, when I found that General WORTH's division had driven the enemy from San Antonio.

The division under General TWIGGS having encountered the main force of the enemy at CHURUBUSCO, in a strongly fortified position, upon which General WORTH's division was also advancing, I was ordered to cross over to the other road, about half a mile distant, to unite in the attack upon the main work. Under the direction of Major-General PILLOW, I crossed my command over two deep and wide ditches, under fire of the enemy's artillery ; I myself, as well as the other mounted officers, having been compelled to dismount from our horses to wade through the ditches.* After a long and severe action,

* *Note by the Committee.—Extracts from the Report of Brevet Major-General Worth, commanding the First Division.*

"I was joined by Major-General PILLOW, who came in from the left with three regiments of his division—CADWALADER's brigade—having, with great difficulty, made his way through the marshes ; thence to the close of the day, I had the pleasure of his gallant association and assistance." (See p. 31.)

* * * *

"The division commander cannot forego the opportunity presented, to acknowledge his obligations, and express his admiration of the gallant bearing of Major-General PILLOW, and Brigadier-Generals SHIELDS, CADWALADER, and PIERCE, with whom he had the gratification of concert and co-operation, at various critical periods of the conflict."

Report of General Cadwalader.

the works were carried, and with it, all the artillery and ammunition of the enemy, and the command joined in the general pursuit and rout.

I refer you to the separate reports herewith enclosed of the commanding officers of regiments, for particulars connected with their immediate commands.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. Johnston, of the regiment of voltigeurs, brought the regiment well into action at the attack on the works at Contreras; and the regiment is spoken of in high terms by Colonel Andrews. The officers generally of this regiment are entitled to be named with consideration. Lieutenant F. D. Callender, commanding the rocket and howitzer battery, was wounded in three places while gallantly engaged with the enemy, and the command subsequently devolved upon Lieutenant J. L. Reno, who rendered valuable service himself on various occasions after the command devolved upon him; and who spoke highly of the conduct of Sergeants Peate, Depew, and McGuire.

Lieutenant-Colonel Wm. M. Graham, in command of the 11th regiment, never lost a moment in pressing gallantly forward wherever service was to be performed, which his command always responded to with alacrity. In his report, he notices with commendation the services of Major J. F. Hunter, Captains Irwin, Waddell, and Guthrie, of Lieutenants Daniel S. Lee, (adjutant,) Montz, McCoy, Evans, Harley, McClellan, Tippin, Scott, and Johnstone.

The 14th regiment, under the command of Colonel W. Trousdale, rendered efficient service, and is highly spoken of in the report of its commanding officer, to which I beg leave to refer.

I lament to say that my aid-de-camp, First Lieutenant J. F. Irons, of the 1st artillery, was dangerously, probably mortally, wounded,* by a grape shot through the neck, when gallantly approaching the battery upon the road at Churubusco. This officer, distinguished on other fields, rendered me and my command valuable assistance. His services and gallant conduct will never be forgotten by me, or by those with whom he served, and to whom he is known.

Captain George Deas, assistant adjutant-general, on duty upon my personal staff, is entitled to be particularly noticed for gallantry, energy, and soldier-like bearing, in the discharge of his duties.

I take much pleasure in expressing my general satisfaction at the good conduct of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, under my command, who, on many occasions, performed gallant service, which it is impossible for me to notice here.

* *Note by Committee.*—See ante, p. 32. shot from an 18 pounder. His horse was He was mortally wounded by a grape at the same time shot by another ball.

Report of General Cadwalader.

Enclosed is a list of the killed, wounded, and missing, of my brigade.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE CADWALADER,

Brigadier-General United States Army, commanding.

To Captain J HOOKER,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Head-quarters, 3d Division.

EL MOLINO DEL REY.

Extract from Major Smith's Report, dated 26th Sept., 1847, "Of the operations
"of the Engineer Service, from the 7th instant, after the rupture of the armis-
"tice," and termination of the negotiations for peace.

"The general-in-chief, having received information from reliable sources, that
"most of the bells in the city of Mexico had been sent to the foundry near
"CHAPULTEPEC, called EL MOLINO DE LOS REYES, to be converted into can-
"non, and that these cannon, when available, would be the main reliance of
"the enemy for artillery, determined to destroy this foundry, together with
"the cannon, and machinery for boring and finishing them, which it might
"contain, and assigned General WORTH's division to the performance of this
"service. The attack upon the foundry was to be made on the morning of
"the 8th instant."

*The Report of this Engagement by Major-General Scott, No. 33, dated "HEAD-QUAR-
TERS OF THE ARMY, Tacubaya, near Mexico, Sept. 11, 1847," states the reasons
for, and the plan of, the attack decided upon; "the execution of which," he
states, "was assigned to Brevet Major-General WORTH, whose division was
"reinforced with CADWALADER's brigade of PILLOW's division, three squadrons
"of dragoons under Major Sumner, and some heavy guns of the siege train
"under Captain Huger of the ordnance, and Captain Drum of the 4th artil-
"lery."*

The General-in-chief adds, "For the decisive and brilliant results, I beg to refer
"to the report of the immediate commander, Major-General WORTH, in
"whose commendations of the gallant officers and men—dead and living—
"I heartily concur; having witnessed, but with little interference, their noble
"devotion to fame and to country."

GENERAL WORTH'S REPORT.

*Extracts from the Report of Brevet Major-General Worth, dated
HEAD-QUARTERS, 1ST DIVISION, Tacubaya, September 10, 1847.*

SIR—Under the inconvenient circumstances incident to recent bat-
tle, and derangement from loss of commanders—staff, commissioned
and non-commissioned, and amid the active scenes resulting therefrom,
I proceed to make a report, in obedience to the orders of the general-

Report of General Worth.

in-chief, of the battle of EL MOLINO DEL REY, fought and won on the eighth of September, 1847, by the first division, reinforced as follows:

1st. Three squadrons of dragoons, and one company of mounted riflemen—270 men, under Major Sumner, 2d dragoons.

2d. Three pieces of field artillery, under Captain Drum.

3d. Two battering guns, (twenty-four pounders,) under Captain Huger.

4th. CADWALADER's brigade, 784 strong, consisting of the voltigeur regiment, the 11th and 14th regiments of infantry.

Having, in the course of the 7th, accompanied the general-in-chief on a reconnoissance of the formidable dispositions of the enemy near and around the castle of Chapultepec, they were found to exhibit an extended line of cavalry and infantry, sustained by a field battery of four guns—occupying directly, or sustaining, a system of defences collateral to the castle and summit. This examination gave fair observation of the configuration of the grounds, and the extent of the enemy's force; but, as appeared in the sequel, an inadequate idea of the nature of his defences—they being skillfully masked.

The general-in-chief ordered that my division, reinforced as before mentioned, should attack and carry those lines and defences, capture the enemy's artillery, destroy the machinery and material supposed to be in the foundry, (EL MOLINO DEL REY;) but limiting the operations to that extent: after which, my command was to be immediately withdrawn to its position, in the village of Tacubaya.

As the enemy's system of defence was connected with the hill and castle of Chapultepec, and as my operations were limited to a specific object, it became necessary to isolate the work to be accomplished, from the castle of Chapultepec and its immediate defences. To effect this object, the following dispositions were ordered.

CADWALADER's brigade was held in reserve, in a position on the ridge, between the battering guns and McIntosh's brigade, and in easy support of either.

The enemy's field battery was taken, and his own guns were trailed upon his retreating masses; before, however, they could be discharged, perceiving that he had been dispossessed of his strong position by comparatively a handful of men, he made a desperate effort to regain it. Accordingly, his retiring forces rallied and formed with this object. Aided by the infantry, which covered the housetops, (within reach of which the battery had been moved during the night,) the enemy's whole line opened upon the assaulting party a terrific fire of musketry, which struck down *eleven* out of the *fourteen* officers that composed the command, and non-commissioned officers and men in

Report of General Worth.

proportion; including, amongst the officers, Brevet Major Wright, the commander; Captain Mason and Lieutenant Foster, engineers; all severely wounded. This severe shock staggered, for a moment, that gallant band. The light battalion, held to cover Captain Huger's battery, under Captain E. Kirby Smith, (Lieutenant-Colonel Smith being sick,) and the right wing of CADWALADER's brigade, were promptly ordered forward to support; which order was executed in the most gallant style; the enemy was again routed, and this point of his line carried, and fully possessed by our troops. In the meantime, Garland's (1st) brigade, ably sustained by Captain Drum's artillery, assaulted the enemy's left; and, after an obstinate and very severe contest, drove him from his apparently impregnable position, immediately under the guns of the castle of Chapultepec. Drum's section, and the battering guns under Captain Huger, advanced to the enemy's position; and the captured guns of the enemy were now opened on his retreating forces, on which they continued to fire until beyond their reach. While this work was in progress of accomplishment by our centre and right, our troops on the left were not idle. Duncan's battery opened on the right of the enemy's line, up to this time engaged; and the 2d brigade, under Colonel McIntosh, was now ordered to assault the extreme right of the enemy's line. The direction of this brigade soon caused it to mask Duncan's battery—the fire of which, for the moment, was discontinued; and the brigade moved steadily on to the assault of Casa Mata, which, instead of an ordinary field entrenchment, as was supposed, proved to be a strong stone citadel, surrounded with bastioned entrenchments, and impassable ditches—an old Spanish work, recently repaired and enlarged. When within easy musket range, the enemy opened a most deadly fire upon our advancing troops, which was kept up, without intermission, until our gallant men reached the very slope of the parapet of the work that surrounded the citadel. By this time, a large proportion of the command was either killed or wounded, amongst whom were the three senior officers present—Brevet Colonel McIntosh, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Scott, of the 5th infantry, and Major Waite, 8th infantry; the second killed, and the first and last desperately wounded. Still, the fire from the citadel was unabated. In this crisis of the attack, the command was, momentarily, thrown into disorder, and fell back on the left of Duncan's battery, where they rallied. As the 2d brigade moved to the assault, a very large cavalry and infantry force was discovered, approaching rapidly upon our left flank, to reinforce the enemy's right. As soon as Duncan's battery was masked, as before mentioned, supported by Andrews's voltigeurs, of CADWALADER's brigade, it moved promptly to the extreme left of our line, to check the threatened assault on this point. The enemy's cavalry came rapidly within canister range, when the whole battery opened a most effective fire, which soon broke the squadrons, and drove them back in disorder. During this fire upon the enemy's cavalry, Major Sum-

Report of General Worth.

ner's command moved to the front, and changed direction in admirable order, under a most appalling fire from the Casa Mata. This movement enabled his command to cross the ravine immediately on the left of Duncan's battery, where it remained, doing noble service, until the close of the action. At the very moment the cavalry were driven beyond reach, our own troops drew back from before the Casa Mata, and enabled the guns of Duncan's battery to reopen upon this position; which, after a short and well-directed fire, the enemy abandoned. The guns of the battery were now turned upon his retreating columns, and continued to play upon them until beyond reach.

He was now driven from every point in the field; and his strong lines, which had certainly been defended well, were in our possession. In fulfilment of the instructions of the general-in-chief, the Casa Mata was blown up, and such of the captured ammunition as was useless to us, as well as the cannon moulds found in El Molino del Rey, were destroyed. After which, my command, under the reiterated orders of the general-in-chief, returned to quarters at Tacubaya, with three of the enemy's four guns, (the fourth, having been spiked, was rendered unserviceable,) as also a large quantity of small arms, with gun and musket ammunition, and exceeding eight hundred prisoners, including fifty-two commissioned officers.

By the concurrent testimony of prisoners, the enemy's force exceeded fourteen thousand men, commanded by General SANTA ANNA in person. His total loss, killed, (including the 2d and 3d in command, Generals VALDAREZ and LEON,) wounded and prisoners, amounts to three thousand, exclusive of some two thousand who deserted after the rout.

My command, reinforced as before stated, only reached three thousand one hundred men of all arms. The contest continued two hours; and its severity is painfully attested by our heavy loss* of officers, non-commissioned officers and privates, including, in the first two classes, some of the brightest ornaments of the service.

* * * * *

I desire to bring to the notice of the general-in-chief, the gallantry and good conduct of Brigadier-General CADWALADER and his command, by which the most timely and essential service was rendered, in supporting the attack, and following up the success. Such movements as he was directed to make, were executed with zeal and promptness.

* * * * *

* Note by the Committee.—789 killed, wounded and missing. See p. 7.

OFFICIAL REPORT* OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL CADWALADER.

HEAD-QUARTERS, 2D BRIGADE, 3D DIVISION,
Navarte, Mexico, September 10, 1847.

SIR—In compliance with orders received on the 7th instant, I marched my brigade, consisting of the voltigeur regiment, under Colonel Andrews, the 11th regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Graham, and the 14th regiment, under Colonel Trousdale, from its encampment at Mixcoac to Tacubaya, and reported to Major-General WORTH for further orders on the same evening, preparatory to the attack and destruction of the foundry of the enemy at MOLINO DEL REY, under the fortress of Chapultepec.

Before day-light on the morning of the 8th instant, I placed my command on the plain, on the west side of the works of the enemy, in the position indicated in the order, number 95, of Major-General WORTH; supporting the heavy battery of Captain Huger on my right, and the field battery of Lieutenant-Colonel Duncan on my left; holding my command in compact order, to support either of the three attacking columns, or any point which the circumstances might require.

The attack was commenced at day-light upon the enemy's positions, by the infantry of the 1st division—my command having been, from the commencement of the attack, within the range of the heavy fire of the enemy, from which it suffered severely.

A large body of the enemy's cavalry appearing on our left, I detached the regiment of voltigeurs† two or three hundred yards in that direction, along a ravine which covered that flank of the army. Major Sumner, at the same time, crossed the ravine with his cavalry. By these movements, and an occasional shot from the field battery, the enemy's cavalry was driven out of reach. Two companies of the voltigeur regiment, commanded by Lieutenants Fry and Kintzing, were then detached, under Major Caldwell, to intercept a retreating party of the enemy—a corresponding movement being made by Major Sumner—and the party of the enemy killed or taken. The regiment of voltigeurs† was subsequently moved to the right in support

* *Note by the Committee.*—This report is addressed to the Adjutant-General of the 1st division—General WORTH'S,—to which General CADWALADER'S brigade had been attached during the whole of this engagement.

† *Note.*—The committee here insert the following extracts from the report of

Col. Andrews, commanding the voltigeurs.—“The regiment of voltigeurs under my command, * * * * at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 8th, moved forward with the other regiments of General CADWALADER'S brigade to support General WORTH'S operations.

“At day-break, we were in the position

Report of General Cadwalader.

of Colonel Garland's brigade, and aided in defeating the enemy's last effort near the foundry at Molino del Rey.

A party of the enemy's cavalry, on our left, was driven off by Captain Blair's company, of the voltigeur regiment, detached for that purpose under Major Caldwell's directions.

Captain Edwards's company was detached, with the field-piece captured on the road near the foundry, to the one-gun battery in the road to Chapultepec, where the piece was actively served by that company. The gun and ammunition were taken to this position, as well as withdrawn, by the men, no limber being found with the piece, and was

assigned us, supporting the heavy battery, (Captain Huger's,) where we remained until the advance of the infantry of the 1st division to attack the enemy's positions, at which time General CADWALADER ordered forward his brigade to support these attacks, again selecting the voltigeur regiment, and detaching them to the left for the important duty of protecting Lieutenant-Colonel Duncan's battery. In the first position taken for this purpose, the regiment remained under a very heavy fire, from which it suffered severely, about fifteen minutes.

"A large body of the enemy's cavalry then appearing on our left, the regiment was marched under a heavy and continuous fire of musketry, two or three hundred yards in that direction; and took position along the ravine which covered that flank of the army. Major Sumner, at the same time, crossed the ravine with his cavalry. By these movements, and an occasional shot from the battery, the enemy's cavalry was driven out of reach. The 1st and 2d companies of my regiment, commanded respectively by Lieutenants Fry and Kintzing, were then detached, under Major Caldwell, to intercept a retreating party of the enemy, a corresponding movement being made by Major Sumner, and the party in question killed or taken.

"The enemy's right being now driven from that part of the field, we were or-

dered to move to the right to join Colonel Garland's brigade; and marching under a direct fire of round shot from the enemy's battery at Chapultepec, we arrived in time to aid in defeating the enemy's last effort near the foundry. The regiment remained in position, on Colonel Garland's left, by his order, until the withdrawal of the troops.

"A party of the enemy's cavalry, which appeared on our left, was driven off by the third company, commanded by Captain Blair, detached for that purpose under Major Caldwell's directions. The 8th company (Captain Edwards's) was detached, with the field-piece captured on the road near the foundry, to the one-gun battery in the road to Chapultepec, to which a party of our infantry advanced, where the piece was served by Captain Edwards's company until the party was ordered in by Colonel Garland, preparatory to his being relieved in his position by Colonel Ransom. The gun and ammunition were taken to this position, as well as withdrawn, by the men—no limber being found with the piece—and was taken from the field by another company (Captain Biddle's) of the regiment. After leaving the vicinity of the foundry, the regiment remained near the field, to protect the wagons employed in bringing off the wounded; that being done, it returned to Mixcoac and encamped."

Report of General Cadwalader.

subsequently taken from the field by Captain Biddle's company of the same regiment.

The attack was commenced at day-light upon the enemy's position, by the infantry of the 1st division. It soon after became necessary to support the centre, which I did, by advancing, in two columns, the 11th regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel Graham, on the right, and the voltigeur regiment, under Colonel Andrews, on the left. The enemy being in great force, in a very strong position, behind stone walls difficult to attack, well defended with artillery, and with continuous lines of infantry, resisted, for a time, the assault; but were compelled to give place to our troops, who ultimately occupied the whole line of their positions which defended the foundry, captured their batteries and a large quantity of ammunition, turning their own guns upon them, and driving them back into the fortress of Chapultepec, securing also a large quantity of grain and flour in the mill.

This result was greatly hastened by the efficient use of three pieces of field artillery, which were brought forward by Lieutenants Harley, McClelland and Scott, by order of Lieutenant-Colonel Graham, under a heavy fire from the enemy. A portion of the 11th regiment gained an entrance into the lower end of a building on the right, occupied by the enemy, where several Mexican officers surrendered, the commanding officer delivering his sword to Lieutenant Scott of the 11th regiment. In the mean time, Lieutenant R. H. Johnson, commanding company E, was killed by a musket ball, while most gallantly leading on his men. Lieutenant-Colonel Graham, although badly wounded in two places, and Lieutenants McCoy and Harley, and a portion of their command, pursued the enemy to the left; and, while leading an assault on a large and strongly fortified building still in the possession of the enemy, Lieutenant-Colonel Graham received two mortal wounds, of which he died in a few minutes, upon the field he had so gallantly assisted to win. Captain Irwin, although severely wounded, remained in command of his company as long as it was engaged; and Captain Guthrie was disabled by severe wounds.

Soon after the action commenced, four companies of the 14th regiment were also detached, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel P. O. Hebert, to support the assaulting party upon MOLINO DEL REY. A captured piece of artillery was fired, under the direction of Captain Glenn of that regiment, who was placed in charge of the same by Lieutenant-Colonel Hebert, until the ammunition was exhausted. Four moulds for casting cannon, found inside the building, were destroyed by Captains Hoffinan and Lovell, of the 6th infantry. A number of muskets, and some ammunition, were also destroyed.

The remainder of the 14th regiment, under the command of Colonel Trousdale, remained upon the field to support the artillery, during which time they were also exposed to the fire of the enemy from both cannon and musketry. In addition to the officers already named, I would particularly mention the services and gallantry of Lieutenant-

Report of General Cadwalader.

Colonel Johnston, Majors Caldwell and Talcott, of the voltigeur regiment, the latter of whom was wounded early in the action, but remained on the field during the day, and also Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert, of the 14th regiment. Captain Charles J. Biddle, of the voltigeur regiment, severely sick, left his bed at Mixcoac, when the firing began, and joined his company. Assistant-Surgeon Samuel D. Scott, of the 11th regiment, was active in his attention to the wounded on the field.

Assistant Adjutant-General George Deas, on duty upon my staff, was much exposed during the action; and by industry, coolness, and gallantry, rendered valuable service.

I forward herewith enclosed the separate reports of commanding officers of regiments, and also a return of the killed, wounded, and missing, on the occasion.

I am very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. CADWALADER,
Brig.-Gen. U. S. A. Comd'g.

To Captain W. W. MACKALL,
Acting Adj.-Gen. 1st Div., U. S. A.

CHAPULTEPEC.

GENERAL SCOTT'S REPORT OF THE STORMING OF CHAPULTEPEC.

Extracts from the Report of Major-General Scott, No. 34, dated
“HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY, National Palace of Mexico, Sept.
18, 1847.

* * * * *

[After stating that “the victory of the 8th at the MOLINOS DEL REY
“was followed by” reconnoissances “directed principally to the
“south—towards the gates of the Piedad, San Angel, (Niño Per-
“dido,) San Antonio, and the Paseo de la Viga;” the report pro-
ceeds thus:]

This city* stands on a slight swell of ground, near the centre of
an irregular basin, and is girdled with a ditch in its greater extent
—a navigable canal of great breadth and depth—very difficult to
bridge in the presence of an enemy, and serving at once for drain-
age, custom-house purposes, and military defence; leaving eight en-
trances or gates, over arches;—each of which we found defended by a
system of strong works, that seemed to require nothing but some
men and guns to be impregnable.

Outside, and within the cross-fires of those gates, we found, to the
south, other obstacles but little less formidable. All the approaches
near the city are over elevated causeways, cut in many places (to
oppose us) and flanked on both sides by ditches, also of unusual
dimensions. The numerous cross-roads are flanked in like manner,
having bridges at the intersections, recently broken. The meadows
thus checkered, are, moreover, in many spots, under water or
marshy; for, it will be remembered, we were in the midst of the
wet season, though with less rain than usual; and we could not wait
for the fall of the neighboring lakes and the consequent drainage
of the wet grounds at the edge of the city—the lowest in the whole
basin.

After a close personal survey of the southern gates, covered by

* *Note by the Committee.*—The city of Mexico.

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PILLOW's division and Riley's brigade of TWIGGS's—with four times our numbers concentrated in our immediate front—I determined, on the 11th, to avoid that net-work of obstacles, and to seek, by a sudden inversion to the south-west and west, less unfavorable approaches.

To economize the lives of our gallant officers and men, as well as to insure success, it became indispensable that this resolution should be long masked from the enemy; and again, that the new movement, when discovered, should be mistaken for a feint, and the old, as indicating our true and ultimate point of attack.

Accordingly, on the spot, the 11th, I ordered QUITMAN's division from Coyoacan, to join PILLOW, *by daylight*, before the southern gates, and then, that the two major-generals, with their divisions, should, *by night*, proceed (two miles) to join me at Tacubaya, where I was quartered with WORTH's division. TWIGGS, with Riley's brigade and Captains Taylor's and Steptoe's field batteries—the latter of 12-pounders—was left in front of those gates, to manœuvre, to threaten, or to make false attacks, in order to occupy and deceive the enemy. TWIGGS's other brigade (SMITH's) was left at supporting distance in the rear, at San Angel, till the morning of the 13th, and also to support our general depot at Mixcoac. The stratagem against the south was admirably executed throughout the 12th, and down to the afternoon of the 13th, when it was too late for the enemy to recover from the effects of his delusion.

The first step in the new movement was to carry CHAPULTEPEC, a natural and isolated mound, of great elevation, strongly fortified at its base, on its acclivities and heights. Besides a numerous garrison, here was the military college of the republic, with a large number of sub-lieutenants and other students. Those works were within direct gun-shot of the village of Tacubaya; and, until carried, we could not approach the city on the west without making a circuit too wide and too hazardous.

* * * * *

The bombardment and cannonade, under the direction of Captain Huger, were commenced early in the morning of the 12th. Before nightfall, which necessarily stopped our batteries, we had perceived that a good impression had been made on the castle and its out-works, and that a large body of the enemy had remained outside, towards the city, from an early hour, to avoid our fire, and to be at hand on its cessation, in order to reinforce the garrison against an assault. The same outside force was discovered the next morning, after our batteries had reopened upon the castle, by which we again reduced its garrison to the *minimum* needed for the guns.

PILLOW and QUITMAN had been in position since early in the night of the 11th. Major-General WORTH was now ordered to hold his

Report of General Scott.

division in reserve, near the foundry, to support PILLOW; and Brigadier-General SMITH, of TWIGGS's division, had just arrived, with his brigade, from Piedad, (two miles,) to support QUITMAN. TWIGGS's guns, before the southern gates, again reminded us, as the day before, that he, with Riley's brigade and Taylor's and Steptoe's batteries, was in activity, threatening the southern gates, and there holding a great part of the Mexican army on the defensive.

WORTH's division furnished PILLOW's attack with an assaulting party of some 250 volunteer officers and men, under Capt. McKenzie, of the 2d artillery; and TWIGGS's division supplied a similar one, commanded by Captain Casey, 2d infantry, to QUITMAN. Each of those little columns was furnished with scaling ladders.

The signal I had appointed for the attack was the momentary cessation of fire on the part of our heavy batteries. About 8 o'clock in the morning of the 13th, judging that the time had arrived, by the effect of the missiles we had thrown, I sent an aid-de-camp to PILLOW, and another to QUITMAN, with notice that the concerted signal was about to be given. Both columns now advanced with an alacrity that gave assurance of prompt success. The batteries, seizing opportunities, threw shots and shells upon the enemy over the heads of our men, with good effect, particularly at every attempt to reinforce the works from without to meet our assault.

Major-General PILLOW's approach on the west side, lay through an open grove, filled with sharp shooters, who were speedily dislodged; when, being up with the front of the attack, and emerging into open space, at the foot of a rocky acclivity, that gallant leader was struck down by an agonizing wound. The immediate command devolved on Brigadier-General CADWALADER,* in the absence of the senior brigadier (PIERCE) of the same division—an invalid since the events of August 19. On a previous call of PILLOW, WORTH had just sent him a reinforcement—Col. Clark's brigade.

The broken acclivity was still to be ascended, and a strong redoubt, midway, to be carried, before reaching the castle on the heights. The advance of our brave men, led by brave officers, though necessarily slow, was unwavering, over rocks, chasms, and mines, and under the hottest fire of cannon and musketry. The redoubt now yielded to resistless valor, and the shouts that followed announced to the castle the fate that impended. The enemy were steadily driven from shelter to shelter. The retreat allowed not time to fire a single mine, without the certainty of blowing up friend and foe. Those who, at a distance, attempted to apply matches to the long trains, were shot down by our men. There was death below, as well as above ground. At length the ditch and wall of the main work were reached;

* *Note by the Committee.*—See page 52, and the note at foot of pp. 52–3, post.

Report of General Pillow.

the scaling-ladders were brought up and planted by the storming parties; some of the daring spirits first in the assault were cast down—killed or wounded; but a lodgment was soon made; streams of heroes followed; all opposition was overcome, and several of our regimental colors flung out from the upper walls, amidst long-continued shouts and cheers, which sent dismay into the capital. No scene could have been more animating or glorious.

* * * * *

[The report then relates the operations on the south-east side of the fortress; where “Major-General QUITMAN was nobly supported by Brigadier-Generals SHIELDS and SMITH.”]

* * * * *

Besides Major-Generals PILLOW and QUITMAN, Brigadier-Generals SHIELDS, SMITH and CADWALADER, the following are the officers and corps most distinguished in those brilliant operations.

* * * * *

GENERAL PILLOW'S REPORT.

Extracts from the Report by Major-General Pillow of the Storming of Chapultepec.

HEAD-QUARTERS, 3D DIVISION U. S. ARMY,
Mexico, September 18, 1847.

CAPTAIN: On the morning of the 12th instant, at 3 o'clock, A. M., I moved with my command, consisting of the field battery of Captain Magruder, the voltigeur regiment, the 9th, 11th, 14th and 15th regiments of infantry, (the 12th regiment constituting part of the garrison at Mixcoac,) and the mountain howitzer and rocket battery, from Tacubaya to the battle-field of the 8th instant, where my dispositions were made to take possession of “Molino del Rey.” Having organized a force for this purpose, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hebert, at daylight, his command moved steadily and in beautiful order, under a hot fire of shot and shell, from Chapultepec, and seized the mills.

I ordered Brigadier-General CADWALADER, with his brigade, to hold possession of this position, and to defend the approaches (which unite at that place) from the city of Mexico and from Santa Fe. In a short time afterwards, an immense body of lancers, with a considerable

Report of General Pillow.

rable force of infantry, made their appearance in the valley above me, and moved steadily forward in the direction of my position, until almost within reach of my field-pieces. With Brigadier-General PIERCE'S brigade, Magruder's battery, and Major Sumner's fine command of dragoons, (that officer having now reported to me for duty,) I made every arrangement for their reception. Having thus executed the orders of the general-in-chief, "to take possession of the mills, to hold them, and from this position defend the batteries intended to be opened, preparatory to the assault upon CHAPULTEPEC and not to provoke a general engagement with the enemy," I did not, under my orders, feel myself at liberty to become the assailant; and the enemy regarding prudence as "the better part of valor," did not think proper to assail me.

At night, I drew my whole force down to the mills, immediately under the fire, and almost under the walls of CHAPULTEPEC; while the enemy advanced from the valley and occupied the position I had held during the day, close in my rear.

Being now almost completely enveloped by the enemy, with CHAPULTEPEC and its strong garrison immediately in my front, and the enemy's large force of lancers and infantry in close approximation to my rear and on my left flank, my command was compelled to lay on its arms during the night.

Early on the morning of the 13th, Captain McKenzie, 2d artillery, reported to me for duty, with a command of 260 rank and file from the 1st division.

At daylight, the cannonade, which had ceased at dark on the previous day, was resumed, and kept up on both sides until about 8 o'clock. In the meantime, I was actively engaged in making the necessary preparations for storming CHAPULTEPEC. With this view, I had placed two pieces of Magruder's field-battery inside the extensive row of buildings (of which the mills were a part) to clear a sand-bag breast-work, which the enemy had constructed outside the main wall surrounding CHAPULTEPEC, and so as to command a breach in the wall. I had also passed the howitzer battery through the houses and walls of the mills, and placed it in battery, so as to aid me in driving the enemy from a strong entrenchment extending nearly across the front of the forest, and commanding my only approach to CHAPULTEPEC. While these batteries were admirably served under Captain Magruder and Lieutenant Reno, I placed four companies of the voltigeur regiment, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Johnston, in position, with instructions, that, upon the cessation of the artillery fire, they should advance by a rapid movement on the outside, and under cover of the main wall, and to enter the enclosure at the breach. At the same time, I placed four other companies of voltigeurs, under command of Colonel Andrews, at a narrow gateway opening from the rear of the mills, with orders to advance in front, to unite with Colonel Johnston's command, to deploy as skirmishers, and, by a simul-

Report of General Pillow.

taneous movement upon the enemy's flank and front, to drive him from his entrenchments and the large trees behind which he had taken shelter. I had placed the 9th and 15th regiments of infantry in position, to advance, as close supports to the storming force, and, if necessary, to form a part of it.

I had ordered Colonel Andrews, as soon as the regiment of voltigeurs had cleared the entrenchments and woods, to form in rear of McKenzie's command, as a supporting or assaulting force, according to the exigencies of the moment. I placed Captain McKenzie's command immediately in rear of Colonel Johnston's command of skirmishers, and directed it to move under the cover of the same wall, to enter the breach close after Johnston's command, and, as Johnston would brush away the enemy, it would advance steadily, assault, and carry the main work of CHAPULTEPEC. I had placed my scaling ladders in charge of this command, and furnished a strong detail of men to carry them forward to the parapet.

I directed Lieutenant Reno to carry with the advancing column the mountain howitzer battery, and to use it whenever he could do so with effect.

I had placed Colonel Trousdale, with the 11th and 14th regiments, and one section of Magruder's battery under command of Lieutenant Jackson, on the road leading on the left of CHAPULTEPEC to the city, with instructions to advance on that road, to hold the enemy stationed at the battery on the road in *observation*, and to give him battle if he attempted to advance or succor the forces within the walls of CHAPULTEPEC.

Having completed these dispositions for the assault, while a heavy cannonade was going on, Brigadier-General CADWALADER was directed* to see to the proper execution of my orders.

All being now ready and eager for the conflict, I ordered the batteries of my division silenced, and the command to advance—the general-in-chief having silenced the heavy batteries.

The voltigeurs having driven the enemy from the wood, rapidly pursued him until he retreated into the interior fortifications. Close in their rear, followed the 9th and 15th regiments, with equal impetuosity, until these three regiments occupied the exterior works around the summit of CHAPULTEPEC.

Captain McKenzie's command had not yet come up. The 5th, 6th, and 8th regiments of infantry of General WORTH's division, ordered forward as a reserve, advanced to their positions and formed. As soon as Captain McKenzie's command was in position with the ladders, the work was almost instantly carried, and the Mexican flag

* *Note by the Committee.*—See post, p. 52, and note to pp. 52-3, also ante, p. 46.

Report of General Pillow.

torn from the castle by the gallant Major Seymour, of the 9th regiment, and the American run up in its place.

To the voltigeur regiment belongs the honor of having first planted its colors upon the parapet. The color-bearer of the regiment having been shot down, the color was immediately seized by the gallant and fearless Captain Barnard, who scaled the parapet and unfurled the flag, under a terrible fire, from which he received two wounds.

The chief honor of this brilliant victory is due to those gallant corps, the voltigeurs, the 9th and 15th regiments of infantry, who drove the enemy from his exterior entrenchments and positions, took possession of and enveloped the crest of the counterscarp, and held this position under a heavy fire of grape, canister, and round shot from the enemy's artillery, (11 pieces in number,) and a very superior force of small arms, until the arrival of the ladders; and to Captain McKenzie's command, who brought up the ladders, and, with the corps already mentioned, so gallantly stormed and carried the main works.

* * * * *

I was ably sustained and assisted during the day by Brigadier-General CADWALADER, whose activity, courage, and high military talents have already distinguished him on other fields, but upon none more than this. I take pleasure in testifying my high sense of obligation to him, and to his chivalric adjutant-general, Capt. George Deas.

* * * * *

We took about 800 prisoners, among whom were Major-General BRAVO, Brigadier-Generals MONTERDE, NONEGA, DORAMENTES, and SALDANA; also, 3 colonels, 7 lieutenant-colonels, 40 captains, 24 first, and 27 second lieutenants.

* * * * *

I have General BRAVO's own account of the strength of his command, given me only a few minutes after he was taken prisoner. He communicated to me, through Passed Midshipman Rogers, that there were upwards of 6,000 men in the works and surrounding grounds. The killed, wounded and prisoners, agreeably to the best estimate I can form, were about 1,800, and immense numbers of the enemy were seen to escape over the wall on the north and west side of Chapultepec.

My own force *actually* engaged in storming the work did not exceed 1,000 men.

* * * * *

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL CADWALADER.

HEAD-QUARTERS, 2^D BRIGADE, 3^D DIVISION,
City of Mexico, September 18, 1847.

SIR:—In compliance with orders from division head-quarters, I have the honor to report the operations of my command on the 12th, 13th and 14th instant, in the attack upon CHAPULTEPEC, and the subsequent advance upon the CITY OF MEXICO.

Before daylight, on the morning of the 12th instant, I marched from Tacubaya, to the west side of the fortress of CHAPULTEPEC, and formed my command, with the other brigade of this division, upon the plain, for the purpose of attacking and occupying Molino del Rey, preparatory to the attack upon CHAPULTEPEC.

At daylight, two companies of the regiment of voltigeurs, under the command of Captain James D. Blair, and M. J. Barnard, were advanced, and extended, as they approached Molino del Rey, supported by four companies of the 14th regiment, the whole under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel P. O. Hebert, who occupied and held the position, (you having previously reconnoitred the north side of the enemy's position,) and passed down the whole front before Molino del Rey, to draw the fire of the enemy, and ascertain his strength and position as the troops advanced. Our siege guns kept up a fire upon CHAPULTEPEC during the day. The remainder of my command, with other troops, remained upon the plain, to hold in check large forces of the enemy, (principally cavalry,) which threatened our flank and rear.

On the morning of the 13th instant, after the fire of the siege guns had ceased, by direction of Major-General PILLOW, the mountain howitzer battery, under the command of Lieutenant Reno, attached to the regiment of voltigeurs, opened a fire upon the enemy posted behind some field-works, on the north side of the wood, to the westward and near the foot of CHAPULTEPEC, commanding the meadow over which our troops were to approach.

The fire of the battery was very effective, although much exposed to the fire of small arms from the enemy, and from shells from the heavy guns from the fort, which exploded among them, doing some injury also to the 9th and 15th regiments, drawn up in rear of the wall, and awaiting the moment to commence the assault.

To cover the advance of the storming party, under Captain Macenzie, after the howitzer battery had cleared the space in front, four companies of the regiment of voltigeurs, under Colonel Andrews, moved forward, and drove the enemy from the corn-fields, meadows, and woods, on the west side of CHAPULTEPEC. At the same moment, four companies of the same regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Johnston, advanced from Molino del Rey, under cover of the south wall, under a brisk fire from the lunette, covering the breach, by which

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they were to pass the wall, driving the enemy from the parapet, following him through the gorge, and driving him from the woods and hill-side, into the works, and carrying the two outworks on their right. Here they were joined by Lieutenant Reno, with two of the mountain howitzers, and by the other wing of the same regiment.

The 9th regiment, under Colonel Ransom, and the 15th regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Joshua Howard, which had been ordered to support the movement, pressed forward.

Major-General PILLOW having been wounded at the foot of the hill,* by his direction, I went forward with the attacking forces, upon the west flank of the hill.

I regret extremely to say, that, whilst in the act of heroically leading his regiment up the heights of CHAPULTEPEC, Colonel Truman B. Ransom, the gallant and efficient commander of the 9th regiment, was killed by a ball which penetrated his brain, the command of the regiment devolving upon Major Thomas H. Seymour.

The troops experienced some delay upon the heights, for want of the scaling ladders; and I detached men from the advancing commands to bring them forward.

* *Note by the Committee.*—Extracts from the report of Lieutenant-Colonel Howard, commanding the 15th regiment. "At this point, General Pillow received a wound, which disabled him, and rendered it impossible for him further to lead the charge; but, receiving his personal order to that effect, we continued the charge up the hill." * * * *

* * * *

"The colors of the regiment were waving from the top of the castle in less than thirty minutes from the time the order was given by General Pillow, at the base of the hill, for the regiment to ascend." Major Seymour, commanding the 9th infantry, reported, that the castle was "carried by storm, about half an hour from the commencement of the action.

General Pillow, in an official communication lately printed in the New Orleans Picayune, states, that he was

wholly disabled from duty by this wound. From the time that General Pillow received it, Brigadier-General Cadwalader appears to have led the 3d division of the army, until after the storming and surrender of the fortress, when General Pillow, though suffering severe pain from his wound, was carried forward to the top of the hill. Brigadier-General Pierce, the second officer in rank of the division, in his report, referring to the evening of the 12th of September, writes:—"I was compelled to leave the field, in consequence of severe indisposition, which confined me to my bed during the 13th, and, of course, deprived me of the satisfaction of participating with my brigade in the glorious achievements of that day. The regiments composing my command, having acted under the immediate orders of the general commanding the division, and Brigadier-General CADWALADER, I would re-

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The 6th and 8th infantry, and the New York volunteers, at this time moved forward, and pressed closely upon the rear of the regiments already named.

The detachments of the voltigeur regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Johnston, and two pieces of the mountain howitzer battery, under Lieutenant Reno, had previously advanced, passing round to the right, to the main gate, to attack at that point, and prevent the escape of the garrison, where they encountered a warm fire from the parapet of the east terrace, and the battery at its base, which works were soon reduced—Lieutenant Reno and his guns being again very efficient. I regret to add, that he was severely wounded, at the gateway, after having rendered very important services.

The moment the ladders were in position, all pressed forward, and the fortress was taken by storm, amid the loud cheers of our energetic and gallant troops.

Second Lieutenant Charles B. Brower, of the New York volunteers,* brought General BRAVO, the commander of the enemy's forces, to me, who surrendered to me his sword; and I left him, under a suitable guard, as a prisoner of war.

The Mexican flag, which floated over the fortress, and which had been previously three times shot down by our artillery, was hauled

"spectfully refer you to the reports of the latter officer, and those of the commanders of the above-named regiments, for an account of their operations of the 13th." (See General SCOTT's Report, ante, p. 46.) The report of General PIERCE further states, that he returned to the field on the 14th, when he was detached from the 3d division, and was concerned, with a portion of his brigade, in the operations under Major-General QUITMAN, at the Garita Belen, where he remained until after the surrender of the city, when, having received orders from head-quarters to that effect, he withdrew his command for the purpose of garrisoning the towns of Mixcoac and Tacubaya."

Brigadier-General CADWALADER ap-

pears to have retained the command of the 3d division, until after the close of the active operations of the campaign.

* *Note by the Committee.*—After General CADWALADER had thus received the sword of General BRAVO, his surrender was reported by Lieutenant Brower to Major-General QUITMAN, of whose division the New York regiment was a part. General QUITMAN commends this regiment as the first corps of his division, who, from its side of the hill, planted a standard on the battlements. "Side by side," he writes, "the rival colors of the two commands struggled up the steep ascent, entered the fortress, and reached the buildings * * * which crowned its summit."

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down, and handed to me, by Major Thomas H. Seymour, of the 9th regiment. I have the honor to send the flag herewith.

A train, or hose, leading to mines intended to blow up our forces, in case we should succeed in the capture of the work, was discovered, and destroyed. Private William A. Gray, of Captain Blair's company of voltigeurs, first discovered, and assisted to destroy it.

Previously to the commencement of the attack upon CHAPULTEPEC, the 14th infantry, five companies of the 11th infantry, and a section of Captain Magruder's battery, were placed, by order of Major-General Pillow, under the command of Colonel Trousdale, at the northwest corner of the buildings adjacent to CHAPULTEPEC, occupied by our troops, in observation of a cavalry force of the enemy in our rear, and with orders to attack any retreating force, dislodged from CHAPULTEPEC, by the road to the north.

Colonel Trousdale subsequently advanced from this position, with the 14th regiment and the section of the field battery; and soon encountered a heavy and destructive fire from a battery of two guns in a work across the road to the north of CHAPULTEPEC, at which time he received a severe wound, from two balls, in his right arm. Colonel Trousdale, however, remained with his command, until he succeeded in carrying the battery and guns of the enemy, and then turned over the command to Lieutenant-Colonel Hebert. I refer you to his separate report in regard to the detachment under his command.

[This report of Brigadier-General CADWALADER is continued, without omission, on the next page, under the head of SAN COSME GATE. The committee, in order to carry into effect the resolution of the company, are obliged thus to divide it at the conclusion of the storming and surrender of CHAPULTEPEC.]

SAN COSME GATE.

By way of introduction to the documents which follow, the Committee insert the following additional extract from General SCOTT's Report, No. 34.

“There are two routes from Chapultepec to the capital—the one on the right entering the same gate, BELEN, with the road from the south, via Piedad; and the other obliquing to the left to intersect the great western, or San Cosme road, in a suburb outside of the GATE OF SAN COSME.

Each of these routes (an elevated causeway) presents a double roadway on the sides of an aqueduct of strong masonry, and great height, resting on open arches and massive pillars, which, together, afford fine points both for attack and defence. The sideways of both aqueducts are, moreover, defended by many strong breastworks at the gates, and before reaching them. As we had expected, we found the four tracks unusually dry and solid for the season.

WORTH and QUITMAN were prompt in pursuing the retreating enemy—the former by the SAN COSME aqueduct, and the latter along that of BELEN.”

OFFICIAL REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL CADWALADER.

This is the remaining part of the dispatch of which the previous portions are contained in the last four pages. What follows is in direct continuation from the point at which it was suspended on page 54.

The division commanded by Major-General WORTH, after the capture of CHAPULTEPEC, pushed forward after the enemy in retreat to the

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city by the San Cosme road. A party of the 14th infantry, under the command of Captain Glenn, with Lieutenants Blackburn, Davis and Isaacs, that had become detached from their regiments in pursuit of the enemy, joined, and acted with, the command of General WORTH, in its advance, and capture of the battery and garita of SAN COSME.

Major-General QUITMAN moved forward with his division upon the road to the city, by the garita de BELEN, and the 9th regiment was ordered forward to unite with his command.

After making some hasty arrangements in regard to securing the prisoners in the fortress,* and placing the necessary guards to secure the captured ammunition, I received orders to march with the regiment of voltigeurs and the howitzer battery, (to the command of which Captain Edwards was assigned, after Lieutenant Reno was wounded,) and the 11th and the 14th infantry, upon the arrival of the siege train from Tacubaya, under Captain Huger, in support of General WORTH's division, upon the San Cosmé road.

The 15th regiment was left to garrison Chapultepec. I moved forward, with the voltigeur and 11th regiments, and the howitzer battery, leaving the 14th regiment to bring on the siege train as soon as it arrived.†

On our arrival at the intersection of the road from Chapultepec with the San Cosmé road, I was ordered by General WORTH to occupy a fort to the left, upon that road, his division being engaged with the enemy's forces in front, a portion of which had moved round, and were threatening that flank. I ordered forward the regiment of voltigeurs for that purpose; and, observing an advanced position suitable for a picket, I directed one gun from the howitzer battery, and Captain Biddle's company of voltigeurs, to move forward and occupy it. Lieutenant Isaac J. Stephens, of the engineers, rode forward with me to examine the work, and I regret to say that, under a heavy fire from a party of the enemy, he was wounded severely.

The fire from Captain Biddle's company, and a few discharges from the howitzer, soon drove back the enemy.

I subsequently sent forward the regiment of voltigeurs, by direction of General WORTH, and also five of the guns of the howitzer battery, under Captain Edwards, which did good service from the

* *Note by the Committee.*—Chapultepec.

† *Note.*—Col. Andrews, of the voltigeurs, reports that "after the successful storming of the castle, and the prisoners were secured, the two battalions"

into which the regiment had been divided, "were united, and proceeded under General CADWALADER'S orders and personal direction, on the San Cosmé road, in pursuit of the flying enemy to this city."

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tops of the houses. The 11th regiment occupied the fort on the left, and a small detachment of the marine corps, under Captain Terrett, that had followed in pursuit of the enemy, occupied the position held by Captain Biddle, who proceeded with his regiment.

It is proper that I should mention here that the battalion of the marine corps had marched upon the route taken by General QUITMAN, after his detachment had moved forward upon the San Cosmé road in pursuit of the retreating forces of the enemy, and, in this manner, became separated from the rest of their command.

The 14th regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hebert, which had arrived, with the siege train, under Captain Huger, remained to support it. The garita of SAN COSME, and the garita de BELEN, two principal points of entrance into the city, having been gained by our troops, and night coming on, we remained, content with our position and the glorious result of the works of the day.

On the 14th, our troops moved forward, and occupied the principal positions throughout the city, the enemy having been entirely routed. The voltigeur regiment, and the howitzer battery, remaining with the command of General WORTH.

For many particulars which I cannot introduce into this report,* I refer to the separate reports of the commanding officers of regiments, herewith enclosed.

Lieutenant-Colonel Johnston, of the regiment of voltigeurs, was highly efficient in the responsible and important command assigned to him, receiving a slight wound on the occasion. Major Caldwell, on duty with the other wing of the regiment, was also much distinguished. Colonel Andrews speaks in high terms in his report of these officers, as well as of Captains Biddle, Blair, Barnard, Lieutenants Fry, Kintzing, Walker, Terrett, Tillton, Martin, and of Sergeants Herbert and Elliott. Lieutenant-Colonel Johnston also notices in his report that Captains Edwards, Howard, and Archer, and Lieutenant Forsyth, led their companies gallantly, and were seconded with spirit, by their Lieutenants, Larned, Cross, Swan, Kiger, and Cochrane, and Sergeant Togler.

Lieutenant Reno, of the howitzer battery, already mentioned, is justly spoken of in high terms, and also Sergeants Peate, Depew, and McGuire.

Sergeant Peate was badly wounded; and, I regret to say, has lost a leg in consequence of it.

* *Note by the Committee.*—The rest of the report refers to Chapultepec as well as to the operations which followed its surrender. The division of the report on pp. 54-5, renders this observation necessary.

Report of General Cadwalader.

Major Thomas H. Seymour, of the 9th infantry, was himself very active in the discharge of his duties. He mentions, in his report, 1st Lieutenant and Adjutant Charles J. Sprague, Lieutenant Fitzgerald, Captain Pitman, Captains N. L. Webb and E. A. Kimball, Lieutenants George Bower, Albert Tracy, John H. Jackson, John S. Slocum, and Levi Woodhouse, commanding companies; also Lieutenants Richard C. Drum, Asa A. Stoddard, John Glackin, Thomas P. Pierce, Thompson H. Crosby, Sergeant-Major Fairbanks, (the orderly of Colonel Ransom,) G. McGuiger, Sergeants White, Billings, E. F. Pike, Miller, Clarke, Barton, and Stone.

Lieutenant-Colonel Howard, in command of the 15th regiment, in consequence of the absence of Colonel Morgan, who had not recovered from the wound which he received at CHURUBUSCO, mentions the efficient services of Major Samuel Wood, Captains Chase and Hoagland, Lieutenants Bowie, Frelove, Miller, Marshall, and Sutton, commanding companies; 2d Lieutenants Becket, Beach, Bennett, Titus, French, and Peternell, and 1st Lieutenant and Adjutant T. F. Broadhead. Dr. James B. Slade, the surgeon of the regiment, is highly spoken of by the commanding officer, and was particularly noticed for the valuable services rendered by him. Lieutenant-Colonel Howard also recommends Sergeant Jonathan W. Jones, of the color guard, Sergeant-Major Thomas J. McKean, 1st Sergeant Samuel Ross, 1st Sergeant Fortunatus Lilly, as highly meritorious, and well qualified for promotion.

I desire particularly to report, for the information of the major general, that, after he was wounded, you continued with the advanced portion of the command, rendering most important services throughout the assault upon CHAPULTEPEC, and that subsequently you, as well as Lieutenant Ripley, his aid-de-camp, joined me, and continued with me, upon the San Cosmé road.

I was on this occasion again indebted to Captain George Deas, assistant adjutant-general to my brigade, for valuable assistance and services.

I enclose a list of the killed, wounded, and missing.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. CADWALADER,

Brigadier-General U. S. Army, commanding.

To Captain J. HOOKER,
A. A. General, 3d Division.

GENERAL WORTH'S REPORT.

*Extract from Major-General Worth's Report, dated HEAD-QUARTERS,
1ST DIVISION, City of Mexico, Sept. 16, 1847.*

* * * * *

The general-in-chief * * * * * instructed me to press on, carry the garita SAN COSME, and, if possible, penetrate to the Alameda. Shortly after Brigadier-General CADWALADER reported to me, by the order of the general-in-chief; and, later, between 8 and 9 P. M., Col. Riley, with the second brigade, 2d division. The former was left in position at the Campo Santo, to hold that point, and look to the left and rear. The latter, coming up after the firing had ceased, was halted in rear of the 1st division, and entered the city, with it, on the morning of the 14th.

Here we came in front of another battery, beyond which, distant some two hundred and fifty yards, and sustaining it, was the last defence, or the garita of SAN COSME. The approach to these two defences was in a right line, and the whole space was literally swept by grape, canister, and shells, from a heavy gun and howitzer; added to which, severe fires of musketry were delivered from the tops of the adjacent houses and churches. It hence became necessary to vary our mode of operations. Garland's brigade was thrown to the right, within and masked by the aqueduct, and instructed to dislodge the enemy from the buildings in his front, and endeavor to reach and turn the left of the garita, taking advantage of such cover as might offer, to enable him to effect these objects. Clark's brigade was, at the same time, ordered to take the buildings on the left of the road, and, by the use of bars and picks, burrow through from house to house, and, in like manner, carry the right of the garita. While these orders were being executed, a mountain howitzer was placed on the top of a commanding building on the left, and another on the church of San Cosme on the right, both of which opened with admirable effect. The work of the troops was tedious, and necessarily slow, but was greatly favored by the fire of the howitzers. Finally, at 5 o'clock, both columns had reached their positions, and it then became necessary, at all hazards, to advance a piece of artillery to the evacuated battery of the enemy, intermediate between us and the garita. Lieut.

Report of General Worth.

Hunt was ordered to execute this duty, which he did in the highest possible style of gallantry, equally sustained by his veteran troops, with the loss of one killed and four wounded, out of nine men, although the piece moved at full speed over a distance of only one hundred and fifty yards; reaching the breastwork, he became muzzle to muzzle with the enemy. It has never been my fortune to witness a more brilliant exhibition of courage and conduct. The moment had now arrived for the final and combined attack upon the last stronghold of the enemy in my quarter. It was made, by our men springing, as if by magic, to the tops of the houses into which they had patiently and quietly made their way with the bar and pick, and to the utter surprise and consternation of the enemy, opening upon him, within easy range, a destructive fire of musketry. A single discharge, in which many of his gunners were killed at their pieces, was sufficient to drive him in confusion from the breastworks; when a prolonged shout from our brave fellows announced that we were in possession of the garita of SAN COSME, and already in the CITY OF MEXICO.

* * * * *

GENERAL SCOTT'S REPORT.

[The Committee conclude this collection with the following additional extracts from General Scott's Report, No. 34, of which extracts have been given on pp. 44 to 47 and 54.]

* * * * *

Deeming it all-important to profit by our successes, and the consequent dismay of the enemy, which could not be otherwise than general, I hastened to dispatch, from Chapultepec—first Clarke's brigade, and then CADWALADER's, to the support of WORTH, and gave orders that the necessary heavy guns should follow. PIERCE's brigade was, at the same time, sent to QUITMAN, and in the course of the afternoon, I caused some additional siege pieces to be added to his train. Then, after designating the 15th infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Howard—Morgan, the colonel, had been disabled by a wound at Churubusco—as the garrison of Chapultepec, and giving directions for the care of the prisoners of war, the captured ordnance and ordnance stores, I proceeded to join the advance of WORTH, within the suburb and beyond the turn at the junction of

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the aqueduct with the great highway from the west to the gate of SAN COSME.

At this junction of roads, we first passed one of those formidable systems of city defences, spoken of above; and it had not a gun!—a strong proof—1, that the enemy had expected us to fail in the attack upon Chapultepec, even if we meant anything more than a feint; 2, that in either case, we designed, in his belief, to return and double our forces against the southern gates, a delusion kept up by the active demonstrations of TWIGGS and the forces posted on that side; and 3, that advancing rapidly from the reduction of Chapultepec, the enemy had not time to shift guns—our previous captures had left him, comparatively, but few—from the southern gates.

Within those disgarnished works, I found our troops engaged in a street fight against the enemy posted in gardens, at windows and on house-tops—all flat, with parapets. WORTH ordered forward the mountain howitzers of CADWALADER's brigade, preceded by skirmishers and pioneers, with pick-axes and crow-bars, to force windows and doors, or to burrow through walls. The assailants were soon in an equality of position fatal to the enemy. By 8 o'clock in the evening, WORTH had carried two batteries in this suburb. According to my instructions, he here posted guards and sentinels, and placed his troops under shelter for the night. There was but one more obstacle—the SAN COSME GATE (custom-house) between him and the great square in front of the cathedral and palace—the heart of the city; and that barrier, it was known, could not, by daylight, resist our siege guns thirty minutes.*

* *Note by the Committee.*—In January, 1848, General SCOTT forwarded to the war department a communication from General WORTH, containing observations by General WORTH on this part of General SCOTT's report. General WORTH observes, *first*, that it was not in the *suburbs* (meaning obviously that it was in the *city*, see ante, page 60,) that his command was quartered for the night. He adds, "2d, that before 6 o'clock, my command had carried the gate (or custom-house) of SAN COSME, captured the cannon which defended it, and turned them upon the flying enemy. 3d, that one of my brigades quartered, that night, several hundred yards within the gate, and my head-quarters with it, the pickets and patrols being

"advanced to a church, * * * more than half-way from the gate SAN COSME to the Alameda; the other, and Riley's brigade, quartered, for convenience, at and by the gate." Having thus mentioned the "night position of his troops," General WORTH adds, "By 8 o'clock, the heavy guns, a mortar, and 24 pounder, were got up from the far rear, and before 9, opened upon the great plaza; said guns being in battery at the SAN COSME GATE, the firing of which brought out" the Commissioners, who endeavored to negotiate terms for the surrender of the city, and who were passed, in charge of a staff officer, to the general-in-chief, at Tacubaya. General WORTH also objects to the position given to his troops in a

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[After a detail of the successful progress of General QUITMAN's division at the BELEN or south-eastern gate of the city, the report of the General-in-chief proceeds as follows]

* * * * *

At about 4 o'clock next morning, (September 14,) a deputation of the *ayuntamiento* (city council) waited upon me to report that the federal government and the army of Mexico had fled from the capital, some three hours before, and to demand terms of capitulation in favor of the church, the citizens, and the municipal authorities. I promptly replied, that I would sign no capitulation; that the city had been virtually in our possession from the time of the lodgments effected by WORTH and QUITMAN the day before; that I regretted the silent escape of the Mexican army; that I should levy upon the city a moderate contribution, for special purposes; and that the American army should come under no terms, not *self-imposed*—such only as its own honor, the dignity of the United States, and the spirit of the age, should, in my opinion, imperiously demand and impose.

For the terms, so imposed, I refer the department to subsequent general orders, Nos. 287 and 289, (paragraphs 7, 8, and 9, of the latter,) copies of which are herewith enclosed.

At the termination of the interview with the city deputation, I communicated, about daylight, orders to WORTH and QUITMAN to advance slowly and cautiously (to guard against treachery) towards the heart of the city, and to occupy its stronger and more commanding points. QUITMAN proceeded to the great *plaza* or square, planted guards, and hoisted the colors of the United States on the national palace—containing the halls of Congress and executive apartments of federal Mexico. In this grateful service, QUITMAN might have been anticipated by WORTH but for my express orders, halting the latter at the head of the *Alameda*, (a green park,) within three squares of that

diagram of the field, to which reference had been made in the report of the general-in-chief.

General Scott, in transmitting this communication, endorsed upon it a memorandum, in which he observed that he had committed an error in his report, in stating that the gate of SAN COSME was not passed by WORTH's division in the evening of the 13th of September; adding, "That gate was the second bat-

tery carried by the division, and I "gave the division credit for having "passed *two*." As the extracts from General WORTH's report, inserted on pages 59, 60, do not include his relation of the occurrences subsequent to his first entrance at the GATE OF SAN COSME, in the afternoon, the Committee think the insertion of this note necessary, in connection with the portion of General SCOTT's report to which it applies.

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goal of general ambition. The capital, however, was not taken by any one or two corps, but by the talent, the science, the gallantry, the prowess of this entire army. In the glorious conquest, *all* had contributed—early and powerfully—the killed, the wounded, and *the fit for duty*—at VERA CRUZ, CERRO GORDO, CONTRERAS, SAN ANTONIO, CHURUBUSCO, (three battles,) the MOLINOS DEL REY, and CHAPULTEPEC—as much as those who fought at the gates of BELEN and SAN COSME.

Soon after we had entered, and were in the act of occupying the city, a fire was opened upon us from the flat roofs of the houses, from windows and corners of streets, by some two thousand convicts liberated the night before by the flying government—joined by, perhaps as many, Mexican soldiers, who had disbanded themselves and thrown off their uniforms. This unlawful war lasted more than twenty-four hours, in spite of the exertions of the municipal authorities, and was not put down till we had lost many men, including several officers, killed or wounded, and had punished the miscreants. Their objects were, to gratify national hatred; and in the general alarm and confusion, to plunder the wealthy inhabitants—particularly the deserted houses. But families are now generally returning; business of every kind has been resumed; and the city is already tranquil and cheerful, under the admirable conduct (with exceptions very few and trifling) of our gallant troops.

[The Committee have in a previous page (p. 7) inserted General Scott's recapitulation of the occurrences of August and September, 1847.]

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